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ABSTRAC'r 
Substitntion and Repn~sentat"i,~>n: 
Patterns of thought 
in Christian Atonement Theology 
David Jonathon Peter Hewlett 
This thesis examines the use of the terms 
Substitution and Representation as they are foLmd to 
occur in Christian Atonement Theology. It is a theolog-
ical investigation into the use of the terms, in order to 
establish their meaning and the relation between them. 
Both terms are first subjected to a phenom-
enological enquiry in order to disclose the various 
patterns of thought in which the terms fLmction and which 
they help to generate. The part played by the terms 
within these different contexts, together with the models 
they espouse, are then critically analysed and evaluated. 
In this way the full complexity of the terms Substitution 
and Representation is examined, the appropriateness of 
their range of meanings tested, and the part they play 
in Christian Atonement Theology determined. 
To test the adequacy and accuracy of this 
analysis a more detailed study is made of the work of 
D. Salle, Christ the Representative. Her place within 
the continuing debate surroLmding the terms is established, 
and more light is shed on the use and meaning of the 
terms Substitution and Representation. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Purpose of the Thesis 
This thesis is an attempt to answer the question 
'what do the terms substitution and representation mean 
when they are used in the context of Christian atonement 
theology?' The initial impulse that prompted this study 
of the terms substitution and representation was provided 
by the following passage found in the translators' preface 
to the opening volume of K. Barth's Church Dogmatics on 
the doctrine of reconciliation and which comments on the 
difficulty of the term Stellvertretung: 
Stellvertretung ... enshrines the notions both 
of representation and substitution, and never 
the one without the other. Representation by 
itself is particularly inadequate as a rendering, 
though this aspect is present, and the word is 
used more often perhaps than it ought to be in 
view of the prevailing prejudice against 
substitution. In most cases the latter is both 
fuller and truer, but, as the text discloses, it 
is given a sense more radical than is normally 
the case in English, because Barth envisages it 
as a total displacement of sinful man by the 
incarnate, crucified and risen Son; and also 
more comprehensive, because it is r~ated to the 
whole life and work of Jesus Christ, including 
His heavenly intercession (1). 
A number of questions are immediately ~aised by 
these comments. What is the nature and force of this 
'prevailing prejudice against substitution'? What is the 
meaning of the term representation, so that despite being 
/-·-._ ')• 
,- -: ~- ~ 
\• . ---·· .. 
'> I / • 
\" '· '·-· 
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'particularly inadequate' it may be reluctantly used as 
a more acceptable alternative to the term substitution? 
What is the relation between the terms substitution and 
representation, what 'aspects' are signified by the 
respective terms, such that both may be 'enshrined' in a 
single term with 'never the one without the other'? These 
questions indicate, at least jn a preliminary way, the need 
for a closer study of the terms substitution and represent-
ation and the relation between them. However, two problems 
are immediately encountered which hinder any attempt to 
clarify their respective meanings. 
First, leaving aside any specific theological 
meaning the terms might have, in their everyday use their 
meaning is often very similar so that it is difficult to 
locate precisely where any distinction might lie that will 
assist in clarifying their theological meaning (2). For 
example, there are numerous circumstances where an act by 
proxy can be appropriately described by either of the words 
substitution or representation: a speaker standing in for 
another as his substitute and representing him; a foster 
parent substituting for the absent parent yet also repres-
enting them; a delegate representing a group of people and 
yet in some sense acting as the substitute for each indiv-
idual. In each case the terms substitution and represent-
ation are both appropriate, although there are equally 
clearly situations where both terms are not appropriate. 
A substitute in a football team cannot be described as a 
representative; an ambassador represents his country but 
it would be unusual to describe hj_m as a substitute for 
that country; a lawyer represents a client in court but 
the term substitute would only be used reluctantly and 
with care. In other words, there seems to be much common 
ground shared between the two terms in which their meanj_ngs 
are very similar - a common ground usually indicated by 
dictionaries as expressing the sense of standing in the 
place of another - but there is also the recognition that 
there are differences in meaning between the two terms 
which is conveyed by an unease with certain inappropriate 
uses, despite the fact that it is hard to articulate 
precisely the basis for their divergence. 
Second, when it comes to the theological use of 
the terms substitution and representation the problem lies 
in the fact that both terms have become to a greater or 
lesser extent 'keywords' or 'theological labels' (3). 
These labels come to characterise certain patterns of 
thought, and can be used to evoke them, despite the fact 
that in addition to the close resemblances within these 
patterns of thought there may also be important divergences. 
Because the terms become keywords for these patterns of 
thought, not only may significant points of difference be 
overlooked, but also the many layers of meaning which each 
term can express may be ignored. For example, the desig-
nation 'penal substitution' is familiar, but even a cursory 
examination will show that as there are significantly 
different theories of punishment so also there may be 
significantly different theories of penal substitution. 
Moreover, what if there are substitutionary theories of 
the atonement which explicitly exclude the notion of 
punishment? Are these, as some would claim, no longer 
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th(_'oritcS of stJbstitntion? What happ~-ms to thP keyword 
substitntion when this divergence is recognised? Equally, 
the same is true for theories of representation. What is 
the point of contact between a view of the representative 
work of Christ in which Christ initiates a ministry 1trhich 
all his community must perpetuate, and that view of the 
representative ~rk of Christ in which Christ is the 
inclusive Man, the one who performs the work of all 
humanity? These varying LlSes of the terms have yet to be 
demonstrated and described, but it will be one of the main 
arguments of this work that the 'keywords' substitution 
and representation, far from being simple and readily 
intelligible terms, conceal or embody many different mean-
ings which render them extremely complex terms, demanding 
careful analysis. 
Some Recent Discussions of the Terms 
It might be thought that the discussion of these 
two terms would have been exhausted, particularly given 
the history of_ the term substitution and the controversy it 
has aroused. However, a brief examination of a number of 
recent writers who specifically consider the two terms 
will serve to demonstrate the need for a study of the terms 
that recognises their complexity and attempts to unravel 
the many different meanings which each term is capable of 
bearing. 
L. Morr~s, a large part of whose writing has been 
devoted to studies of the atonement, opens his discussion 
of the terms with the observation that the term represent-
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ative 'seems to mean much the same as substitutionary, but 
without quite the same clarity' ( 4). However, along with 
a number of other writers he argues that the distincti_ve 
meaning or reference of the term representation belongs in 
the sphere of 'personal delegation', a context that is said 
decisively to rule out the term as being 'unsuitable for 
Christian theology' (5). In this respect Morris is no 
doubt accepting the view of J. Denney that a 'representative, 
in all ordinary circumstances, is provided or appointed by 
those whom he represents, and it is practically impossible 
to divest the term of the associations which this involves, 
misleading as they are in the present instance'(6). 
However, only a few pages later Morris quotes with approval 
the view of R. Ottley that 'Christ was our substitute 
in virtue of his representative character as the head and 
flower of our race, in whom humanity is "summed up"' (7), so 
seeming to accept a use of the term representation without 
explanation or comment. To complete the confusion 
Morris proceeds to outline the 'Biblical view of substitution' 
where substitution is reckoned to be 'inclusive', so that 
Christ's work may be described as a 'representative and 
inclusive substitution' (8). Morris' somewhat cavalier 
treatment of the term representation, in contrast to the 
more sensitive and careful attention given to the term 
substitution, would seem to indicate that there is a 
'prevailing prejudice' to be found against the former term 
as much as the latter. 
The same objections can be levelled against 
J. Packer (9), whose work on the language of substitution 
wiLL be given careful study in the next chapter, but 
despite his recognition of the complexity of theologjcal 
language, particularly interpretative terms like substit-
ution, no such recognition is accorded to the term 
representation. Packer accepts Denney's view of the 
significance of a representative, although he does recognise 
that there is 'in addition to this rather specialised usage' 
a sense in which a representative 'involves others, for 
good or ill, in the consequences of what one does' (10). 
It is in this sense that Jesus can be called the 
representative of humanity. Packer, therefore, identifies 
four reasons for dismissing the term representative 'as 
both confusing and confused': 
... first, that we chose Christ to act for us, 
second that the death we die in him is of the 
same order as the death he died for us, and third, 
that by dying in Christ we atone for our sins -
all of which are false. Here now is a further 
reason for rejecting the proposal - namely, that 
it misses or muffs the point that what Christ 
bore on the cross was the Godforsakeness of penal 
judgement which we shall never have to bear 
because he accepted it in our place (11). 
Thus, Packer is prepared to accept that the term represent-
ation conveys some idea of the relation between Christ and 
humanity, although he defines that only in terms of the 
consequences that Christ's work has for humanity, and that 
the two ideas 'representation and substitution are comple-
mentary, not alternatives' (12). 
Unfortunately, the advocates of the term 
representation are often equally culpable in failing to 
treat seriously the complexity and nuances of meaning that 
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are present in the concept of substitution, preferring 
instead to attack what is asswned to be a self-evident 
moral and theological absurdity. As A.Beacock comments on 
the work of H. A. Hodges: 
He groups under the heading 'substitutionary' 
or 'vicarious' atonement all theories which 
contain this idea in one form or another. Yet 
when he is criticising them he seems to have in 
mind a particular theory, and a rather crude 
one at that, of penal substitution (13). 
In contrast to the term substitution advocates of the term 
representation would wish to express at least one of the 
following elements in their use of the term. First, the 
sense of persohal presentation before God in Christ, as 
A. Richardson indicates when he comments that 'a substitute 
takes or usurps our place whereas a representative keeps 
it open for us, acts on our behalf and causes us to be 
present where in fact we cannot personally appear' (14). 
Second, the term representation may express the sense that 
the work of Christ is not something independent of man, 
but something to be 'owned and appropriated' (15). Third, 
the term representation may be used to express the convict-
ion that Christ's work does not consist in a bearing of 
punishment, but in an offering of holiness, obedience or 
confession on behalf of man. As P. T. Forsyth puts it: 
I should, therefore, express the difference 
between the old view and the new by saying that 
the one emphasises substitutionary expiation 
and the other emphasises solidary reparation, 
consisting of due honour of God's holiness, and 
the honouring of that and not of his honour (16). 
Finally, in this preliminary examination of the 
recent discussion of the terms substitution and 
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representation mention should bE made of two works which 
deaJ more exclusively in this matter. The first discussion 
is to be found in an article by G. Mather entitled 'The 
Atonement: Hepresentative or ~~ubstitutionary?' (17). Mather 
suggests that both terms 'may be properly regarded as 
different emphases of the same fundamental truth' ( 18) · 
He examines the work of L Morris as an advocate of the term 
substitution and V. Taylor for a presentation of the concept 
of representation. Having omlined the position of both 
writers he concludes that the two terms 'far from being 
exclusive, are in fact complementary' (19). Each term 
expresses a 'necessary aspect of the whole truth' (20), so 
that the issue between them hinges upon the following 
question: 
To what degree does the believer undergo the 
experience of Christ and reproduce this work? 
In so far as the experience and work of the 
believer are the same or similar, the sacrifice 
of Christ will be spoken of in terms of 
representation; in so far as they are different, 
it will be spoken of in terms of substitution. 
Representation emphasises similarity: substit-
ution emphasises dissimilarity (21). 
Mather's work contains a useful description of the use of 
the terms substitution and representation by Morris and 
Taylor, but his conclusion that the terms are complementary 
is premature in the light of the fact that the account of 
the terms given by no means exhausts their possibilities 
and certainly does not represent an adequate basis on which 
to determine their respective meanings and roles. 
The second discussion of the terms is found in 
the work of D. Salle entitled 'Christ the Representative' 
(22). Because of the importance of this work for the 
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present study, and because of her somewhat individuaJ 
approach to the subject, combining as she does the notion 
of a post-theistic theology with the concept of represent-
ation, a separate chapter is necessary to do her work 
justice. Chapter VI, therefore, will consist of a detailed 
account of her Hark, and an evaluation and critique of her 
argument. It will be shown that despite the distinctiveness 
of Solie's approach, there are none the less many points 
of contact between it and the patterns of thought that 
have been disclosed in the first part of this enquiry. 
Salle's work is therefore examined not only for the sake 
of an assessment of any contribution towards the clarif-
ication of the terms substitution and representation, but 
also as a test case for the adequacy and accuracy of the 
work contained in the main part of this study. 
The Method and Content of the Thesis 
The brief description of the terms substitution 
and representation given in the course of this introduction 
has indicated that any attempt to investigate their 
respective meanings in the context of Christian atonement 
theology must recognise and accommodate their complexity 
and variety of meaning. For this reason Chapters II and III 
will consist of a description of the terms substitution 
and representation, and the range of meanings that they 
are held to be capable of expressing. Chapter II will 
describe the full range of meanings that may be comprehended 
in the term substitution, to be followed in Chapter III by 
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a similar exercise with respect to the term representation. 
Both chapters consist of phenomenological studies of the 
terms, drawing on the work of theologians both past and 
present, adducing illustrations to demonstrate patterns of 
meaning that are appropriate to both terms. These 
illustrations are not intended to represent an adequate or 
complete account of the thought or work of any particular 
theologian, but simply to describe and illustrate the range 
of meanings accorded to both terms. 
An obvious objection to the pattern of this 
investigation may be formulated as follows: is not every 
use of the terms, substitution and representation, context-
specific, not merely in relation to a theologian's own 
thought but also to his own times? Would not instances of 
the terms substitution and representation occurring in the 
minds of theologians vary according to different social 
contexts? Indeed they would, and if the purpose of this 
thesis were exhaustively to document the use of the terms 
over their entire history the absence of detailed 
consideration of their social contexts would be a fatal 
objection to its methodology. 
But, in fact, the resources of historical theology 
are available for use in ways other than historical study. 
Such is the nature of Christian theology that theologians 
of the past are taken to be our contemporaries; and it is 
as diverse instances of the contemporary use of the terms 
substitution and representation that reference will be 
made to theologians of the past. By a 'phenomenological 
study of the terms' is meant, in this instance, the 
0 
occurrence of the terms 1n present ~irculation, including 
those which derive from the selective use of the past by 
contemporary theology. 
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Because the primary concern of the thesis is with 
the terms substitution and representation themselves, 
severe restriction is placed on the use of literature of 
other languages. A study of equivalent terms in other 
languages would have been revealing, but impossible within 
the limits of this thesis. However, the quotation with 
which this introduction began, commenting on the difficulty 
of the term Stellvertretung demonstrates the relevance of 
this study for other languages. Clearly, where a work 
exists in translation the terms substitution and represent-
ation, where used, are taken as further examples of their 
range of meanings, although it is not thereby claimed that 
the author's intention or meaning has been comprehensively 
considered. 
On the basis of this description of the full 
range of meanings of both terms there can take place an 
evaluation and assessment of the various patterns of 
meaning that have emerged. Because this descriptive study 
reveals that both terms are in fact reckoned to express a 
range of meanings that transcend any simple distinction 
between the two terms, Chapters IV and V '"ill undertake the 
task of evaluation in a different form. Chapter IV will 
consider and assess the ways in which both the terms 
substitution and representation express the meaning of the 
work of Christ and their function in this context. 
Chapter V will consider and assess the ways in which both 
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terms ftmction in the context of a description of the 
relation between Christ and mankind. The reasons for this 
division of the material will become clear as the study 
proceeds, but it ensures that the terms are treated in 
their full complexity and that their full range of meanings 
are recognised. As has already been mentioned, Chapter VI 
consists of a detailed analysis and critique of Salle's 
work 'Christ the Representative', in order to determine 
the particular contribution she makes to the discussion of 
the terms. The concluding Chapter VII summarises the 
findings of the enquiry and offers some comments on their 
significance for Christian atonement theology. 
CHAPTER II 
PATTERNS OF SUBSTITUTION IN CHRISTIAN ATONEMENT THEOLOGY 
Introduction 
The term substitution has for some time been 
the subject of considerable theological odiwn, to such an 
extent that in 1948 F. W. Camfield, himself wishing to 
defend the use of the term, could say: 
If there is one conclusion which had come almost 
to be taken fer granted in enlightened Christian 
quarters it is that the idea of substitution has 
led theology on a wrong track; and that the word 
'substitution' must now be dropped from the 
doctrine of the atonement as too heavily laden 
with false and even misleading connotations (1). 
The situation cannot be said to have altered largely today (2). 
Before beginning this enquiry into the theol-
ogical meaning and use of the term substitution it may 
help to outline some non-theological uses of the word. 
The most common and general use of the word is its 
description of a replacement or the act of replacement 
that takes place in a sports team. The substitute in this 
context replaces an injured or inadequate member of the 
team, who, as a result, has no further part to play. This 
act of substitution describes a straightforward exchange, 
although it should be noted that this exchange only takes 
place within the clearly defined limits and rules of a 
game. A second use of the word substitution carries 
different connotations: ersatz products, coffee or tobacco 
substitutes, replace a genuine product but are intended 
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to fulfil the same purposes, either more cheaply or 1n 
some other sense as an improvement on the original. A 
substitute product is thus different in some sense but 
equivalent in another. This notion of equivalence in 
association with the term substitution is also an integral 
feature of certain technical uses of the word in logic, 
medicine and ciphers, where a different expressj_on or 
product may be substituted for another because it functions 
as an equivalent. Finally, the notion of replacement comes 
to the fore when the term substitution is used, as it was 
in the American Civil war, to describe a man hired to 
replace a drafted man. This was the same as the French 
system of rempla¥ant, where the term substitute described 
either the replacement or the fee that could be paid to 
avoid the draft. 
Thus, the non-theological uses of the term 
substitution can be characterised by the concepts of 
exchange, replacement and equivalence, and while some uses 
of the term are only appropriate to things, others are 
applicable to people in specific circumstances. As an 
introduction to the theological uses of the term substit-
ution these examples are instructive, but it is readily 
apparent that any theological use gives the term a more 
specific content by employing it in specific contexts and 
in association with particular theologica1 concepts. 
To anticipate the results of this chapter it 
will be shown that the term substitution stands in 
relation to a cluster of widely divergent ideas and that it 
functions as an interpretative too~ emp1oyed to articulate 
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and or~er theological materia] in order to establish and 
preserve central and formative relations within this 
diverse material. This study can therefore be said to 
demonstrate in a practical sense the main contention of 
J. I. Packer, who argues more theoretically and abstractly 
for an understanding of this interpretative function of 
the term (3). It will therefore be helpful to outline the 
main points of Packer's argument, not because it provides 
the basis for the study which follows, but because it 
complements and highlights one of its conclusions. 
Packer focusses on two characteristics of theol-
ogical thought. First, the character of God's reality 
and work as mystery: 
... a reality distinct from us which in our very 
apprehending of it remains unfathomable to us: 
a reality which we acknowledge as actual without 
knowing how it is possible, and which we 
therefore describe as incomprehensible (4). 
Second, when this dimension of 'mystery' is recognised 
and respected it will become evident that ordinary 
language is 'stretched' when attempts are made to speak of 
these mysteries (5). Theological language consists1 
therefor~ of models, which are 'analogies with a purpose', 
functioning in a particular way to 'inform us about our 
relationship with God and through the Holy Spirit enable 
us to unify, clarify and intensify our experience in that 
relationship' (6). Within Christian theology different 
types of model are to be found: the control models of 
scripture, the dogmatic models of the Church, and the 
interpretative models, like that of substitution, standing 
'between Scripture and defined dogma ... for stating the 
faith to contemporaries' (7). 
Because Packer recognises thE interpretative 
status of the term substitution he can, first, distinguish 
the term from the context of penalty, although he believes 
this to be a correct 'qualifier' (8); second, it allows 
him to locate and define the concept of substitution within 
a pattern of diverse and wide ranging theological criteria, 
so that their Lmi ty and clarity may be apprehended ( 9). 
Thus, Packer chides those who have seen the concept of 
substitution in a 'rationalist' (10) way as though it 
explained 'how' the work of Christ saves men (ll). On 
the contrary, Packer believes that as an interpretative 
tool the function of the term is to express and bring to 
our awareness central Christian experiences and insights, 
namely the fact of 'the remission of my sins ... to 
correlate my knowledge of being guilty before God with my 
knowledge that ... no question of my ever being judged 
for my sins can now arise' (12). 
Whether Packer is correct in the particular 
interpretative function he assigns to the term substit-
ution will be questioned, but his analysis of the term 
as an interpretative tool operating in the context of 
differing qualifiers will be confirmed by the phenomen-
ological study of the term which follows in this present 
chapter. In the first section the use of the term 
substitution will be considered in the context of the 
term 'penalty', illustrating the variety of motifs and 
ideas that can be grouped under the general heading 'penal 
substitution'. In section 2 the use of the term sub-
stitution will be considered in the context of ideas of 
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pubJic order or i~OVt'rnnH-:::n t. Tltt-' Gull~ of thr'-' rnateria_! of 
this ;:hapter vJj l! be found within these two :sect ions since 
these contexts provide the norma] and most controversial 
occasions for the use of the term substitution. 
Sections 3 and 4 illustrate the use of the term 
substitution in the context of non-penal descriptions 
of satisfaction and in the context of descriptions of a 
conflict with the powers of evil. The latter context in 
particular contributes little to an understanding of the 
term substitution but both sections point up possible 
areas of confusion and the ability of the term to function 
in diverse circumstances. Finally, in section 5, the use 
of the term substitution is considered in the context of 
the idea of 'inclusiveness', thus illustrating a different 
and surprising use of the term. 
l. Substitution in the Context of 'Penalty' 
There can be no doubt that it is due to the 
association of the terms substitution and penalty that the 
former term has come to be castigated as 'sub-Christian' 
and immoral ( 13). The force with which this posi ti(ll1 has 
been both attacked and defended has led many to consider 
the term substitution solely within the particular 
context of such ideas and has helped to create the illusion 
that the phrase 'penal substitution' describes a single or 
self-evident conceptual framework (14). In reality the 
situation is very different. First, as shall be seen 
the association of substitution and penalty constitutes 
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only on~ out of a nwnber of r!ontextuaJ frameworks for the 
qualification and interpretation of the term substitution. 
Second, the material of this section will demonstrate 
that even within the description 'penal substitution' 
there is room for significant diversity (15). It will 
become evident that the concepts described by the phrase 
'penal substitution' can respond to critical pressure or 
to insights that are generated by the concepts themselves, 
thus bringing about change in the pattern of theological 
ideas which may still remain under the increasingly 
diffuse and complex description of 'penal substitution'. 
It will be one of the tasks of this section to clarify 
these different patterns of penal substitution by pointing 
up the differences that are to be found between them. It 
should be noted that no attempt will be made to trace or 
to argue for a particular historical development of these 
different patterns, even to locate the causes for such 
a development. The only concern of this section is to 
demonstrate and describe with precision the different 
patterns of thought that can be expressed under the 
heading 'penal substitution'. 
Before proceeding with a description of these 
different patterns it should be remembered that the des-
ignation 'penal substitution' is a comparatively recent 
addition to theological terminology (16). It is well 
known that the Reformation writers largely took over the 
existing vocabulary revolving around the term satisfaction 
which continued to provide the key element in atonement 
theology despite a change of context. As late as 1886 
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A. A. HodgE could prPf~r to ~rganjs~ his work on the 
atonement around the term sat isfactj_on, pointing out that 
the terms substitution and vicarj_ous were ambiguous and 
open to a number of inadequate and misleading definitions 
(17). The term substitution is used comparatively 
infrequently before the 19th century, with terms like 
'sponsor' or 'surety' being preferred (18). 
ThP accoLmt of the use of the term substitution 
in the context of penalty begins with the following 
quotations from the work of W. G. T. Shedd: 
In every instance of transgression the penalty 
of law must be inflicted, either personally or 
vicariously; either upon the transgressor or 
upon his substitute. The remission of penalty 
under the divine administration is not absolute 
but relative. It may be omitted in respect to 
the real criminal, but, if so, it must be 
inflicted upon someone in his place. . .. Justice 
necessarily demands that sin be punished, but 
not necessarily in the person of the sinner (19). 
The same thoughts are given clear expression by J. Owen: 
God may give to everyone his own, or what is due 
to every one, in the infliction of punishment, 
although he do not inflict it on sinners them-
selves, but on their surety, substituted in their 
room and stead (20). 
This form of expression of the concept of penal 
substitution is characterised by the logical and 
consistent development of three basic propositions. First, 
God is conceived as a just law-giver. This propositi~n 
is illustrated, again by Shedd when he says: 
All true scientific development of the doctrine 
of the Atonement, it is very evident, must take 
its departure from the idea of divine justice. 
This conception is the primary one in the Biblical 
representation of this doctrine ... we shall 
find that just in proportion as the mind of the 
Church obtained a distinct and philosophic 
conception of this great attribute, as an absolute 
and necessary principle in the divine nature, 
and in human nature, was it enabled to specify 
with distinctness the real meaning and purport 
of the Redeemer's Passion, and to exhibit the 
rational and necessary grounds for it (21). 
Second, transgression of God's law must be met 
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with punishment. 1. Berkhof writes that pun:Lshment 
c1enotss: 
(that] pain or loss which is directly or 
indirectly inflicted by the Law-giver, in 
vindication of His justice outraged by the 
violation of the law. It originates in the 
righteousness or punitive justice of God, by 
which He maintains Himself as the Holy One and 
necessarily demands holiness and righteousness 
in all His rational creatures. Punishment ... 
is, in fact, a debt that is due to the essential 
justice of God (22). 
Shedd expresses the relation between transgression and 
punishment with customary directness when he says: 
Retributive justice is necessary in its operation. 
The claim of the law upon the transgressor for 
punishment is absolute and indefeasible. The 
eternal Judge may or may not exercise mercy, but 
He must exercise justice (23). 
Third, God is merciful and loving towards sinrers 
in that He permits a substitution, so that their due 
punishment falls not on the guilty, but on their substitute. 
J. Owen remarks that: 
Christ dying for us as a surety . . . being made 
a curse for us, was an undergoing of death, 
punishment, curse, wrath, not only for our good, 
but directly in our stead; a commutation and 
subrogation of his person in the room and place 
of ours, being allowed and of God accepted (24). 
Chapter IV of this thesis will deal in more 
detail with the analysis and criticism of this model of 
penal substitution; for the moment it is necessary simply 
to continue with its description. This may best be done 
by focussing on some of the shifts in meaning that can 
take place even within the framework of thought designated 
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by the phrase 'penaJ substitution'. By examining th~ 
different senses in which Christ's work is said to be 
penal or to have a penal reference, it will be demonstrated 
that the phrase 'penal substitution' describes a rangP of 
conceptions such that any serious consideration of 'the 
theory of penal substitution' must recognise this internal 
diversity and any subsequent criticism must respect the 
fact that different expressions of this theory are not 
equally vulnerable to any particular critique. 
The first understanding of the term penal in the 
phrase 'penal substitution' to be considered involves the 
close association of the concepts of penalty, punishment 
and suffering. If suffering is the dominant feature of 
punishment then interest may well be focussed on the 
thought of the physical or spiritual pain suffered by 
Christ. Of course, a choice made between speaking of 
Christ's physical or of his spiritual torment may already 
reflect a divergence in thought as to the role of suffering· 
in this particular punishment. Many writers who wish to 
speak of Christ suffering the punishment of sinners may 
well regret the language of S. Charnock, who writes that 
God was: 
desirous to hear Christ groaning, and see him 
bleeding ... He refused not to strike him that 
He might be well pleased with us; quenched His 
sword in the blood of His Son that it might be 
for ever wet (25). 
Instead, it is more probable that while not forgetting the 
physical pain suffered by Christ, it is some form of 
spiritual anguish which is seen to constitute his real 
suffering (26). 
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Further, i_f suffc=:ring is taken to be a fundamental 
characteristic of pLmishment, interest may wel] be focussed 
on the amount of suffering endured. Once Li. has been 
accepted that Chrjst's substitution consists in his 
receiving the punishment for our sins, then of necessity 
it must be asserted that he really does suffer that 
identical punishment, or else both a rational and consist-
ent basis for God's forgiveness will be abandoned and the 
Christian's certainty of his liberation from punishment 
will be taken away (27). In other words it is necessary 
that Christ's sufferings are seen to be the same in kind 
and extent as the penalty that was due to the sinners 
themselves. This can be seen in a relatively undeveloped 
manner in Calvin, particularly in his exposition of 
Christ's descent into Hell. 
Nothing had been done if Christ had only endured 
corporeal death. In order to interpose between 
us and God's anger, and satisfy his righteous 
judgement, it was necessary that he should feel 
the weight of divine vengence .... Like a sponsor 
and surety for the guilty, and, as it were, 
subjected to condemnation, he undertook and 
paid all the penalties which must have been 
exacted from them, the only exception being, 
that the pains of death could not hold him. 
Hence there is nothing strange in its being 
said that he descended to Hell, seeing he endured 
the death which is inflicted on the wicked by an 
angry God. . .. Not only was the body of Christ 
given up as the price of redemption, but ... he 
bore in his soul the torures of condemned and 
ruined man ( 28). 
J. Owen is more specific when he says that: 
. . . if God laid the punishment of our sins upon 
Christ, certainly it was the punishment that was 
due to them; mention is everywhere made of a 
commutation of persons, the just suffering for 
the unjust, the sponsor for the offender ... 
but of a change of punishment there is no 
mention at all (29). 
Owen translates the language of pecLmiary debt from 
'things real' to 'things personal' and argues that there 
are two possible ways of seeing satisfaction (30): 
First, by a solution, or paying the very thing 
that is in the obligation, either by the party 
himself that is boLmd, or by some other in his 
stead: as, if I owe a man £20, and my friend 
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goeth and payeth it, my creditor is fully sat-
isfied. Secondly, by a solution, or a paying of 
so much, although in another kind, not the same 
that is in the obligation, which by the creditor's 
acceptation stands in the lieu of it; upon which 
also, freedom from the obligation followeth, not 
necessarily, but by virtue of an act of favour 
( 31) . 
It is on this choice, between an identical payment and 
a token that is accepted as a favour that Owen states his 
case agains~ Socinus (32). 
However, although the language of an i d ,:,nt icaJ 
payment may be said to be logically and evangeJically 
most rigorous and consistent, the dif~iculties involved 
in su~h a concept proLpt the use of a more subtle idea, 
that of equivalence. 'Substitution excludes idsntjty 
of suffering: it clo'-'S 11~'! excl ur! ,_, equivalence' , 
1\. H. Stron~ a1:, ueQ ( 33), following the statement of 
W. G. T. Shedd that: 
. . . a golden eagle is worth a thousand copper 
cents. The penalty paid by Christ is strictly 
and literally equivalent to that which the sinner 
would have borne, although it is not identical. 
The vicarious bearing of it excludes the latter 
( 34) . 
Thus, by employing the language of equivalence, the rigour 
and consistency of the argument of penal substitution 
appears to be sustained, while the precise nature of 
Christ's suffering is left Lmstated. How then are Christ's 
sufferings constituted an equivalent? Primarily because 
of the 'dignity' consequent upon the Lmion of the divine 
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\·lj th the hLUnan in Christ ( 35). Tlw r\ ignjty of' the subject 
;~s the di vine-hLUTian person rend en:: such hmnan sufferings 
of the highest possible value, such that they more than 
canst it ute an equivalent to th,:; sufferings clue to sinful 
hLUTiani ty. Owen relates this divine chgni ty to the dur-
ation of the sufferings of Christ: such sufferings, 
although taking place only in a 'limited season', could 
fully satisfy divine justice (36). Shedd, too, believes 
that the suffering of Christ: 
... contains the element of infinitude, which is 
the element of value in the case, with even 
greater precision than the satisfaction of the 
creature does; because it is the suffering of a 
strictly infinite Person in a finite time, while 
the latter is only the suffering of a finite 
person in an endless, but not strictly infinite 
time (37). 
The notion of equivalence functions in response 
to the Socinian critique that there was no intrinsic value 
to the sufferings of Christ or to the satisfaction he is 
said to have made. However, an increasing reticence can 
be detected in the use of this concept to indicate a 
quantifiable amount of suffering and it comes instead to 
express simply the certainty that what Christ has accom-
plished is both adequate and appropriate for the 
satisfaction of God's justice. That there is a tension 
between the stricter, more logical language of an identical 
substitution and this ambivalent and ambiguous use of the 
concept of an equivalent substitution can be shown by the 
discussions to be found in the work of A. A. Hodge and 
C. Hodge (38). Both are seen to be theologians struggling 
to express a notion of equivalent substitution that falls 
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neither into the shee1· implausibility and the difficulties 
associated with thP language 'Jf J iteral identity of 
ptmishment, nor j_nto the inadequacies of a substituted 
punishment that b(_,ars no relation to the penalty that the 
sinner ought to have borne. A. A. Hodge writes that 
Christ: 
... did not render a pecuniary satisfaction, and 
therefore did not suffer the same degree or 
duration, nor in all respects the same kind, of 
sufferings which the law would have inflicted on 
the sinner in person. But he did suffer the very 
penalty of the law - that is, sin was punished 
in him with strict rigour of justice. His 
sufferings were no substitute for a penalty, 
but those very penal evils which rigorous justice 
demanded of this exalted person, when he stood 
in our place, as a full equivalent of all that 
was demanded of us. The substitution of a divine 
for a human victim necessarily involved a change 
in the quality, though none whatsoever in the 
legal relations, of the suffering (39). 
C. Hodge is even more ambivalent, for although 
he recognises that justice demands 'a real satisfaction', 
he also sees that Christ did not suffer an 'exact guid 
pro quo, so much for so much', but that his suffering and 
death were 'adequate to accomplish all the ends designed 
by the punishment of the sins of men' (40). In fact, when: 
... we say that Christ's sufferings were penal ... 
we say nothing as to the nature or the degree of 
the pains which He endured. We only say ... that 
they were designed for the satisfaction of justice 
( 41). 
However, Hodge realises that such a statement could be 
misunderstood, so he immediately adds: 
... 'it is not to be inferred from this, however, 
that either the kind or degree of our Lord's 
sufferings was a matter of indifference ... He 
would not have suffered as He did, nor to the 
degree He did, unless there had been an adequate 
reason for it .... There must be enough of 
self-sacrifice and suffering to give dignity and 
inherent value to the proffered atonement (42). 
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Both A. A. Hodge and C. Horlge oscillat~ between 
the thought of the intrinsic value of Christ's sufferings 
as constituted by his dignity as a di11ine human person, 
and the value of Christ's sufferings as determined by 
God's acceptance of them as an adequate and full satis-
faction of His justice. In other words, it would appear 
to be the case that for the logical or rational pattern 
of thought which speaks of the satisfaction of God's 
justice through the infliction of a substituted penalty 
it is essential that this is in all strictness and rigour 
our penalty falling on another; but, the problems of 
conceiving of an identical penalty falling on another 
lead to statements which assert the equivalence of Christ's 
penalty to that which should have been endured by sinners 
themselves where such statements can be sustained only 
by an appeal both to an intrinsic worth and to an extrinsic 
worth determined solely by God. Thus, what might have 
appeared as a rational and logical pattern of thought 
is found to contain ambiguities that cast doubt on the 
very principle inv0lved in the notion of a substituted 
penalty which fully satisfies justice in all its legal 
demands (43). 
By focussing on the concept of penalty, and 
seeing the different ways in which penalty is seen to be 
related to Christ's substitution, a variety of patterns 
of thought has been disclosed, all of which fall under 
the heading of penal substitution but which in fact 
express quite different understandings of Christ's 
substitutionary work. However, the discussion so far has 
been confined to the narrow understanding of penalty and 
justic~ as exemplified by the three propJRitions listed 
above, but it is quite apparent that the language of penal 
substitution can be sustained even in a very different 
conceptual framework. This is the case when the concept 
of penalty is associated directly with death rather than 
witb suffering or punishment although tbe resulting pattern 
of substitution is still described as penal substitution 
(44). The association of penalty and death has two 
consequences. 
First, it facilitates understanding that Christ 
did in fact suffer the penalty for sin. If sin and death 
are 'indissolubly united' (45), in the sense of a 'cause' 
and an 'effect' (46), then the death of Jesus must have 
a direct reference to sin. Sin issues in death, for that 
is the consequence of a Holy God (47). 
God, as the One who is separated personnally 
from man, is the angry One: the necessary effect 
of this separation is the opposite of the effect 
of personal communion with God, absolute disaster, 
death in the pronounced human sense (48). 
Therefore, Jesus, by his death, fulfilled the holy will of 
God which decrees that sin issues in death, so that because 
he came 'to die our death' (49) God's love 'breaks through' 
(50) his wrath and he may forgive without denying His 
holy nature. 
Second, the association of penalty with death 
allows for a change in perspective on how it is that 
Jesus' undergoing of death satisfies God. God is satisfied, 
not because an equivalent quantity of pm1ishment deserved 
by sinners has been meted out to Christ, but because 
God's holy nature has been confirmed that sin issues in 
death. For E. Brunner, because he retains the language 
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of penalty and equivalence, these consequences are Jess 
clearly visible, although the following statement reflects 
this change in awareness: 
The objective aspect of the Atonement, therefore, 
may be summed up thus: it consists in the 
combination of inflexible righteousness, with 
its penalties, and transcendent love; thus it 
means that the world-dualism caused by sin, 
which issues finally in death, is declared valid, 
and at the same time the overwhelming reality 
of the Divine Love is also justified (51). 
For J. De~r the change is more apparent: 
in His atoning work Christ is our Substitute. 
He enters into all the responsibilities that 
sin has created for us, and He does justice to 
them in His death. . .. In perfect sinlessness 
He consents even to die, to submit to that 
awful experience in which the final reaction of 
God's holiness against sin is expressed. Death 
was not His due: it was something alien to One 
who did nothing amiss. But it was our due, and 
because it was ours He made it His. . .. He died 
(for our sins], and in so doing acknowledged 
the sanctity of that order in which sin and 
death are indissolubly united ... for how could 
men be saved if there vv-ere not made in human:\ ty 
an acknowledgement of all that sin is to God, 
and of the justice of all that is entailed by 
sin under God's constitution of the world (52)? 
Despite the close association of this language 
with the penal language that has already been described, 
it is evident that there are differences which are not 
superficial, and the term substitution is required to 
reflect and express these changing conceptual frameworks. 
Another change in the conceptual framework for 
a penal understanding of the term substitution can be 
discerned in the work of W. Pannenberg, which deserves 
mention despite its individual character (53). The 
concept of substitution employed by Pannenberg is shaped 
by his hermeneutical presupposition that theological 
statements must be justified 'from the human course of 
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the event', not 'on the basis of the incarnation' (54). 
In other words, Pannenberg will not allow the theological 
claim of Christ's divinity to be employed as an explan-
ation of the rationale of the cross (55). Instead, 
Pannenberg gives distinctive content to the concept of 
substitution by understanding Jesus' death as the 
revelation of 'the punishment suffered in our place for the 
blasphemous existence of humanity' (56). Jesus is judged 
and condemned as a blasphemer, but his resurrection by 
God shows that this judgement is unjust and invalid, so 
that 'not he but the one who rejected him in the name of 
the law was the blasphemer' (57). This inversion of 
standards shows that those 'who rejected him as a blasphemer 
... were the real blasphemers' who 'rightly deserved the 
punishment that he received. Thus, he bore their punishment' 
(58). The logical problems raised by this use of the concept 
of blasphemy of which Christ's judges are guilty only after 
his resurrection have been well argued by H. Neie, but 
they are only of concern here to the extent that they 
indicate that Pannenberg's treatment of the problem has 
not indisputably clarified how it is that one may justly 
suffer the punishment due to another (59). Further, it 
should be noted, that although the concept of substitution 
may be legitimised in this way from the historical events 
of Jesus' death the penal aspect of the substitution 
receives little attention as the significance of this 
death is explored (60). 
Finally, although it might seem to be going 
beyond the boLmds set by the heading of 'penal substitution' 
it is instructive to note some uses of the term 
substitution in which a penal context is denied and yet 
which appears to be evoked by the demands of the concept of 
substitution itself. F. W. Camfield, in an article 
already cited, attempts to outline a non-penal theory of 
the atonement based on the thought of P. T. Forsyth that 
'not suffering, not death, not punishment, as such, but 
holiness' was the satisfying element in Christ's sacrifice 
(61). However, despite this intention, penal language 
reappears: 'The infliction and judgement which we could 
not bear, he bore for us' (62). Since the nature of this 
infliction is not specified further it remains unclear as 
to what part the concept of judgement is supposed to play 
in the satisfaction made by Christ (63). H. Neie detects 
in Moltmann's use of the term Stellvertretung (consistently 
translated as representation) a similar 'ambivalence' 
which arises because 'he too is arrested by the concept 
of God as the legislator who redeems intra legem' (64). 
Certainly such statements as 'God passes judgement on 
Himself, God takes the judgement on the sin of man upon 
Himself; He assigns to Himself the fate that men should 
by rights endure' (65), make use of a penal framework of 
thought, which Neie sees as creating an 'insoluble tension 
between the Christ and God who suffer out of love on our 
behalf and the God who suffers penally and vicariously the 
judgement on the unforgiveable sin and the unexpiateable' 
(66). Moltmann himself rejects as partial and inadequate 
the Jewish concept of expiatory sacrifice (67), but does 
not appear to have expunged such ideas from his own theology, 
perhaps because 'a judgemental connotation is ineradicably 
part and parcel of the understanding of Christ's suffering 
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within the framework of Luther's theologia crucis' (68). 
A similar ambiguity, which can only be touched 
on here, is the rejection by K. Barth of the concept of 
punishment as the 'main concept', and particularly as the 
means by which satisfaction is offered to the wrath of 
God - 'the latter thought is quite foreign to the New 
Testament' (69). With regard to the idea that 'we are 
spared punishment by what Jesus Christ has done for us' 
Barth argues that 'the New Testament statements concerning 
the passion and death of Jesus Christ are not at all or 
only indirectly in this direction' (70). None the less, 
as a recent discussion has demonstrated (71), some 
confusion is created because Barth still continues to 
construe the atonement within the 'framework' taken from 
the 'sphere of the law' (72), and thus would appear to 
employ a penal understanding of substitution. 
Summary and Observations 
In this first section attention has been focussed 
on the penal context of the term 'substitution', a context 
that for many indelibly characterises the term, so that to 
speak of substitution a penal framwork of thought is 
automatically evoked. It remains to be seen in the rest 
of this chapter how far it is true that the concept of 
substitution is tied to this penal framework, but for the 
moment some points can be noted in summary of the material 
so far investigated. 
First, it has been demonstrated that within a 
penal framework of thought there are a number of significant-
ly different understandings of the concept of substitution, 
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with such 'theories' diffPring not just in emphasis, but 
in fundamental areas respecting the nature and purpose of 
penalty together with the manner of substitution that is 
appropriate to these different understandings. It is not 
just a difference of emphasis that sees, on the one hand, 
penalty being inflicted on the substitute Christ so that 
God's wrath may be mercifully diverted, and on the other 
hand, as the upholding of the moral order of the universe. 
Neither i~ it an insignificant variation that some see 
Christ as suffering the precise penalty that would have 
fallen on the sinners themselves; others see Christ as a 
suitable equivalent so that the demands of God's laws are 
fulfilled in a way that God Himself decrees to be fitting; 
others again see Christ substituting himself for men so that 
the validity of the law is demonstrated and God's 
government upheld. All of these variations are, and can 
be, described to a greater or lesser extent under the 
heading of penal substitution, but as the term 'penal' 
expresses different meanings and insights, so too the term 
'substitution' comes to be associated with different 
patterns of thought and so carries with it these different 
associations. 
Second, it follows from this divergence that 
different expressions of penal substitution are not 
necessarily equally vulnerable to points of criticism. It 
does not clarify the situation, nor does it do justice 
to the complexity of the issues, to seize on the least 
palatable expression of penal substitution in order to 
dismiss it as sub-christian, and thus claim to have 
disposed of the problem. 
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Third, doubt has been cast on the claim that 
the conceptual framework of penal substitution offers in 
itself a rational explanation of Christ's saving work, 
since the notion of penal substitution can only be sub-
stantiated by an appeal to the idea of equivalence, not 
to the literal identity of Christ's substitution. Any 
use of the idea of equivalence, however, necessitates 
some form of appeal to God who decrees or accepts that 
there is indeed an equivalent. In other words, the logic 
of penal substitution is not to be found in a 'closed 
system', explicable in its own terms as a consistent 
explanation of Christ's saving work, for at its heart 
there is found to lie an appeal to God to accept this 
particular substituted work, which can be advanced on 
rational grounds only in the sense that it is somehow 
'fitting', but which ultimately is seen to be a pure act 
of grace. 
Fourth, it would appear to be the case that even 
in cases where those wishing to use the term 'substitution' 
dissociate it from a penal context, the term may carry 
with it that understanding, which then reappears without 
examination, or it may evoke that context in the minds of 
others and so create confusion. 
Thus, the results of this section investigating 
the use of the term substitution in the context of concepts 
of penalty may be summed up by saying that the 'theories 
of penal substitution' describe a range of interpretations 
as to the nature of the penalty said to be involved in 
Christ's substitutionary work, and so also describe a 
range of perceptions as to the content and meaning of the 
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term substitution itself. Such theories shade almost 
imperceptibly into theories that are claimed to be non-
penal, and they share signficantly in presuppositions that 
extend beyond the confines of any particular definition 
of penal substitution. It is this latter point that must 
now receive further consideration and illustration under 
the heading of 'substitution in the context of public 
order'. 
2. Substitution in the Context of Public Order 
In the previous section it was demonstrated 
that the language of penal substitution could accommodate 
expressions concerning Christ's death where his sufferings 
were seen as the means of preserving the order of God's 
government. This was not necessarily seen to contradict 
the principle statement that God's government is preserved 
precisely because it is our penalty that is suffered, 
but the ambiguous use of the concept of equivalence can be 
seen to open up the possibility of conceiving of God being 
satisfied through a means other than the literal penal 
substitution of Christ in the place of the sinner (73). 
The origin of this development is associated with the name 
of Hugo Grotius (74), despite the fact that Grotius saw 
himself as defending the orthodox doctrine of satisfaction 
(75). The 'theory' linked with his name, the 'Governmental' 
theory of the atonement, which was quickly seen by the 
orthodox to pose a serious threat, could be developed 
because Grotius' treatment of the satisfaction made by 
Christ regarded his sufferings not as the penal consequence 
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of our sin as administered by the law but as demonstrating 
an act of deference to the law, an act which is substituted 
in place of the punishment of offenders so that God's 
righteousness is proved as effectively as would have been 
the case had offenders received their punishment (76). 
In other words, Christ does not suffer penalty instead of 
us, in the sense of bearing the just desert of our sins, 
bearing our punishment, but rather his suffering is 
substituted for our puniSf@ent, replacing punishment, but 
meeting the same ends (77). This is a subtle distinction, 
but its force may be discerned more clearly by considering 
the conceptual transformation that is involved from two 
perspectives. 
First, the mncept of law is changed so that the 
appropriate understanding is no longer governed by the 
practice of criminal law, which is taken to demand 
retribution in the form of punishment, but instead by the 
demands of public order or rectitude. Sin violates the 
moral order of the universe, which is in itself an 
expression of God's order or holiness, so sin is a 
challenge to God's government. It would be perfectly 
just of God to punish the offender as a way of upholding 
the sanctity of his law and as a way of maintaining that 
order by deterring others, but there is no necessity which 
compels God to act in this way. God is not bound by the 
law, precisely because it is His law and therefore serves 
Him and the community which He governs (78). Rather, 
God is free to forgive so long as the order of this 
government, His public order which maintains the good of 
the universe, is maintained. To forgive freely, with no 
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action on God's part, would be to allow the breakdown of 
the order of the universe in that the law would be flouted, 
and would be seen to be flouted, with the result that 
there would be no compelling reason for it not to be 
flouted again in the future (79). But, Christ's suffer-
ings are shown to uphold this moral order, for God clearly 
reveals His abhorrence of sin and demonstrates its 
seriousness for the order of the universe. Christ's 
death was a satisfaction, but it was not a satisfaction 
of distributive justice relating to the punishment of 
crimes, but of rectoral justice which relates to God's 
regard for the good of the universe (80). 
Second, it can be seen that although the term 
'penal' may still be used, in this context it is given the 
meaning of 'penal example' (81). Penalty is no longer 
seen to be the necessary punishment of sin, but instead 
is understood to be the expression of God's hatred of 
sin in His desire to uphold public law, which is now 
seen to be maintained because in the suffering of Christ 
there is an effective warning and deterrent against further 
sin. 
There is therefore nothing wrong in this, that 
God whose is the highest authority in all 
matters not in themselves unjust, and is himself 
subject to no law, willed to use the sufferings 
and death of Christ to establish a weighty 
example against the immense guilt of all, with 
whom Christ was most closely allied, by nature, 
by sovereignty, by surety (82). 
When these two changes in perspective are 
recognised it can be seen that the treatment of the 
satisfaction made by Christ described by the term 'govern-
mental' is clearly differentiated from theories of penal 
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S11hstitution. The conceptual framework of the purpose 
and manner of punishment has completely changed, and 
therefore the character of the substitution involved is 
also quite different. Those who recognised this change 
argued that the concept of substitution should no longer 
be used, as it had been emptied of its 'real' meaning, ~' 
the meaning associated with a penal framework of thought 
(83), but the problem with this demand is to recognise 
when the context is penal and when it is governmental. 
For example, the following quotation from R. Wardlaw 
demonstrates just how difficult it is to specify precisely 
the context of the argument and thus to determine the sense 
being given to the term substitution: 
The righteousness of God is declared, or made 
manifest, by the infliction of the penalty of 
transgression on the person of Jesus Christ, as 
the voluntary surety and substitute of the 
guilty (84). 
(The context at present seems to be firmly located in a 
penal framework, ·but Wardlaw continues): 
The two great ends of public justice are, the 
glory of God, and, in connection with it, the 
general good of his creatures. -It is essentially 
necessary to the attainment of these ends ... 
that if any sinner be pardoned, it should be in 
such a way as, while it displays the Divine mercy, 
shall at the same time testify the Divine 
abhorrence of his sins (85). 
The logic of substitution is then understood to be found 
in the fact that: 
... all the ends of public justice are fully 
answered. The law retains its complete unmit-
igated perfection ... while the riches of mercy 
are displayed, for the encouragement of sinners 
to return to God, the solemn lesson is at the 
same time taught, by a most convincing example, 
that rebellion cannot be persisted in with 
impunity; and motives are thus addressed to the 
fear of evil, as well as to the desire of good (86). 
47 
Three points can be noted to conclude this 
section on the understanding of substitution in the 
context of public order. First, there is quite clearly 
a significant change in the concept of substitution when 
employed in thj_s context as opposed to the contexts provided 
by the concepts of penalty outlined in section l. This 
difference may be expressed in several ways: either, 
Christ suffers not as our substitute in bearing the penalty 
due to our sins, but as a substitute for punishment dis-
playing divine abhorrence against sin; or, Christ does not 
suffer our punishment but is substituted as an example, 
witnessing to the moral order of the universe. 
However, second, it is equally important to 
recognise that although these two contexts of penal and 
governmental ideas do offer significantly different 
accounts of how God is satisfied in the death of Christ, 
there is also continuity between them. Not only are the 
concepts of both areas of thought combined and muddled by 
those who wish to use the language of satisfaction, but 
more importantly, the governmental pattern of thought can 
be seen to be a reflection of an ambivalence discovered 
already in the concept of penalty. Even within the frame-
work of penal theories of substitution the difficulty of 
the assertion that Christ has born our penalty because of 
our sins gives rise to an ambivalence in the language of 
equivalence so that Christ's sufferings are said to be 
adequate by God's decree; the governmental theories of 
substitution stand within the tradition of this problem, 
but offer a solution which separates further still any 
intrinsic relation between Christ's suffering and our penalty. 
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Third, within these shifting patterns of thought 
the term substitution is continually employed and it has to 
adapt to the changing context in which it finds itself. 
When the governmental context is clearly articulated it 
can be seen that the term substitution takes on a quite 
different meaning from that of its penal context. Christ 
is no longer our substitute in the sense of taking our 
place and suffering our punishment; rather, he is 
substituted by God instead of our punishment as a means of 
declaring His nature and purpose. In other words, when the 
term substitution is used it relates not to an exchange of 
persons, Christ for men, but an exchange of method, 
Christ displaying the divine abhorrence of sin substituted 
for our punishment (87). The logic of the term has 
changed, as has its function in theological vocabulary. 
3. Substitution in the Context of Satisfaction 
It has been noted already in the course of this 
chapter that the term substitution has only recently come 
to occupy a prominent place as a conceptual theological 
term in doctrines of the atonement and that the term 
satisfaction formerly occupied a more central and sig-
nificant role. In the previous two sections reference has 
been made to the way substitutionary terminology changes 
in the context of penal understandings of satisfaction, 
but our concern is now with the reference of the term 
substitution to a non-penal understanding of satisfaction. 
Attention will be focussed on the work of Anselm, although 
it may be disputed that such a non-penal understanding of 
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sati~3facti_on i_s to be found in the Cur Deus Homo (88). 
Therefore, an outline of the argument that serves to 
characterise Anselm's concept of satisfaction will be given 
which seeks to demonstrate wherein such an understanding 
is significantly different from the penal concepts of 
satisfaction that have already been described (89). The 
point of this section is not the provision of a fully 
adequate outline of Anselm's atonement theology, so much 
as an illustration of the fact that the term substitution 
can be used in the context of an understanding of satis-
faction that is at least claimed to be non-penal,and that 
it is given a different contextual framework from which its 
meaning is derived, a meaning which is therefore possibly 
different. The following, therefore, is an attempt to 
focus on certain themes that shape the Anselmian concept 
of satisfaction (90). 
First, there needs to be considered Anselm's 
view of sin and the consequences it has for man. Sin is 
a failure of the whole man to subject his will to the will 
of God, a failure of the creature to give the Creator 
what is desired of him (91). Unatoned sin requires pun-
ishment, lest it be unjustly forgiven, and thus it follows 
that either man must make satisfaction for this sin 
against God or he must be punished (92). Si~ce satisfaction 
can only be effected by man making a positive gift to God, 
over and above any repentance and correction of the sin, 
Anselm regards it as impossible that man can render this 
satisfaction, principally because man already owes every-
thing to God so that nothing remains to be offered as a 
gift (93). Therefore, since man's offence is so serious 
in being a violation of God and of His Kingdom, he must 
be punished (94). 
Second, there needs to be considered Anselm's 
view of the Incarnation and its purpose. God does not 
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wish man to perish because of his sin; indeed, this would 
be quite unfitting since God's purposes would then be 
frustrated, but for man to be saved satisfaction must be 
made (95). The solution is provided by God Himself' 
becoming man, who because of His sinless life can offer the 
one thing which is not demanded of Him- His life (96). 
The offering made by the God-man, the free gift of his 
life, is a genuine satisfaction made by man, but because it 
was the offering of the God-man, it was a gift greater 
than all the sin and dishonour done to God, and can 
therefore be the means whereby God's honour is restored 
so that there is no longer the necessity that man be 
punished (97). 
Third, there needs to be considered Anselm's 
view of the application of the work of Christ. The God-
man satisfies the violated honour of God, but it does 
not thereby automatically follow that men are freed from 
their debt (98). But, because the free gift of the God-
man can be said to merit a reward, and because he himself 
needs nothing, in his love and mercy, and in harmony 
with the saving purposes of God he· gives his reward 
instead to the men whom he came to save (99). 
From these three points it should be clear that 
the language of penalty is inappropriate as a central 
description of Christ's work of satisfaction. Although 
the sinner's death may be said to be the penalty for sin, 
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Christ's death is offered precisely not as penalty but as 
an overwhelming gift to God. We must, therefore, agree 
with J. Mcintyre that 'St Anselm's theory cannot without 
considerable explanation be called "penal''' (100), and 
disagree with those who, like Brunner, see Anselm's concept 
of satisfaction as holding 'the balance evenly between 
the ideas of penalty and sacrifice' (101). Mcintyre 
comments: 
... while St Anselm does not draw his argument 
to any conclusive statement, we may fairly say 
that the position is one of vicarious ... or 
representative satisfaction. . .. If the word 
'substitution' were not so frequently used in 
the phrase 'penal substitution' ... then the 
phrase 'substitutionary satisfaction' would not 
be inappropriate. Man ought to make the 
satisfaction, but the Deus-homo substitutes 
Himself for man and achieves that end to the 
honour of God (102). 
Thus, it is possible to employ the language of 
substitution in the context of an understanding of 
satisfaction that contains little or no emphasis on the 
role of penalty in that satisfaction. It must not be 
hastily assumed, therefore, that either of the terms, 
substitution or satisfaction, and in particular, in their 
conjunction as substitutive satisfaction, must necessarily 
evoke a penal context for their interpretation of the work 
of Christ. When the term substitution is employed to 
describe Anselm's thought, or any comparable framework, 
its import and significance must be clearly and carefully 
differentiated from the meaning given to the term in a 
penal context. For Mcintyre the sense of the term is 
limited simply to the fact that Christ does for men what 
they could not do for themselves, but the nature of the 
work of satisfaction performed in the place of man directs 
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attention away from certain aspects of substitution and 
focusses attention instead on other aspects. For the main 
thrust of Anselm's argument is not that Christ underwent 
something that ought to have been undergone by man, but 
that he did something which man ought to have done but 
had failed to do. In other words, if the term substitution 
is characterised by the notions of replacement or commut-
ation so that it can be said that Christ stands in our 
place and in our stead, then the term can not be approp-
riately used to describe Anselm's thought as Mcintyre 
interprets it. However, as Mcintyre realises, the term 
substitution also carries in its basic meaning of an 
exchange the sense of one standing in the place where 
another ought to be but in fact is not. According to this 
sense the term substitution can appropriately describe 
Christ's work of satisfaction in which in my stead and 
place he gives to God perfect obedience and thus restores 
God's honour. Thus, as Mcintyre observes, the term 
substitution can be used in this context and is given 
an appropriate meaning, but only with careful qualific-
ation and in the full recognition of the different 
direction indicated by the term from that of its use in 
a penal context. 
4. Substitution in the Context of the Defeat of 
the Devil 
The material in this section may be treated 
briefly, since it is apparent that the use of the term 
substitution in the context of the defeat of the devil is 
not of primary significance for an understanding or 
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definition of the term itself. None the less, as in the 
previous section, the language of substitution may be 
employed in this context, where its meaning is determined 
by the understanding that Christ, in defeating the forces 
of evil, does something in man's place of which man himself 
is incapable of doing. K. Heim sees a substitutionary 
dimension of Christ's work against 'the Satanic will of 
rebellion• (103) and explains it in this way: 
Only the One whose life was a sacrifice without 
blemish to God could attempt the fight with the 
dark power without being wounded by its arrows. 
He fought a battle in which, if we had attempted 
it, we should not have stood a chance. What He 
did we cannot do. That is acting by proxy in 
the strict, exclusive sense of the word .... It 
is precisely the exclusive character of His 
vicarious work for us that has that compelling 
power (104). 
Indeed, for Heim, it is only in this context of a battle 
that the language of substitution becomes intelligible, 
for only here is there no immoral transfer of guilt, but 
an intervention by Christ to fight on our behalf and to 
stand for us where only he could stand (105). 
In a similar vein G. Aulen comments: 
It is clear, however, that the affirmation of 
Christian faith to the effect that the work of 
Christ was 'for us•, 'for our sake', ultimately 
includ~the conception 'in our stead'. The 
first expressions tend to be superceded by the 
latter. This approach to the work of Christ 
is intimately connected with the idea of his 
struggle and victory over the demonic forces. 
This struggle and victory have occurred for our 
sake, for our salvation and redemption. But 
since we have been unable to accomplish this 
work ourselves, it has manifestly been done in 
our stead (106). 
G. Lefebvre makes explicit the connection between 
Christ's ransom and the term substitution: 
Just as the notion of substitutive satisfaction 
... necessarily involves a relationship towards 
God, to whom satisfaction is given by means of 
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sacrifice, so the notion of SQbstitQtive material 
ransom indicates a relationship towards the 
powers of evil in so far as they have illegit-
imately arrogated this power to themselves (107). 
FQrthermore, Lefebvre links this SQbstitQtion with penal 
concepts by emphasising the persecQtion and captivity of 
Christ at the hands of Satan's agents. 
Hence, if oQr Lord, in order to free QS from this 
chastisement, from this slavery, from this 
captivity, had to SQbstitQte himself for QS and 
endQre from the agents of Satan the pains which 
we deserved, then trQly he was a slave and 
captive (108). 
Finally, J. Packer believes the term sQbstitQtion to be 
appropriate to describe the work of Christ in overcoming 
the devil: 
The assQIDption is that man's plight is created 
entirely by hostile cosmic forces distinct from 
God; yet, seeing JesQs as OQr champion, exponents 
of this view woQld still properly call him oQr 
SQbstitQte, jQst as all the Israelites who 
declined Goliath's challenge in 1 Sam 17:8-11 
WOQld properly call David their SQbstitQte (109). 
ThQs, in this admittedly limited QSe of the term SQbstit~ 
Qtion, similar characteristics to those foQlld in the last 
section are apparent, in that the main thrQst of the 
argQIDent points away from an Qllderstanding of SQbstitQtion 
in which OQr place, together with its accompanying judgement 
or responsibilites, is said to be occupied by Christ, and 
Instead points to a work done by Christ of which we are 
ourselves incapable. 
5. Substitution and InclQsiveness 
In the course of the stQdy so far the attempt 
has been made to illustrate and describe the varying 
conceptual contexts in which the language of substitQtion 
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may be located and to explore the varying content that 
can then be given to the term as it is used to explicate 
the manner of Christ's salvific work. These varying 
contexts have given rise to, and express different poss-
ibilities for, a range of understandings of the nature of 
Christ's work before God. The present section introduces 
a different topic in that the content of the term sub-
stitution is now to be found in the explication of the 
relationship that exists between Christ and those for whom 
his work is performed. This new context is, therefore, 
not to be regarded as another alternative to those that 
have already been discussed, in the sense that a penal 
context can be regarded as an alternative to a non-penal 
context, but instead it should be seen as providing material 
for another sort of 'qualifier' (110) which is to be applied 
to the term substitution to express and clarify the relation 
between the substitute and those for whom he is substituted. 
This new context is described by the qualifier 'inclusive', 
where the concept of 'inclusive substitution' is not tied 
exclusively to any particular view of substitution, but 
where the term 'inclusive' may be employed to a greater 
or lesser extent to qualify the meaning of substitution in 
almost any context (111). 
Before turning to illustrate this theme two 
comments are needed to clarify the situation. First, the 
context that is expressed by the term 'inclusive' is one 
that occupies a prominent place in any discussion of the 
term representation. It will become clear in the following 
chapter that one of the central claims of those wishing 
to use the term representation is that it expresses this 
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sense of inclusiveness more adequately than the phrase 
'inclusive substitution'. Thus, it should be borne in 
mind that an exploration of the theme of inclusivity 
will be carried out in greater detail in the illustration 
of the term representation. At present our concern lies 
solely with the effect of the concept of inclusivity on 
the term substitution and with the specific sense in which 
the phrase 'inclusive substitution' is understood. 
Second, the general description of 'inclusive 
substitution' conceals two divergent patterns of thought, 
which must be recognised and differentiated. The first 
of these derives from the work of P. Marheineke, who 
signifies by the phrase 'inclusive substitution' his under-
standing of Christ as a 'central individual', and 'centre 
of history', who is determinative because he manifests 
'embryonically world unity and world consummation' in his 
God-manhood (112). Marheineke is exploring the Pauline 
and Irenean motif of the Second Adam and the recapitulation 
of all things in him (113), but his concern is to provide 
a 'Christological interpretation of history' (114), and 
only in this sense to relate the concept of inclusivity 
to the substitutionary work of Christ. In other words, 
j" 
Marheineke's use of the phrase 'inclusive substitution' is 
closely related to certain uses of the term representation 
that express an understanding of Christ as archetype or 
prototype, a motif that will receive more detailed attention 
in the next chapter. 
The second pattern of thought that can be 
expressed by the phrase 'inclusive substitution', and the 
one that is to be considered in this section, is perhaps 
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best illustrated by the following words of L. Morris: 
Nothing less than this is adequate to the 
biblical view of oneness with Christ as the 
necessary correlate of substitution .... The 
biblical substitution is not a purely external, 
more or less academic kind of substitution. It 
is a substitution in which the believer is 
existentially involved. He is caught up in the 
struggle. He is transformed. Substitution is 
inclusive (115). 
Thus, according to this pattern of thought, the notion of 
inclusive substitution is employed to counter the charge 
of externality or exclusiveness that would seem to be 
implied in the use of the term substitution alone. The 
meaning that is given to substitution of an act 'in our 
stead' , or 'in our place', is no~r to be understood not as 
a replacement, but as an act in which believers (or 
possibly all humanity) are also 'involved'. As G. Capaldi 
comments: 
The concept of 'substitution' must receive its 
content within the context of a Christ who acts 
once for all but yet to whom we are united in 
our actions as part of that original act. Hence 
'substitution' can never be taken to mean simply 
'replacement' (116). 
Capaldi goes on to explain this act of Christ as that 
which is: 
... inclusive of my act in its own full part-
icularity and individuality. For Jesus Christ 
makes room for my act; his act is precisely to 
provide time and place for my act (117). 
W. Pannenberg, in a section entitled 'the concept 
of inclusive substitution' relates this inclusivity to 
the overcoming of death (118). Jesus dies alone, excluded 
'from the nearness of God' and from 'community with the 
God whose coming Kingship he had proclaimed' (119). But, 
his substitution is inclusive so that: 
... no one else must die this death of eternal 
damnation, to the extent that he has community 
with Jesus. Men still have to die, - Jesus' 
substitution does not take man's place in that 
sense - but now their death is taken into the 
community of Jesus' dying so that they have a 
hope beyond death, the hope of the coming 
resurrection to the life that has already 
appeared in him (120). 
However, it remains true that the concept of 
inclusive substitution is not widely employed in these 
specific and explicit senses. This must be partly a 
result of the obvious difficulties of associating two 
concepts that would normally appear to be mutually 
contradictory. How can an act that is initially defined 
as being performed in my place, in stead of me, also be 
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understood to include me and my own act? The logical and 
theological problems involved in the concept of inclusive 
substitution will be investigated more fully in chapter V, 
but it is already clear that the new and strange content 
that is being given to the term substitution raises 
serious questions as to its continuing intelligibility. 
-
It would also appear to be the case that the concept of 
inclusive substitution is employed comparatively rarely 
because the concept of representation is believed to 
express this inclusive dimension, and thus a combination 
of the terms substitution and representation is more 
common than the problematic phrase 'inclusive substitution'. 
Thus, W. Wolf says that Christ: 
is our 'substitute' in that he does what 
we could never do by our own power, but it 
is a representative and inclusive 'substitution' 
( 121) . 
The inverted commas around the term 'substitution' betray 
Wolf's unease with the use of the term in this context. 
Thus, it may be concluded that not only does the phrase 
'inclusive substitution' raise questions as to the 
credibility and coherence of such a concept, but so too 
does a particular combination of the terms substitution 
and representation (122). 
Summary and Observations 
The use of the term substitution has been 
examined and described as it is found in the contexts of 
penalty, public order, satisfaction, victory, and 
inclusiveness. Attention was focussed on the first two 
contexts of penalty and public order since it is these 
contexts that are generally understood to provide the 
setting for the term and where its meaning is said to be 
established. It was observed, even within this limited 
contextual framework, that the term substitution could 
express significantly different meanings, thus already 
demonstrating that the term is not a simple concept with 
a single or narrowly defined meaning and that it can not 
be used in ways that assume a self-evident or self-
explanatory meaning. The discussion of the contexts of 
satisfaction and victory demonstrates that even if the 
~erm substitution is not central or determinative here, 
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it could none the less be employed and in so doing could 
express and evoke a different range of meanings. Finally, 
the concept of inclusiveness as employed in relation to 
the term substitution was seen to open up yet another 
conceptual sphere in which the term was claimed to have 
a direct reference. The impression that results from the 
complete study is one of the complexity of the term 
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substitution as evinced by the range and variety of the 
meanings that it has been held to be capable of expressing. 
One further observation must be made to prepare 
for the critical discussion and analysis of these findings 
in Chapter IV. It has become clear that the term 
substitution is an interpretative conceptual tool which 
organises and expresses a cluster of concepts that are 
held to play some part in Christian thought on the 
atonement. To adopt Packer's terminology, these concepts 
may include the primary 'control' models of scripture, 
but they may equally well include models which bear some 
relation to scripture but which gain more precise content 
from other sources - e.g. the concept of penalty, which 
has been seen to be only partially and indirectly linked 
with the Bible (123). The term substitution is employed 
to organise and express the relationship between a number 
of these concepts, and in so doing, becomes coloured by 
the resulting framework of thought. The development that 
then takes place around the term, and which is the cause 
of such confusion, is a complex process involving an 
interplay between these different concepts and between 
these concepts and the different frameworks of thought 
of which they are, to a greater or lesser extent, a part; 
an interplay that may sometimes be occasioned by a creative 
ability of the term itself. Thus, in giving conceptual 
clarity and systematic structure to these various concepts, 
the term substitution itself provides the opportunity for 
new insights and fresh developments, perhaps even for 
opposing or contradictory statements, as the resulting 
concept of substitution is tested against the range of 
~··· 
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concepts which it is attempting to interpret. Therefore, 
in any assessment of the term substitution this complex 
interplay that takes place between the different 
concepts, between the term substitution and certain 
specific concepts, and between the resulting conceptual 
framework and other concepts, must be recognised. This 
means that there is only limited value in taking a 
'known' definition of the term substitution and judging 
other meanings in relation to this. Rather, this first 
chapter has demonstrated that the complexity and variety 
of the meanings given to the term substitution is an 
inevitable consequence of the complexity of the conceptual 
framewor~ in which the Christian doctrine of the atonement 
is expressed. 
CHAPTER III 
PATTERNS OF REPRESENTATION IN CHRISTIAN 
ATONEMENT THEOLOGY 
Introduction 
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Our study turns now from examination of the 
diversity and range of meanings that can be given to 
the term substitution and focusses attention instead on 
the use of the term representation in the context of 
Christian atonement theology. As in the last chapter, 
where a brief look at modern theological uses of the 
word substitution helped to introduce its specific 
theological senses, so too an account of the non-
theological uses of the term representation will assist 
in the understanding of its theological uses. In the 
case of the term representation this is of even greater 
importance since the possible range of meanings is far 
broader than was possible for the term substitution. 
Three different aspects of the term can be readily 
portrayed. 
First, the political meaning of representation. 
It has already been noted that critics of the theological 
use of the term representation see this constitutional 
or elective reference as a decisive reason for its 
inadmissability in atonement theology since it cannot 
be said that we elect or appoint Christ as our 
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representative (1). However, even a brief glance at 
the discussion which surrounds the political concept of 
representation reveals that such a criticism construes 
the meaning of representation too narrowly and 
simplistically. G. Sartori lists no fewer than seven 
alternative descriptions of democratic representation, 
listed here not only because they demonstrate the 
complexity of this language, but also because they will 
be seen to be paralleled by various theological uses 
of the term. 
i) The people freely and periodically elect 
a Body of Representatives - the electoral 
theory of representation. 
ii) The governors are accountable or 
responsible to the governed - the 
responsibility theory of representation. 
iii) The governors are agents or delegates who 
carry out the instructions received from 
their electors - the mandate theory of 
representation. 
iv) The people feel the same as the state -
the idem sentire, or syntony, theory of 
representation. 
v) The people consent to the decisions of 
their governors - the consent theory of 
representation. · 
vi) The people share, in some significant way, 
in the making of relevant political 
decisions - the participation theory of 
representation. 
vii) The governors are a representative sample 
of the governed - the resemblance, or 
mirroring theory of representation (2). 
Thus, in the political sense of the term representation, 
to be able to say that A represents B is to invoke any 
number of complex models which serve to substantiate or 
warrant such a description (3). If this is borne in 
mind in any enquiry into the theological use of the 
term representation it should guard against any premature 
rejection of the term on the grounds of a simplistic 
picture of election. 
Second, there is the more general sense in 
which the term representation functions to denote .'a 
making present', either of a person or a thing. It is 
in this sense that a lawyer may be said to represent 
a client, a salesman to represent a company or product, 
an ambassador to represent a monarch or head of state. 
In all such cases the representative speaks for and 
acts in the name of the one represented so that the 
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two parties are in some sense identified, and the 
representative can both be regarded and treated as though 
he 'embodied' the person or the one represented (4). 
In the case of the lawyer representing a client the 
position is not so much that he 'makes him present' but 
that he enables him to appear in the most favourable 
light, and in this way so to act on his behalf. However, 
in case it be supposed that this concept of representation 
is confined to the area of personal delegation it should 
be noted also that a national represents his country, 
whether he wishes it or not. The American hostages 
held in Iran represented America, and it was assumed 
almost without question that an act of violence against 
them could be legitimately construed as an act of 
violence against America, or against all Americans. 
Similarly, a soldier represents his country, not just 
in the sense of fighting for it, but by the identification 
of their fates and actions. A soldier who flees from 
battle is taken to shame his country, precisely because 
it is his country that is represented in that situation. 
Thus, representation involves patterns of identification, 
between people and between things, so that any 'making 
present' is not simply a game of make-believe but an 
issue of real importance (5). 
65 
Third, representation can also involve the sense 
of 'typification'. Thus, someone or something is said 
to be representative of a larger group if he or it is a 
typical example, embodying or bringing to expression the 
characteristics of that group. On the other hand, this 
sense of representation may carry with it the idea of the 
ideal or exemplar of a group, as one who does not simply 
sum up characteristics already present, but who embodies 
ideal qualities for which the rest of the group must 
struggle but for whom they are normative (6). This 
idea of representation may also carry with it a more 
abstract aspect in which the sense of representation 
is closely identified with the concept of a symbol. A 
lion represents or symbolises strength, a character in 
a story represents or symbolises good or evil, and 
models or diagrams may represent or symbolise realities 
in a manner that is possible to grasp. 
These examples by no means exhaust the poss-
ibilities of the term representation, but they indicate 
something of its complexity and point to the range and 
variety of meaning that can be expected as the theolog-
ical concept of representation is explored. To 
facilitate this description the material in this chapter 
will be divided into three parts, each of which expresses 
a facet or dimension that is taken to be of particular 
significance to the term representation. First, the 
use of the term will be explored as it gives expression 
to an understanding of the work of Christ that is said 
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to be done 'on our behalf' but not 'in our stead'. 
Second, the use of the term will be considered as it 
expresses the conviction that Christ's work has a 
communal or inclusive character. Third, the use of the 
term representation will be considered that expresses the 
Ideal or archetypal quality of Christ. In all three 
parts these general headings provide the context in 
which a detailed examination can be made of the variety 
of uses to which the term representation can be put. 
As will become clear, the boundaries between these 
different meanings are not clearly defined, and the 
different uses are not mutually exclusive, so that the 
thought of any one theologian may well range across the 
whole spectrum of thought, a phenomenon that accounts in 
part for the attractiveness of the term. This means 
that, as with the first chapter, the material used here 
to illustrate these different uses should not be taken 
to be an adequate account of any particular theologian's 
thought or work, but instead as a means of illustrating 
and advertising the complexity, variety and range of the 
term representation. 
l. Representation and the Work of Christ 
It is a commonplace among writers on the 
atonement that the term substitution describes an act 
that is done in our stead, while the term representation 
describes an act performed on our behalf, and although 
a sharp distinction is often said to be present between 
these two expressions it is generally the case that the 
nature of the distinction remains unclear (7). This 
discussion of the appropriateness of the terms substit-
ution and representation is often closely linked to a 
discussj_on of the New Testament prepositions Qv~~ and 
c / un~e (8). However, it must be clear that if the terms 
substitution and representation are given meaning 
primarily from their contextual frameworks, as this 
study argues, a discussion of these prepositions can be 
df only limited significance for the terms themselves. 
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In addition, the task of determining the meaning of these 
prepositions is itself fraught with difficulty (9), a 
fact which prompted R. Dale to comment that 'the fact of 
the Atonement - if it be fact - is neither to be 
established nor imperilled by controversies on the force 
of a greek preposition, about whose precise value 
scholars can have any grave doubt' (10). An act may be 
performed on our behalf by being done in our stead, and 
an act performed in our stead may perhaps be ~ightly 
interpreted as being on our behalf, but there is no 
necessary exclusion of one from the other. If a 
distinction is to be made between these expressions, and 
thus between certain uses of the terms substitution and 
representation, the distinction must be introduced on 
the basis of the different contextual frameworks which 
only then may give some substance to the claim that there 
is a significant difference between a work done in our 
stead and a work done on our behalf. These phrases 
have to be given content, and, as has been shown, the 
content of the phrase 'in our stead' has proved remarkably 
diverse; it remains to be shown that the content of the 
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phrase 'on our behalf' is equally complex. Four 
different, but overlapping contexts will be examined in 
this section to illustrate this use of the term rep-
resentation as expressing a work of Christ done on our 
behalf. 
a) There may be briefly considered the use of the 
term representation in the context of the 'active 
obedience' of Christ, as may be evinced by the following 
quotation from the work of A. A. Hodge: 
when we say that Christ was the substitute 
of his people we affirm this to be true of 
him viewed in his function as a sacrifice. 
When we say that he is the Representative, 
we affirm this to be true of him as the 
second Adam or federal Head, undertaking and 
discharging all the obligations of the 
broken law in our stead (11). 
Hodge relates this obedience of Christ to his position 
as second Adam or federal Head, concepts which will be 
examined in more detail later, but H. Smith uses the 
term representation to describe the obedience·Df Christ 
in the course of an examination of Patristic writings: 
Salvation may be regarded as the result of the 
Incarnation itself; or of Christ's active 
obedience as our Representative, not necess-
arily as that of his substitutionary death (12). 
Referring to Irenaeus' understanding of 'recapitu~ation' 
he says 'here we have the effect of Christ's aActive 
Obedience" as not only our example, but our Represent-
ative' (13). Christ is termed our representative in 
his fulfilment of the law's requirements because, even 
though there may be nothing that the believer's work 
can add to this fulfilment, and thu~ although it is a 
work done 'in our stead', yet Christian discipleship 
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requires that his pattern of obedience is brought to bear 
on the believer's life, in order that it may begin to 
become his own, and therefore Christ's work is one of 
representation fulfilling perfectly what must be repeated 
imperfectly. V. Taylor comments on Christ's obedience: 
b) 
The obedience is also representative obedience; 
it is the obedience which men ought to offer to 
God, and which they would offer if they 
fulfilled the obligations of their sonship. 
As representing men, Christ in His suffering 
offers that obedience, truly embodied in 
Himself, in their name and for their sake, 
not by way of barter or exchange, but with 
the intention that they should identify them~ 
selves with it and so offer it themselves (14). 
It is in the context of a theory of sacrificial 
offering that the term representation is most commonly 
used in connection with an act of Christ performed on 
our behalf. This interpretation of the meaning and 
rationale of sacrifice is raised in conscious opposition 
to the view of sacrifice that sees a confirmation therein 
of the principle of penal substitution and it dfverges 
sharply from it. In this new interpretation three 
aspects or features of sacrifice can be related to the 
concept of representation. 
First, the notion of identification, associated 
with the laying of the hands of the offerer on the head 
of the victim, an act which does not transfer sin but 
which identifies the animal victim with the guilty party 
and thus constitutes it the representative of that person. 
The language of identification will be explored more 
fully in section 2 of this chapter, but for the moment 
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it can be noted that this identification precludes the 
possibility of regarding the animal as a substitute and 
leads instead to the view that the animal's death 
represents the desire of the worshipper to give his life 
totally to God while recognising his own impurity and 
defilement. Thus, for example, S. C. Gayford comments: 
We have seen that the connection between 
offerer and victim was so close that it could 
in no unreal sense be called an identity, 
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and that the laying on of hands symbolically 
represented the identification ... the offering 
was not merely 'vicarious' in the sense of 
being made instead of, in the place of (vice), 
another. The victim was not a substitute but 
a Representative, a deputy, for that other, 
and in symbol identified with him (15). 
Second, instead of the sacrifice being viewed 
as a process of punishment, the aspect of 'offering' is 
emphasised. In the animal the worshipper offers to God 
a purified and sanctified life, an act which expresses 
the worshipper's desire to be so regarded by God, to be 
presented before God as this pure and pleasing gift (16). 
If Christ's death is regarded as a sacrifice his role 
will be seen not as victim but as Priest, the one in 
whom we are presented before God, so that God looks on us 
only as we are in him, a holy and pure offering acceptable 
in his sight (17). V. Taylor well expresses this aspect 
of the representative offering of Christ: 
The truer view of the representative activity 
of Jesus is one which recognises that in His 
suffering and death He has expressed and 
effected that which no individual man has the 
power or spirituality to achieve, but into 
which, in virtue of an ever-deepening fellowship 
with Him, man can progressively enter so that 
it becomes their offering to God (18). 
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Third, conseqQent Qpon this notion of identific-
ation and the idea that Christ's sacrifice is an offering 
to God, the concept of representation expresses the 
sense in which the offerer is obliged to participate in 
the life of the offering by the conformation of his own 
actions and attitQdes to those expressed by his rep-
resentative (19). ThQs, it may be claimed that the 
crQcial distinction between a substitutionary sacrifice 
and a representative offering is that in the latter 
there is a moral obligation on the part of the one 
represented to repeat and appropriate in his own life the 
qQalities that have been claimed as potentially his in 
the person of his representative. This concept of 
representation as an imitative participation extends 
beyond the confines of sacrificial views of the atone-
ment bQt its characteristics are to be clearly seen here. 
ThQs, for Taylor, the representative offering of Christ 
does not 'indicate one whose activity lies apa~~ from 
ourselves, or serves instead of our own, but one whose 
service leaves in oQr hands the decisive word in the 
affirmation of faith' (20). This means that with respect 
to Christ's offering of obedience, submission and 
penitence it is in the name and for the sake of men 
'not by way or barter or exchange, but with the intention 
that they should identify themselves with it and so 
offer it themselves' (21). 
c) The theme of sacrifice leads on naturally to 
the theme of intercession as a context where Christ is 
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said to act as a representative on our behalf. The 
theme receives detailed treatment in F. Schleiermacher 
who argues that representation consists of two points: 
Christ appears before the Father, first, to 
establish our fellowship with Him, and then, 
further, to support our prayer before the 
Father .... in virtue, therefore, of that 
relation to us which is based upon His peculiar 
dignity He remains the representative of the 
whole human race, for like the High Priest, He 
brings our prayer before God and conveys to us 
the divine blessings (22). 
d) The term representation has been commonly used 
in the context of describing the theory of 'vicarious 
penitence', and the conviction that Christ on our behalf 
representatively offered a perfect penitence to the 
Father's judgement on sin. Although neither McLeod 
Campbell (23) nor Moberly (24), the main proponents of 
this view, give an important place to the term repres-
entation, by the early part of this century their views 
could be described under the heading of 'the reEresent-
ative theory' (25). This description is also aided by 
such writers as V. Taylor who give an important place 
to the term representation •within the context of the 
language of vicarious penitence (26). However, this 
description can be misleading if the concept of rep-
resentation is identified or allied in any particular 
way with the concept of penitence. It is correct to 
indicate that in the theory of vicarious penitence a 
significant place may be given to the concept of 
representation as it denotes the identification of 
Christ with mankind and the union that must be entered 
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into between each individual and Christ which establishes 
and applies the vicarious quality of Christ's penitence, 
but there is no intrinsic or necessary connection 
between the concept of representation and penitence. The 
theory of vicarious penitence may well include the concept 
of representation, but there is no connection close 
enough to warrant its description as 'the representative 
theory'. 
Summary 
The first part of this chapter has demonstrated 
how the term representation functions to express the 
conviction that Christ's work is in some sense 'on our 
behalf'. In the first three contextrdescribed- the 
active obedience of Christ, his sacrificial offering, and 
his heavenly intercession - it was shown how the term 
representation was employed to designate these works 
as being on our behalf and some basic characte~istics 
were thereby illustrated which were taken to differ-
entiate the term representation from the term substit-
ution. This was seen most clearly in the description 
of the use of the term representation in the context 
of sacrificial language, emphasising the continuity 
between Christ's work and our response through his 
identification with us, through the presentation and 
offering of himself to God with which we are identified, 
and through our imitation of, and participation in, 
those qualities and actions which evince the purity and 
holiness of his life. Throughout the discussion, however, 
(and this point came to the fore while considering the 
theory of vicarious or representative penitence) it was 
impossible to avoid making reference to the use of the 
term representation that is concerned to describe not 
the character of Christ's work but the nature of his 
relation to us. That is, to answer the problem of how 
any work may be said to be in the place of, or on behalf 
of, another. It is this use of the term representation 
to describe the inclusive character of Christ and his 
relation to mankind that must now be considered. 
2. Representation in the Context of Inclusivity 
In this section the fundamental question that 
the term representation is said to answer is 'what is 
the relation between Christ and other men such that his 
work can be said to be for them?' In other words the 
term representation is now considered not in the context 
of the work of Christ but in the context of the relation 
between Christ and others (27). Thus, with this use 
of the term representation, there may be found some 
complementary description of Christ's work which 
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utilises the term substitution; or it may be the case 
that the term representation will carry a number of 
meanings which express both the relation that subsists 
between Christ and others and the manner of his work. 
This double reference of the term explains in part its 
complexity and the difficulties inherent in accurately 
determining its meaning, but the situation is complicated 
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further by the variety of means by which the relation 
between Christ and others may be expressed. In order to 
help clarify these different expressions and uses of the 
term representation the material in this section will 
be grouped under two main headings: the organic relation 
and the elective relation. The material as a whole 
points towards the concept of representation as expressing 
inclusivity or community, and the divisions found in 
this section are not intended to signify precise or 
sharp boundaries, but only to point up the different 
ways in which the term can be used to signify the 
inclusive character of Christ's work. There is, of 
course, a fluidity and ease of movement across this 
spectrum of thought, and the quotations adduced from a 
range of theologians are not intended to be an exhaustive 
description of their thought but simply a means of 
highlighting and illustrating the different patterns of 
thought that can be expressed in this context ~y the 
term representation. 
a) Representation and the Organic Relation Between 
Christ and Humanity 
The term 'organic' in the above heading is 
perhaps misleading if it is taken to refer only to a 
'biological' context, for the material in this-section 
will describe a range of concepts that illustrate some 
dimension of inclusiveness that is ontological in its 
formulation. Clearly there is an abundance of theol-
ogical material that describes such a relation between 
Christ and humanity, but our concern here j_s limited to 
the specific use of such material within the context of 
the term representation, or to such material that the 
term representation is taken to describe or evoke. In 
order to recognise and appreciate the complexity and 
diversity of this material the following description 
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will proceed from three different perspectives. First, 
there will be described the relation denoted by the term 
representation that employs the language of Christ's 
assumption of Man or Humanity in the Incarnation. Second, 
there will be described the relation denoted by the term 
representation that employs the language of solidarity, 
corporeity, or incorporation. Third, a number of biblical 
motifs are selected together with comments that serve 
to demonstrate the use made of such language to describe 
the organic relation between Christ and others with the 
aid of the term representation. 
i) The first approach to be described that 
associates the term representation with an organic 
relation between Christ and others involves a pattern of 
thought that sees in Christ's incarnation the assumption 
of Man or Humanity so that all individual men are 
thereby included 'in Christ' (28). This pattern of 
thought is exemplified in the writing of R. C. Moberly 
who argues that as Christ is to be understood not as a 
God among Gods but as perfect God so too he must be 
understood not as a man among men but as Man: 
His relation to the race was not a differ-
entiating but a consumating relation. He was 
not generically but inclusively man (29). 
E. Mascall comments on the same theme: 
In the language of traditional theology, 
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Christ both paid man's debt to God and 
destroyed the power of the devil. And we must 
notice for the fulfilment of both these aspects 
of redemption it is necessary that he shall be 
both the consubstantial Son of God the Father 
and also, in his impersonal and universal 
human nature, the representative of all mankind 
(30). 
With respect to this 'debt' which must be paid, Mascall 
uses the terminology of representation to remove the 
'crudity and barbarity' of some views of the atonement, 
for there is 'no question of the wrong person being 
punished for the offence, for Christ is one with us in 
his function as the representative and universal man, 
consubstantial with us as touching the manhood' (31). 
One of the main problems that arises in 
illustrating this theme of Christ as Man and the 
representative of all men is to know precisely -~n what 
sense such terms as man, Man, the Man, humanity or 
Humanity are being used. In Chapter V a careful analysis 
will be offered of the different models that underlie 
these expressions, but for the moment the theme will 
simply be illustrated. Thus, J. Dunn comments that: 
... in Paul's theology Jesus represents man, 
not just a man, on the cross, ... the point is 
that he died not instead of man, but as man (32). 
B. Westcott comments that: 
If Christ had been born as other men, he would 
have been one man of many, limited by an 
individual manhood, and not in very truth the 
Son of Man, the perfect representative of the 
whole race. . .. We can see that the Divine 
personality of the Son, the Son of God, the 
Son of Man, harmonises the two facts-Gf a true 
manhood and a universal manhood in Christ, and 
gives to this Humanity that absolute complete-
ness in which each man to the end of time can 
find the fulfilment of his partial nature, 
and through which the will of God could be 
accomplished for all under the conditions of 
earthly existence (33). 
Two additional points about this language of 
the universal and representative humanity of Christ need 
to be made at this stage. First, such language is 
widely to be found in those writers previously examined 
in the context of substitutionary expressions of the 
atonement. P. Van Buren makes considerable use of the 
term representative to denote Calvin's emphasis on the 
fact that it is our flesh that Christ lays down for our 
salvation, and that it is his and our humanity that is 
risen and ascended to heaven: 
Christ did not die as a single man, alone and 
to Himself; He died as our representative, 
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so that we are united with Him in His death, 
because of the union He has made between Himself 
and ourselves by becoming our true Substitute, 
and we have therefore died with him (34). 
In a different context Anselm can use the language of 
'human nature' to link the salvific effect of Christ in 
individuals to his one act of satisfaction: 
For he who was not obliged [to undergo] death 
and who, having kept justice, would have avoided 
death, freely and for the sake of justice _ 
endured death, which was inflicted upon him. 
Thus, in that man human nature freely and out 
of no obligation gave to God something of its 
own, so that it might redeem itself in others 
in whom it did not have what it, as a result 
of. indebtedness, was required to pay (35). 
Second, it should not be thought that writers 
who use this language of Christ's representative humanity 
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are unaware of the difficulties involved, or that they 
suppose themselves to be comm~ed to a particular 
philosophical stance on the status of universals (36). 
For example, J. Torrance claims that his description of 
Jesus as representative and incl11sive humanity does not 
involve a platonic concept of the Ideal man, for if it 
did: 
... then the important thing would be not Jesus 
as an individual, but the Ideal, the Principle 
he embodied. It is rather the thoroughly non-
dualistic biblical thought of Jesus being not 
only a man but the Man in whom God has given 
Himself to the world and for the world, that 
his purposes for Man might be brought to 
fulfilment (37). 
ii) The second approach to be considered of the use 
of the term representation in the context of an inclusive 
relation which is said to exist between Christ and others 
is associated with the language of 'corporeity' and 
'solidarity'. As was mentioned earlier there is no 
clear boundary between this material and that of the 
previous sub-section, but a number of new perspectives 
will be seen to be given to the term representation by 
this new material so as to warrant this differentiation. 
The language of corporeity is probably given 
most explicit consideration in the use of the phrase 
'corporate personality' (38). G. Lampe, commenting on 
a range of scriptural ideas - the summing up of men in 
Christ the New Adam, the ~X1Y~I of the epistle to the 
Hebrews - claims that behind this language: 
80 
There lies the Hebraic idea of corporate 
personality, the notion which finds expression 
in the Old Testament tendency to think of the 
nation collectively as a single person, Israel; 
to mingle ... the thoQght of the patriarchs 
as individQals with the idea of the same 
patriarchs as the corporate personae of the 
tribes which traced their descent from them, 
so that the ancestor can stand for the tribe 
as its Representative .... life is more than 
the life of the individQal ... it extends 
to the groQp, boQlld together as a single entity, 
capable of being represented by, SQffiilled QP 
in and almost personified by a single 
individQal life (39) 
Christ is the representative of man becaQse he inclQdes 
them (40) in his corporate personality and can act as 
one on behalf of the many (41). 
However, the langQage of corporeity extends 
beyond the notions of corporate personality in its 
bearing on the QSe of the term representation. The 
motif of the Body of Christ is significant in this respect 
since it can offer another context for defining the 
inclQsiveness of Christ so that he may be man's rep-
resentative. L. Thornton writes: 
When Christ died something happened once for 
all, not only to him who died, but to all for 
whom he died. They also died with him upon 
the cross. . .. The Messiah and his people 
together form one organism. It was this new 
organism which was nailed to the cross and 
which was afterwards triQIDphantly raised from 
the dead. To it, in principle, all mankind 
belongs; and therefore, in some s&nse, 'they 
all died' upon the cross. They were identified 
with their representative in what he there did 
for them, just as in that same event he was 
identified with them in their sinfQl condition (42). 
For Thornton the concept of the body of Christ has a 
double reference in that it points back to the physical 
constitution of JeSQS and points forward to the reality 
81 
of the Church (43). This double reference allows Thornton 
to make statements about the inclusive quality of Jesus' 
physical constitution and the acts which he performed 
as, for example, 'Christ and the Church are one flesh 
the mystical body was implicitly included in the 
mortal body from the first' (44). 
A more usual use of the language of corporeity, 
however, is to be found in the concept of incorporation. 
This incorporation of the believer into Christ may be 
regarded as the realisation of a representation which was 
already potential in Christ's assumption of humanity 
(45); or incorporation may be regarded as the act that 
actually constitutes Christ as our representative: 
... Christ is the inclusive representative of 
the people of God, or redeemed humanity, which 
constitutes in union with him a sort of 
corporate personality .... Now Christ died 
and rose again, and 'as One has died for all, 
then all have died' (2 Cor 5:14) - all, that 
is to say, who are incorporated in that people 
of God which is 'the body of Christ' (46). 
In addition to the use of the languag~ of 
corporeity to express the inclusive and representative 
significance of Christ there is also to be found the 
closely connected language of solidarity . 
. .. The priestly office expresses the fact 
that Christ is on the side of man, that in 
solidarity with him he lets himself come under 
the pressure of history, its guilt, its 
oppression (9Attts ), and its finitude. Here 
then, being true man, he is man's representative 
and in this capacity stands over against God 
(47). 
The language of solidarity may function simply as an 
alternative to the language of incorporation, preserving 
the physical or ontological form of the union by the 
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concept of 'being made solid' with Christ (48). The 
language of solidarity, however, takes on a different 
set of ideas when it is used in the context of the idea 
of social solidarity, a solidarity that is constituted 
by patterns of dependence and interaction. B. Westcott 
observes that: 
50 years ago the term 'solidarity' and the idea 
which it conveys were alike strange or unknown. 
We had not apprehended in any living way that 
we are, as St Paul says, literally members of 
one another, as men and nations (49). 
H. Johnson sees solidarity: 
... Both in terms of heredity and environment. 
We are linked with the human race in the sense 
that we draw the raw material of personality 
from our ancestors through the medium of 
heredity. . .. We are also connected to the 
rest of humanity through the medium of 
environment. What others do vitally effects 
us for good or ill; what we do does not merely 
concern us, but has effects upon our fellow 
men (50). 
It is this phenomenon of solidarity that explains our 
'link' with Christ and thus how his act is a 'victory 
achieved by the One for the Many' (51). Thi~ t0oJ seems 
to be what E. Peterman means by representative physical 
satisfaction: 
iii) 
Christ himself is representative in the order 
of physical reality, for Christ, in solidarity 
with human history, is the event that re-orients 
history's deviation; in solidarity with human 
society, he is that social Person who is able 
to shape the form of social living, in solid-
arity with men, he is that person who is 
able to convert man's person and restore his 
nature (52). 
This third sub-section is not concerned to 
provide any new subject matter with regard to the 
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inclusive and representative work of Christ but to 
illustrate the way in which this language can function 
to interpret biblical themes. To this end four passages 
have been chosen that specifically relate the term 
representation to four different motifs. First, the 
motif of Adam: 
Adam is a name which stands to [Paul] for the 
'corporate personality' of mankind, and a new 
'corporate personality' is created in Christ. 
All that Christ did and suffered he did and 
suffered as 'inclusive Representative' of the 
new humanity which emerges in him. This idea 
is very fundamental to Paul's thought about 
the person and work of Christ (53). 
Second, the motif of the High Priest: 
The covenant between Yahweh and Israel was 
concentrated as it were, in the person of the 
High Priest ... it is this thought that lies 
behind the New Testament and patristic under-
standing of the inclusive and representative 
humanity of Christ, the Mediator of the New 
Covenant, who represents God to man and man 
to God in his own Person as the One on behalf 
of the Many (54). 
Third, the motif of the Son of Man: 
In the manhood of Jesus Christ is sumined up 
the whole human race. He is not just one among 
many, a son of man, but One in whom all others 
are represented, the Son of Man (55). 
Fourth, the motif of the New Israel: 
b) 
The New Israel, according to the New Testament 
thought, is 'in Christ' as the Jews were in 
Abraham, or as mankind was in Adam. The Messiah, 
the Christ, is at once an individual person -
Jesus of Nazareth - and he is more: he is, as 
the representative and (as it were) the 
constitutive person of the New Israel, potent-
ially inclusive. He includes, he is one with, 
the New Israel; and the New Israel is one with, 
it united to, him, as its head (56). 
Representation and Election 
While the association of representation and 
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election is perhaps not surprising in a democratic 
context, the treatment of this pattern of ideas may not 
be supposed to occur most naturally under the general 
heading of an inclusive relation. However, even when 
an elected representative is considered within a 
political sphere, inclusive language is not judged to be 
out of place (57). An MP represents his constituents, 
speaking and acting in their name, concentrating them, 
as it were, into a single person in whom they might be 
said to be 'present'. While it should be noted that 
this pattern of democratic concepts goes some way 
towards an understanding of the theological use of the 
term representation within the context of election, it 
is by no means a sufficient description. For, as shall 
be seen, it is precisely the concern of those who use 
such theological language of representation and election 
to establish the inclusive relation between Christ and 
others not in a constitutional sense but in terms of an 
ontological unity or community. J. Owen indicates this 
idea when he describes Christ as the Federal Head of 
the elect so that: 
... when he is punished, they also are 
punished: for in this point of view the federal 
head, and those represented by him, are not 
considered as distinct, but as one: for although 
they are not one in respect of personal unity, 
they are however one; that is, one body, in 
mystical union: ye~ onLmystical Christ: viz 
the surety is the head, those represented by 
him the members; and when the head is punished, 
the members also are punished (58). 
The point is argued by H. Martin who pays more 
exclusive attention to the concepts of the Covenant and 
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the Federal Union so that the substitutionary work of 
Christ may be grounded in a 'real' relation with 'those 
for whom his atonement is available' (59). 
The eternal covenant oneness - the federal 
union - grounds the representative character 
of the Messiah and his substitution and 
suretyship. Each of these three relations 
indeed, leans for support on that which 
preceeds it: suretyship justified by substit-
ution; substitution by real representation; 
representation, by federal union or covenant 
oneness. And here ultimately the series 
terminates and rests - rests in the unchange-
able council and will of the sacred three (60). 
However, to illustrate the way in which the 
elective relation between Christ and humanity can be 
associated with the term representation, the use made 
of that term by the translators of Barth's Church 
Dogmatics will be briefly described (61). 
If we listen to what scripture says concerning 
man, then at the point where our attention 
and thoughts are allowed to rest there is 
revealed an elect man, the elect man, and 
united in Him and represented by Him an elect 
people (62). 
In other words, although election is a decision·; and as 
such has verbal parallels with a constitutional pattern 
of election and representation (63), precisely because 
it is the decision of God this election is decisive and 
constitutive for every man. Because Jesus Christ is 
electing God and elected man in him is known the decision 
of God concerning men, and Jesus' history becomes the 
decisive and constitutive history of all men (64). In 
Jesus, therefore, God is not dealing with humanity as 
such, or with an abstract humanum, but with one man, 
from whom all others take their being and their history 
(65). Because of the primacy and completeness of the 
election of Jesus Christ and because of the derivative 
and dependent, but still decisive election that is made 
known concerning other men, ontological statements have 
to be made to describe this relation, but they are 
statements which are grounded in the decision of God 
which as such is decisive for the being of man {66). 
The character and purpose of the election of 
Jesus Christ and therefore the election of all indiv-
iduals in him shall be illustrated shortly, but first it 
should be noted that this pattern of election and 
representation cuts right across one of the most common 
objections that is raised against the use of the term 
representation. As was noted in Chapter I the objection 
is raised that the term representation always suggests 
or posits a relation between two parties that is 
established from the side of the constituent, so that 
the representative is considered to be dependent upon 
the constituent and cannot be conceived apart from him 
(67). However, in the use of the terms election and 
representation in the Church Dogmatics there could be 
no suggestion of this manner of relation. Election is 
the decision of God concerning men, and Christ is man's 
representative solely because all other elect are elect 
in him despite their decision concerning their repres-
entative (68). This pattern of representation is not 
established from the side of the constituent but rather 
is one that establishes the constituent (69). 
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The character and content of this representation 
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can best be illustrated by a consideration of the twofold 
form that Christ's election takes- the rejection of 
man and the election to exaltation and participation in 
the glory of God (70). 
First, regarding man as sinner, God wills his 
rejection, which is to say, his destruction (71). It is 
not simply a matter of the bearing away of sin, for sin 
only has reality in the orientation of the man who 
turns from God and therefore hastens to his destruction: 
it is the man of sin who is judged and rejected by God 
(72). 
This is what happened when Jesus Christ, who 
willed to make Himself the bearer and 
Representative of sin, caused sin to be taken 
and killed on the cross in His own person (as 
that of the one great sinner). Ardin that way, 
not by suffering our punishment as such, but 
in the deliverence of sinful man and sin 
itself to destruction, which He accomplished 
when He suffered our punishment, He has .. . 
blocked the source of our destruction; ... He 
has saved us from destruction and rescued us 
from eternal death (73). 
The election of Jesus Christ isJtherefore, in this first 
sense an election to rejection, to be the decision of 
God concerning all the rejected, to be the representative 
of all who are rejected, so that in him judgement is 
passed on man, and therefore our judgement and destruction 
comes to pass. 
It is (at Golgotha] to death that He bows his 
head and commits Himself. In and with the 
fulfilment there of the will of God it is 
nothingness which can triumph over Him - and 
in and with Him over the whole of the human 
race represented by Him ... It is also to the 
wrath of God ... that Jesus commits Himself and 
in and with Himself the world and the individual 
sinner. The reconciliation of the world with 
God which took place in Jesus Christ had there-
fore the meaning that a radical end was made of 
Him and therefore of the world (74). 
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Second, the election of Christ and our election 
in Him, establishes him not only as our representative, 
as the one man in whom all are destroyed, but also as the 
one man in whom all are raised to new life and are 
exalted to fellowship with God (75). 
As He is man, the first born Brother of all 
men, He is the Head and Representative of man. 
He Himself is only as we also are elected and 
called in Him. But if-rt is the declaration 
of the New Testament witness that He Himself 
was not only dead, but also the One who is 
alive from the dead, He reveals that in and 
with Himself we also are alive - because we 
are elected and called in Him. The fact that 
we see our own humiliation in His is not the 
end of the story. The revelation of His 
majesty discloses also the relative and sub-
ordinate but genuine majesty to which we are 
elected and called in Him. In the revelation 
of His being as the New Man He reveals us too 
in a new being. In and with His life from 
death He manifests our life as it is saved in 
Him, as it is graciously ... posited afresh 
in the fellowship with God which had been 
forfeited (76). 
Thus, it can be seen that the term represent-
ation indicates the inclusive reality of Christ, an in-
elusiveness that is established as a result of·the primacy 
and decisivenss of his election, and which renders his 
history of rejection and election determinative for the 
history and being of all individual men. As man's rep-
resentative, he undergoes our death (and us in him) and 
as man's representative he is exalted and raised (and 
us in him) (77). 
Summary 
This discussion of the use of the term 
representation in Barth's Church Dogmatics brings to ~~~d 
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the illustration of the term representation in the 
general context of inclusivity. In it attention has been 
focussed on those themes and approaches that denote by 
the term representation the inclusive significance of 
Christ, first through an examination of organic models 
- the description of Christ's assumption of Humanity or 
Man, the description of Christ as a corporate person-
ality, the description of Christ as one into whom 
believers are incorporated or with whom they are brought 
into a relation of solidarity - and second through an 
examination of the theme of election - the description of 
Christ as the one chosen by God who is therefore the 
representative of God's dealings with all men. In all 
these cases the term representation could be employed 
to express a particular understanding of the relation 
between Christ and others, and thus, to express a 
considerable range and variety of meanings. This range 
of meanings is found in addition to those alrea~y 
described in section 1 of this chapter which expressed 
an understanding of the nature of the work of Christ. 
One final context in which the term representation 
functions and expresses another set of meanings must now 
be considered to complete this demonstration of its use: 
the description of Christ as the Ideal Man. 
3. Representation in the Context of Christ as the 
Ideal Man 
The third dimension that may be present in the 
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use of the term representation picks up a common non-
theological use of the word where it means 'illustrative' 
or 'typical'. The precise characteristics of this 
language are not easily discerned, for there is no 
sharp distinction between a person or act which is said 
to be representative as a typical or determinative reality, 
and the person who, or work which, is representative in 
that it includes or embodies the person or act of another. 
Perhaps the distinction can best be grasped by an 
examination of the subtle difference between the phrases 
'Christ the representative man' and 'Christ the 
representative of man'. While the use of the term 
representative in the description of Christ as the 
representative man is not of central significance in 
the debate concerning the meaning of representation and 
its relation to the term substitution, it is another 
element in an already complex field of meanings and 
associations and it is a use that may often be found to 
Qllderlie other uses of the term and so may be a confusion 
if its role is not dearly recognised. 
To indicate this use of the term representative 
the following statement is taken from the work of J. Dunn: 
When we talk of Christ as representative man 
we mean that what is true of him in particular 
is true of men in general. When we say Adam 
is representative man in his fallenness, we 
mean that all men are fallen. So when Paul 
says Christ died as representative man he means 
that there is no other end possible for men -
all mankind dies, as he died, as flesh, as the 
end of sinful flesh, as the destruction of 
sin ( 78). 
In his article Dunn oscillates between this use of the 
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term representative to describe Christ or Adam as the 
manifestation or typification of a particQlar sort of 
existence, and the QSe of the term to describe Christ as 
one who inclQdes others, bQt it is not clear what the 
relation is between the two concepts or indeed that DQlln 
is aware of QSing the term in these different senses 
(79). In the qQotation given above DQDD woQld seem to 
regard Christ as representative man in that he manifests 
or typifies man's condition - one whose end is death -
Beyond death he no longer represents all men, 
fallen man. In his risen life he represents 
only those who identify themselves with him, 
with his death (in baptism), only those who 
acknowledge the Risen One as Lord ( 2 Cor 5.:15) . 
( 80). 
In his resQrrection JeSQS is representative man in that 
he typifies or manifests the condition only of those who 
identify with him (81). This QSe of the term seems to 
be closely related to H. TQrner's definition of a 
representative as 'someone who SQIDS Qp and makes 
articulate in word or deed the Qllexpressed aspirations 
and muddled gropings of the group he represents' (82). 
This Qllderstanding of Christ as the represent-
ative man can be developed in two ways. First, his 
representative character may be related to certain 
qualities or attributes (83). 
If Christ had been born as other men, He would 
have been one man of many, limited by an 
individQal manhood, and not in very truth the 
Son of Man, the perfect representative of the 
whole race .... the life of Christ, the human 
life of Christ ... is a Qlliversal life, 
Qlliversal in character and experience: in the 
personal discipline of Qlllloticed solitude, and 
in the broad conflicts of public ministry: 
universal by the absence of every transitory 
element: universal by the embodiment of every 
essential feature of man's nobility (84). 
G. Stevens argues that: 
... in Jesus Christ we see humanity at its 
climax; he is the typical, representative man. 
His life and work must also partake in that 
representative character. His relation to 
mankind is such that in his career and 
characteristic acts and experiences we are to 
see revealed the true law of life for all 
men (8'1). 
', 
J. Robinson attempts to remove this talk of Jesus as the 
representative man from the context both of the man who 
had everything and from the context of the man who was 
everything, and prefers instead to see in Christ the 
single quality of the one who is for all: 
According to the New Testament Jesus is the 
man of God, the Son of God, God for us, 
precisely as he is not the man for himself, 
but the man for others, the man for all: he is 
the representative man, who dies - and lives -
for all. He is the universal man, the final 
man, the man for all space and all time (86). 
Second, the representative character Qf Christ 
can be related more closely to the union of divine and 
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human natures in his person, and to his ideal, archetypal 
or prototypical status for all human aspiration and 
development (87). ForT. Strong, man is the pinnacle 
of nature, but each individual is limited by his finite 
existence, and: 
... so long as humanity was made up of limited 
individuals, so long as the Word of God was 
partially revealed in some one aspect in each, 
the ideal of humanity was not yet realised. 
For this the world was to wait till the Fulness 
of God should dwell among men bodily, till the 
Word should be incarnate (88). 
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So, Christ's hwmanity is representative and exemplary 
because 'He represented ideally the true and proper 
relations in which man should stand to God' (89). Christ, 
therefore, is the representative man because he brings to 
realisation an ideal of hwman perfection and destiny 
(90). E. Teselle, commenting on Hegel, refers Christ's 
representative character specifically to the unity of 
divine and hwman nature, which are already resolved 
within God but which: 
... must first be represented (Vorgestellt) 
in an individual other than the ones who come 
to discover it, and this of course is the 
significance of Jesus. What makes such 
representation necessary is that they, occupied 
with their customary sphere of worldly activity, 
are unaware of their intrinsic potentialities; 
... when Jesus exhibits, in his finite 
particularity, a fully achieved unity betwen 
God and man, he acts out the message that God 
is not alien to man and that man is even being 
taken up into God's life. It is appropriate, 
Hegel thinks, that th~be one individual who 
represents the idea, for the idea also is one, 
concrete and real in God, not an abstraction 
from a multiplicity of individuals (91). 
It is in this context that the phrase 'inclusiv~ 
substitution' is also used, particularly as it describes 
the thought of Marheinecke as he expounds the signif-
icance of Christ as the centre of history (92). 
Whether the phrase 'Christ the representative 
man' is used to describe a quality, or whether it 
describes an archetypal state or condition, the concept 
of representation will generally include some reference 
to the imitation or participation from the side of the 
believer in order to make what is representative in 
Christ his own. Thus, for Stevens, the fact that Christ 
is the typical, representative man, means 'that in him 
we see what hwmanity truly and ideally is, then may we 
not also dare to hold [with Paul] that we must in 
principle rep_eat his life and death and resurrection 
in ourselves in order to realise his salvation' (93). 
In other words, Christ is representative 'in the order 
of signs' as E. Peterman puts it, 'for what happened 
in Christ manifests what must happen in man in order 
that he be delivered from sin, namely, a death to the 
flesh when a person, fortified by grace, resists to 
death the sinful ways of nature' (94). 
To anticipate at least one of the themes that 
will emerge from the study of D. Salle, the following 
quotation of J. Robinson indicatet the continuing 
relevance and force of this use of the term represent-
at ion: 
... The realisation is fitfully dawning that 
'God' now means, for us, not an invisible 
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being with whom we can have direct communication 
as it were on the end of a telephone;- but that 
by which he is represented, his surrogate -
the power of a love that lives and suffers for 
others .... that is the way Jesus pioneered, 
the first representative of the 'new being' (95). 
Finally, attention must be drawn before the 
close of this study to the use of the term representation 
that describes Jesus as the representative of God. It 
is difficult to know precisely what sense has been 
given to the term when it is used in this context, for 
it may mean that Jesus 'presents' God, that is, brings 
Him near to men, and therefore represents Him to men, 
but it seems that at root the meaning of the term must 
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be 'to actualise', 'manifest' or 'embody' in the sense 
that has been seen above to apply to the description of 
Jesus as the representative man. Thielicke refers this 
representation of God by Christ to the doctrine of the 
prophetic office which expresses the conviction that 
Christ: 
... who controls the active Word of judgement 
and grace, is on the side of God. He is God's 
representative and thus far stands over against 
men (96). 
For Thielicke to describe Christ thus is to make 'antic' 
statements about his person (97), but this would not 
seem to follow from J. Robinson's statement that because 
Jesus: 
is the one completely obedient man, who 
'always' does his Father's will, right 'to the 
end', ... he is the perfect reflection or 
representation of God, in the way that an only 
son may be said to be the very image of his 
father (98). 
Thus, this use of the term representation to describe 
Christ as the representative of God fails to clarify the 
meaning of the term1 for the sense in which Christ 
represents God clearly shares the ambiguity already 
found to be present in the term representation. However, 
its use should be noted, not only because it enhances 
the attractiveness of the term, since it is held to be 
capable of expressing the relation of Christ both to 
God and to men, but also because it is a theme that 
recurs in D. Salle's work, a theme that will be treated 
in greater detail in Chapter VI. 
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Swmnary and Observations 
The use of the term representation has been 
examined and described as it is found in three different 
contexts - the interpretation of the work of Christ, 
the inclusiveness of Christ's person and work, and the 
ideal quality of Christ. Within each of these contexts 
a variety of expressions and meanings was discerned and 
the use of the term representation was thereby illust-
rated. As with the term substitution it has been 
demonstrated that the term representation is a complex 
theological tool that can express and evoke a wide 
range of meanings in the course of interpreting diverse 
material that is held to be of relevance for under-
standing the salvific work of Christ, particularly in 
its relation to humanity. Thus, as with the term 
substitution, because such a range of different meanings 
accrue to the term representation, it cannot be 
assumed that in a particular use its meaning will be 
self-evident or self-explanatory, nor can the term be 
treated in a critical discussion as though it only had 
one meaning or a limited range of applications. 
Chapter V will be an attempt to explore and analyse 
critically the appropriateness and suitability of the 
term in Christian atonement theology on the basis of a 
recognition of this variety of meanings and of the 
range of contex~in which the term functions. 
In one respect this examination has differed 
from that accorded to the term substitution, for the term 
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representation has not been the subject of a prolonged 
and critical discussion with regard to its meaning or 
appropriateness, and therefore with regard to the problems 
involved in its use, in the complexity of its meaning, 
and in the range of its application. Thus, whereas 
there was found to be considerable discussion within the 
context of different meanings of the term substitution, 
with one meaning being measured critically against 
another, this internal dialogue is lacking in respect 
to the term representation, with two results: first, 
the term is measured against the term substitution, 
uncritically using the variety and range of meaning to 
oppose a narrow and restricted understanding of sub-
stitution (a situation that can, of course, be reversed 
when the complexity and variety of the term substitution 
is recognised and is measured against a narrow and 
restricted understanding of representation); second, 
the term representation may be used in a variety of ways, 
passing from one meaning to another, without a 
sufficiently critical attitude to this movement because 
the various meanings stand under the general auspices 
of the term representation. 
Finally, this study of the use of representation 
in these varying contexts has disclosed material which 
will be shown to bear directly or indirectly on D. Salle's 
work in 'Christ the Representative'. Although much in 
that book is novel and involves a reassessment of the 
term representation it will become clear that not only 
is there a significant degree of continuity, but also 
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that some of the ambiguities in SBlle's work can be 
illustrated and highlighted from the ambiguities that have 
already been found to be present in the use of the term. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE USE OF THE TERMS SUBSTITUTION AND 
REPRESENTATION TO DESCRIBE THE WORK OF CHRIST 
Introduction 
The material of Chapters II and III has 
demonstrated the range of meanings that the terms 
substitution and representation can be said to bear and 
the variety of contexts in which they have been held 
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to be relevant and applicable. A picture has, therefore, 
emerged of two terms that are intimately related in the 
history of the discussion of Christian atonement theology, 
but whose meanings, while coinciding to a certain extent, 
can be seen to diverge and to reflect substantially 
different understandings or aspects of Christ's 
salvific work. It is possible, therefore, to make some 
preliminary comments on the use and relation of the 
terms substitution and representation before considering 
a critical analysis and clarification of their respective 
meanings. 
First, it has become clear that the terms 
cannot be used as though their meanings are self-evident 
or as though they can evoke only one context for under-
standing the work of Christ; as a minimum it must be 
said that the terms deserve a more careful consideration 
and delineation if they are to be of continuing use in 
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discussions on a doctrine of the atonement. 
Second, with the range and variety of meanings 
that have been shown to be expressed by both terms it 
is clear that they do not fulfil an identical role in 
Christian atonement theology and therefore cannot be 
treated as interchangeable or synonymous terms. It 
follows also that the terms should not be assumed to be 
complementary without careful discrimination and 
delineation to ensure the appropriateness or possibility 
of such a conjunction. 
Third, because of the range and variety of 
meanings and contexts that have been described, any 
evaluation and criticism of their meaning must take 
account of their full complexity and cannot be satisfied 
with general comments that fail to recognise this 
diversity. 
The purpose of this and the following chapter 
is to engage in a critical analysis and discussion of 
the terms, taking account not only of their interpretative 
function, but also of the range and complexity of their 
meaning as evinced by the previous studies. In order to 
facilitate this discussion and to ensure that the terms 
are accorded their full range of meanings and complexity, 
the examination will make use of the fact disclosed in 
Chapters II and IIIthat each term has two aspects to it, 
or better, that each term functions in two areas of 
thought that are related and yet which refer to substan-
tially different concerns. On the one hand, it can be 
seen that both the terms substitution and representation 
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are employed to interpret and express the manner and 
content of Christ's saving work; on the other hand, 
both terms can also be seen to interpret and express the 
manner and characteristics of the relation between 
Christ and mankind, or the relation of his work to others. 
This is not to argue for or perpetuate a facile distinction 
between the person and work of Christ but to recognise 
that both terms contribute to an understanding of the 
atonement in both these areas of thought, thus explaining 
both their overlapping concerns and their divergence of 
meaning. By examining the part played by both terms 
in each of these aspects it is possible to ensure that 
not only are the full ranges of meaning of both terms 
adequately discussed, but also that the relation and the 
divergence between the terms is most clearly recognised. 
In this chapter, therefore, the contribution of both 
terms is examined as they seek to interpret and express 
the manner of Christ's work, although recognising that 
the focus of attention will be on the term substitution. 
In the following chapter the contribution of both terms 
is examined as they seek to interpret and express the 
manner of the relation between Christ and mankind, 
recognising in this instance that the focus of attention 
will be on the term representation. 
The course of this chapter will be as follows. 
Since the terms substitution and representation have been 
described as interpretative tools which aid understanding 
of the salvific work of Christ, it is necessary to review 
the character of the Biblical material that can be said 
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to bear upon and generate these interpretative models (1). 
There then follows four sections, each involving a 
critical examination of some central theme that was 
disclosed in Chapters II and III in the context of the 
work of Christ. The first of these critical examinations 
probes the claim that substitutionary terminology, and 
particularly that which arises in a penal context, has 
the function of an explanation of Christ's work whj_ch is 
based upon a rational and consistent system of thought. 
The second discussion analyses the various concepts of 
justice that shape the concept of substitution and 
enquires critically into the problems and the value of 
these different expressions of substitution. The third 
discussion examines the claim that substitutionary 
terminology demands a concept of the atonement that is 
morally irrelevant to man because Christ's work is 
morally exclusive. It is in this context that the claim 
of the term representation to present a morally relevant 
understanding of atonement will be scrutinised. The 
fourth discussion focusses briefly on the Christological 
and Trinitarian dimension of substitutionary terminology 
in this context. The chapter concludes with some 
observations and comments on the meaning and use of the 
terms to express an understanding of the work of Christ. 
1. The Bearing of Biblical Material on the Use of 
the Terms to Describe the Work of Christ 
Four themes will be identified which bear on 
the use of the terms substitution and representation in 
the context of the work of Christ. 
a) The Theme of Sacrifice 
The use of sacrificial terminology in the New 
Testament (l Cor 5:7, l Pet 1:18-19, Eph 5:2, Jn 1:29, 
Heb 9:15f, et al) points, not only to the sacrificial 
rites of the Old Testament patterns of worship (2), and 
not only to concepts of sacrifice mediated through 
Graeco-Roman culture (3), but also to the reality of 
Christ's sacrifice which is seen to be not merely an 
instance of a general occurrence but the sacrifice which 
controls and interprets all other sacrifices and to 
which they are pointers and shadows (4). This complex 
use of sacrificial language, together with the recog-
nition that it is impossible to describe with certainty 
the Old Testament rationale of sacrifice, generates a 
wide variety of interpretations concerning the signif-
icance and meaning of Christ's sacrificial death (5). 
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At least three different interpretations can be cited 
which embody and reflect different understandings of the 
terms substitution and representation. 
i) A sacrifice may be said to be the God appointed 
method whereby the penalty due to sin can be meted out 
on an animal victim in the place of the guilty party, 
so that the claims of divine justice are satisfied and 
God is thereby propitiated. C. Hodge gives a clear 
summary of this interpretation of sacrifice: 
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l) That the design of such offerings was to 
propitiate God; to satisfy His justice, and to 
render it consistent and proper that the offence 
for which they were offered should be forgiven; 
2) That this propitiation of God was secured 
by the expiation of guilt; by such an offering 
as covered sin, so that it did not appear 
before Him as demanding punishment; 3) That 
this expiation was effected by vicarious 
punishment; the victim being substituted for 
the offender, bearing his guilt, and suffering 
the penalty which he had incurred; 4) That the 
effect of such sin-offerings was the pardon 
of the offender, and his restoration to favour 
and to the enjoyment of the privileges which 
he had forfeited (6). 
Hodge concludes that if this is the correct interpretation 
of Old Testament sacrifices then there can be no doubt 
that Christ's death is similarly to be understood (7). 
It is clear that this interpretation of sacrifice stands 
in close relation to patterns of penal substitution, 
focussing on the expiation of sin by the propitiation 
of God through the exchange of an innocent victim for a 
guilty party and the destruction of this victim (8). 
Christ's sacrifice is therefore understood primarily 
in terms of the sacrificial sin-offering. 
ii) A sacrifice may be regarded as an offering 
accepted by God which is adequate or appropriate to 
satisfy conditions under which He will forgive the 
offender. 
Christ did not make satisfaction by enduring 
the punishment which we sinners had merited. 
This does not belong to the nature of a 
sacrifice, and has nothing in common with it. 
For sacrifices are not payments of debts, as 
is evident from those offered under the law. 
The beasts that were slain for transgressors 
did not expiate the penalty which they merited, 
nor was their blood a sufficient Au~v for the 
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soul of man. But they were oblations only, 
by which the transgressor endeavoured to turn 
the mind of God to compassion, and to obtain 
remission from Him (9). 
Thus, sacrifice is seen as an act of homage which 
testifies to a repentance and which moves God to 
compassion. 
iii) A sacrifice may be regarded as an offering 
that demonstrates and signifies the relation in worship 
in which a man stands before God. It is the costly 
submission of devotion and service which expresses the 
self-offering of the worshipper. V. Taylor argues that: 
The aim of sacrifice is a restored 
fellowship; its medium is a representative 
offering; its spiritual condition is the 
attitude of the worshipper; its rationale is 
the offering of life; its culmination is _ 
sharing in the life offered by means of the 
sacred meal. These ideas form a natural 
background against which the Passion-sayings 
can be readily understood (10). 
Sacrifice is therefore the movement from man to God, 
initiated by God, but in which man participates--and 
through the offering provided is enabled to enter into 
the presence of God, not in his sinful and impure 
condition but as represented by the purity and holiness 
of the offering. 
The complexity and fluidity of sacrificial 
concepts prohibits any definitive interpr~tatioti, ~ut 
it is significant that interpretations of sacrifice are 
shaped by presuppositions concerning Christ's salvific 
work so that they are seen to be not so much a foundation 
for an understanding of substitutionary or representative 
pat terns of atonement but embodiments ()r reflect ions 
of those various patterns. 
b) The Theme of Redemption 
The decisive experience of Israel in its 
liberation from Egypt, the expectations of redemption 
from bondage throughout the history of Israel, the 
redemption that was possible for slaves or captives, 
the redemption that was possible for certain wrongs, 
the redemption that followed from certain sacrifices, 
all form the background for the New Testament use of 
the term redemption, together with its cognate terms, 
to describe the salvific work of Christ (11). Its use 
in the New Testament is infrequent: A~ov occurring 
106 
( ) ., ''-oJ only at Mark 10:45 Matt 20:28 , 11\.~ll'vi(_O-' at I Tim 2:6, 
)\v-re_~..:> at Titus 2:14 and I Pet l: 18-19. Paul's use of 
, " the term ~~o~vTt~s is more frequent, but has the 
general meaning of deliverance, referring to the bondage 
of sin (Eph 1:7, Col 1:14, Rom 3:24, Titus 2:14), or 
to the bondage of creation (Rom 8:23). The writer of 
\" 7 ,, 
the letter to the Hebrews uses both 1'\Ti'(_wO'I.c; and eot"OA\}'\""{~tT''> 
in the first instance in the context of sacrifice and in 
the second to refer to the deliverance from the 
transgressions of the first covenant (12). Gal 3:13 and 
4:5 speak of deliverance from the curse and bondage of 
) ~ ,. v 
the law, but here Paul uses the verb &~o..~oeo.~~ . In 
I Pet 1:18 deliverance is from a vain manner of life, 
whereas Mark 10:45 gives no clear conception of what 
the 'many' are ransomed from. Thus, the theme of 
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redemption employs various images of deliverance, many 
of which are associated with some form of price or cost 
whereby such liberation is brought about, in order to 
describe and express the change that has come about for 
the believer, contrasting old patterns of bondage to 
new patterns of freedom. The variety of contexts in which 
redemption terminology appears suggests that the means 
of redemption may be variously construed, but the force 
of the image is on the reality of the deliverance for 
the believer. 
c) The Judicial Theme 
Judicial terminology is evident in the Old 
Testament and New Testament in terms such as .<o..,a.\i((fvw , 
1T~~"'iil'"~f(a.., ~?f'o.. , but the relation between judgement 
and Christ's death is far from clear (13). J. Jeremias 
argues that any allusion or appeal to the figure of the 
suffering servant involves an implicit plea to a 
judicial setting in which the innocent receives the 
judgement and punishment of the guilty (14). In the 
New Testament Col 2:14 can be cited as illustrating 
another use of judicial language but the exegetical 
problems of this passage together with those of 
Rom 3:21 ff, Rom 8:3 ff, Gal 3:13, and II Cor 5:21 are 
well known. It seems to be the case that because both 
Old and New Testaments speak of the judgement that is 
due to sin, a general context is established in which 
the forgiveness of sins is viewed despite the fact that 
a dichotomy appears between the judgement that is past 
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and the judgement that is still to come. Before 
commenting further on the character and basis of the New 
Testament judicial language it is necessary to point 
out that the New Testament makes no explicit connection 
between the concept of punishment and the death of Christ. 
It is possible to interpret judgement, curse and sin in 
penal terms, but this interpretation is dependent upon 
the selection of particular judicial frameworks and 
does not follow self-evidently from the notion of 
judgement in the New Testament. At best the New Testament 
points only partly in the direction of penal concepts 
to interpret the death of Christ and it gives no clear 
warrant for the development or interpretation Qf 
judicial categories from this perspective (15). 
However, there is good reason for judicial 
categories, and inherent within these categories the 
possibility of penal interpretation, since the character 
of Christ's history embodies the tension between 
judgement and justification, rejection and acceptance. 
Jesus' story is one of unjust suffering (16), and of 
subsequent vindication; but the theological problematic 
that demands interpretation is due to the interrelation 
between this man and the God he calls Father in the 
light of this story of judgement and justification. As 
one who claims and pro-claims the Kingdom, and thus 
himself and his God, his death and resurrection are not 
accidents of history but events which 'involve' God. 
Thus, Paul's use of ~~~J~~~v~l to refer not to the 
betrayal of Judas, but to the handing over of Jesus 
by God, represents the profoundest theological insight 
into the significance of the death and resQrrection of 
this man (17). By their silence and acqQiescence in 
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this death, both JesQS and his God fill the event with 
meaning, and the resQrrection impells both the necessity 
and the direction of theological reflection on this 
event as an event of life and death, jQdgement and 
jQstification, rejection and election, betrayal and unity 
of will, defeat and vindication. ThQs, the theological 
issQes are not SQperimposed on an otherwise simple 
'Gospel of JesQS' bQt are themselves the very material 
and problematic OQt of which and in which the first 
Christians perceived and articQlated the reality of 
salvation. 
d) The Theme of Reversal and Exchange 
It follows from the character of Christ's story 
that at its heart, and in a manner that carries profoQnd 
theological significance, there lies a pattern of 
exchange, a reversal, or an exchange of roles, which is 
a 'blessed exchange' (Diognetus) (18) because it is the 
articQlation of a fundamental 'for QS 1 (19). As in the 
Old Testament the remnant experience a reversal of roles 
for the sake of many, as in the Gospels where the Lord 
becomes a servant, asBarabbas is released but Jesus is 
condemned, so the theme of reversal and exchange emerges 
(20). Gal 3:13, II Cor 5:21, 5:9, in their different 
ways seek to articulate and interpret this pattern of 
exchange, seeing in it not only the mystery and 
outworking of God's love but also the impulse for 
Christian discipleship and service. M. Hooker is right 
to draw attention to the fact that II Cor 5:21 speaks 
not of a simple exchange (which she characterises as 
substitution) but of an interchange (which she terms 
representation) because our righteousness is found 
'in him', and this insight will form an important basis 
for our discussion and evaluation of the terms substit-
ution and representation as they describe the relation 
between Christ and his people (21). However, it seems 
as though this 'interchange' is itself the development 
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of the more basic pattern of exchange, a development 
possibly occasioned by the misuse of the pattern of 
exchange where it was taken to mean that there was no 
continuing dependence of the believer upon Christ, or 
that there was no place for present suffering or 
humiliation in the Christian life because Christ had 
suffered, or that Christ's exchange brought abo~t 
salvation, glory and riches for the believer. Paul 
therefore, according to Hooker, has to correct the 
distortion by emphasising the continued dependence o~ 
and identification with,Christ so that Christians only 
share in Christ's glory through sharing in his sufferings 
(22). The pattern of exchange as an articulation of a 
basic experience of salvation may need correction or 
refinement, but it none the less functions as a primary 
theological model which the terms substitution and 
representation seek to articulate within their own 
contextual frameworks to interpret the saving work of 
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Christ. 
In this brief review of four biblical themes 
the intention has not been to find a doctrine of 
substitution or representation in the Bible but rather 
to highlight those motifs that seem to give grounds for 
such language in Christian atonement theology, and which 
may serve as a check and restraint upon their use as 
theological interpretative tools. In order to help 
assess the value of these terms and the frameworks in 
which they operate, their coherence and consistency 
will be examined, using the changes and variations that 
have taken place in their meaning and use to focus on 
those areas of difficulty and ambiguity which exist. 
In this way a clearer picture will emerge of the 
strengths and weaknesses, uses and limitations, of the 
various patterns of thought that have been described. 
Using Packer's terminology the recognition of the 
interpretative role of the terms as models which seek 
to articulate and interpret the 'control models' of 
scripture means that the models themselves can be tested 
and evaluated in terms of their own consistency, and 
particularly as the different 'qualifiers' modify and 
shape the models in new ways (23). In addition, 
recognising the relation between such models and the 
primary models ofthe Bible , the attempt must be made 
to determine to what degree the framework and patterns 
of thought comprised in the new models illustrate, 
illuminate, or possibly distort and misconstrue those 
biblical insights. 
2. The Critique of 'Rational' or 'Explanatory' 
Patterns of Substitution 
11 2 
In Chapter II it was demonstrated that certain 
patterns of substitution, particularly those designated 
by the phrase'penal substitution~ derived some of their 
significance from the supposition that they offered an 
explanation of Christ's work (24). At the time it was 
noted that doubt had been cast on this explanatory role 
of the term substitution, since it was clear that not 
only did the qualifier 'penal' undergo significant 
variations in the attempt to 'make sense' of the death 
of Christ, but also the resulting pattern of substitution 
was neither as consistent nor as 'rational' as might 
at first sight be supposed. It is now necessary to 
examine this claim rather more closely, since if it 
can be demonstrated that even this use of substitution 
actually supports the claim that the term substitution 
is being used as a model which helps to articuYate and 
interpret material that is not susceptible to rational 
explanation, then the argument for the interpretative 
status of the term is considerably strengthened. 
a) First, it was seen to be the case that the 
validity of such a view depended upon the fact that 
the substitution of Christ in ~ place to receive our 
punishment was to be taken with absolute seriousness. 
Since the force of the explanation resided in the fact 
that 'God must punish' but that punishment may fall on 
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a substitute instead of the guilty, it is necessary to 
assert that the punishment suffered by Christ is, in 
all literalness, our punishment (25). Clearly this 
context provides for an unambiguous use of the term 
substitution, for the exchange that takes place between 
Christ and sinful man is spatially and conceptually 
governed by a one to one correspondence. Christ in our 
place, ourselves in Christ's place (26). But it is 
precisely this direct and unambiguous substitution that 
is so problematic. The suffering experienced by Christ, 
that is his punishment, does not appear to correspond 
directly to that which is due to man - eternal punishment 
or eternal death (27). Further, the suffering experienced 
by one man cannot easily be seen to correspond directly 
to a multiplicity of punishments that are due to each 
man individually. Given these problems of construeing 
Christ's exchange with guilty man as the occupation of 
an identical place or the reception of an identical 
punishment, the notion of 'equivalence' is developed (28). 
The term equivalence allows the theologian to 
assert that although there can be no identity between 
Christ's suffering and that which is due to us, there is 
none the less an equivalence which continues to 'explain' 
why Christ's death satisfies God's justice (29). The 
equivalence of Christ's suffering is established by the 
christological argument from the dignity of his person 
as the God-man, so that although identical neither in 
duration nor perhaps in kind to the sufferings due to 
men, the fact that they are the sufferings of this man 
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renders them an eqQivalent, thQs preserving the rationale 
that God's jQstice is satisfied (30). BQt the problems 
are now clear: to assert eqQivalence recognises 
implicitly that a comparison is made on the basis of an 
accepted scale of valQes. The example often qQoted of 
100 dollars gold being exactly eqQivalent to 100 dollars 
silver demonstrates that it is only on the basis of an 
agreed or accepted convention that there is reckoned 
to be SQCh eqQivalence. To recognise this logic of the 
concept of eqQivalence, is however, to strike at the 
very heart of its intention as an explanatory device, 
for it mQst be remembered that the rationale of the 
argQffient depended Qpon the fact that there is a necessity 
in the jQstice of God that the pQllishment dQe to OQr 
sin is inflicted. The concept of eqQivalence now 
implies that it is no longer OQr pQllishment that Christ 
suffers in our place but a SQffering and pQllishment that 
is different, although it bears some relation to our 
due, but which is accepted by God in its place (31). 
In other words, the use of the concept of equivalence 
only appears to sustain the rationale of the argQffient 
that was necessary for the intelligibility of the model 
of penal substitution; in reality the concepts of 
pQllishment and justice are subtly changed, so that the 
central insight of the model (that in Christ's suffering 
he receives the judgement due to man's sin) is lost and 
the model instead becomes an explanation of Christ's 
death expressing the 'insight' that God cannot forgive 
without inflicting some pQllishment (32). 
b) Second, the difficulty in the formulation of 
the model of penal substitution can be apprcached from 
another angle, which highlights the difficulty by 
exposing the ambiguity of the concept of justice which 
is employed. In order to argue for the necessity of 
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the infliction of punishment a concept of justice is 
invoked which reflects the thought~forms of criminal law. 
In technical terms this form of law may be called 
distributive justice. Such justice demands that crime 
be punished because, as an infringement of law, punish-
ment is the inevitable and necessary consequence. 
However, in order to assert the exchange of punishment 
that is said to have taken place between Christ and 
sinful man, an appeal has to be made to a concept of 
justice known as commutative or civil justice, a concept 
that is expressed in terms of payments of debts. By 
means of this appeal the concept of equivalence, or 
ev.en that of the identity of the punishment, may be 
sustained, but at the expense of introducing an anomaly 
into the argument which again attacks the very principles 
on which it is based. The anomalies are that under 
civil law there is no necessity for a debt to be repaid, 
but only a relative good; nor can punishment have any 
part to play in the payment or non-payment of a debt. 
In other words, the conceptual framework provided by 
the practices of criminal law to articulate the exchange 
that takes place between Christ and man breaks down 
because criminal law does not allow such an exchange; 
the appeal to civil law makes the exchange possible, 
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but not if punishment or suffering is involved (33). 
Thus, the patterns of substitution that 
articulate the exchange between Christ and his people 
in terms of punishment in the context of criminal law, 
do not offer an explanation of the work of Christ, but 
because they appear to do so and because such an 
'explanation' must 'work', the concepts of punishment 
and justice are altered and adapted, which results only 
in the loss of awareness as to the function of the 
model and the pattern of exchange to which it bears 
witness. The models not only fail as explanations since 
they are not coherent, but also they mislead and draw 
attention away from the central insight they were 
intended to express. It is this latter problem that 
must now be explored more fully, by examining critically 
the concepts of justice in which the reversal or 
exchange between Christ and his people is said to take 
place. 
3. The Problem of Substitution in the 
Context of Law 
In Chapter II three different patterns of 
substitution were identified, all of which used the 
terminology of law, but which expressed different models 
of the atonement (34). Since this section focusses 
on the critical problems of substitution as an 
intelligible or viable concept within this context it 
is necessary to do full justice to the different 
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patterns of substitution that have been disclosed. An 
examination and evaluation of substitutionary terminology 
will therefore be made in the three contexts of criminal 
law, civil law, and pecuniary law, recognising that in 
these different contexts the concept of substitution 
will become vulnerable to criticism in different ways. 
a) The Use of Substitutionary Terminology in 
the Context of Criminal Law 
Regardless of the specific interpretation of 
the manner of punishment, whether it be physical, 
spiritual, or emotional suffering, two types of 
substitution are possible within the context of criminal 
law. First, punishment may be thought of as being 
'deflected' onto another party, which remains innocent 
and holy even or precisely in its acceptance of such 
suffering (35). The objections to this concept are 
familiar and compelling. i) God is conceived as wielding 
a retributive force which must find an outlet apart from 
the sin which occasioned such wrath, but such a notion 
departs from the New Testament and Old Testament under-
standing of sin and judgement,'where the penalty is 
bound up with the act of sin, where any 'problem' of 
forgiveness lies not in the nature of God, i.e., in the 
need to exercise punishment, but in the obstinacy and 
disobedience of those whom He wishes to save (36). 
ii) The notion of a 'deflected' punishment indicates 
a curious distortion of criminal law, for tnere is no 
intrinsic connection between sin and its punishment; 
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rather, the ideas of criminal law are taken to substantiate 
a general framework in which sin demands punishment, 
but this is used to justify a retributive principle where 
the infliction of punishment regardless of who is punished 
is a necessity for God. Such a concept of 'deflected' 
punishment, while giving clear articulation of the 
substitution of Christ, misuses ideas of criminal law 
to establish a principle of retribution that conflicts 
with the basic principles on which the notion of criminal 
law is based, and therefore cannot be considered a suitable 
model for further interpretation of the atonement (37). 
Second, and more commonly, it is argued that 
a transfer of sin or guilt or liability to punishment 
takes place, so that the victim, while innocent in one 
sense, in another sense is guilty in that it is reckoned 
to be guilty and may therefore be justly punished. It 
is possible merely to assert, as for example does 
C. Hodge, that such a transfer is possible beca~se 
'the Bible asserts and assumes no moral principle which 
does not underlie all the providential dealings of God 
with individuals or with nations' (38). The rite of 
sacrifice is interpreted and understood to embody this 
principle (39), as is the statement that God 'visits 
the iniquity of the fathers upon the children' (Ex 20:5) 
( 40). 
However, it is clear that if the framework of 
criminal law is being employed to give expression to 
the conviction that sin demands punishment, then to 
posit a transfer of sin from the guilty to the innocent 
is in fact to articulate an awareness of the incompre-
hensible grace of God. For in criminal law there can 
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be no precedent for an act that is fundamentally unjust 
(within the criteria of this type of law), and the 
conditions that theologians list in the attempt to 
determine how in God's justice it can be said to be jrnt 
only serve to highlight this fact (41). The basic 
proposition that sin demands punishment as rooted in 
the character of God Himself seems well founded, but the 
use of the framework of criminal law to articulate this 
conviction only serves to demonstrate the free mercy and 
grace of God when he does not punish someone as they 
deserve: it cannot articulate the justice of punishing 
an innocent party in stead of the guilty. 
The problem is that if Christ's death is seen 
as the means by which the retributive justice of God 
becomes instead the strange righteousness of God which 
freely justifies the ungodly, then it is but a short 
step to argue that the cause is due to the infliction 
of God's retributive justice on Christ in his death. 
But it is precisely this last step which, while it is 
not disqualified, is not encouraged or demanded by the 
New Testament interpretations and accounts of Christ's 
death. There is little direct evidence that the New 
Testament sees Christ's death as a punishment inflicted 
by God, although it is possible to construe the New 
Testament in this way, particularly, as has been shown, 
if the.language of sacrifice is held to be explicitly 
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penal in character. Rather, it seems to be the case 
that because the New Testament relates Christ's death 
to sin, and because sin in other contexts is related 
to punishment, then it is held to be the case that 
Christ's death is to be related directly to punishment. 
The sequence of thought is logically justified, but it 
is only indirectly present in the New Testament, and 
this by itself should be sufficient to limit the range 
and applicability of such an interpretation, and should 
certainly caution against the reading of the New Testament 
solely or even primarily from this perspective. 
b) The Use of Substitutionary Terminology in 
the Context of Civil Law 
This framework of thought represents a 
development of, or an alternative within, the concept 
of criminal law, for God is not held to punish sin as 
a necessary consequence of His own reaction to sin, but 
rather that in His position as Ruler or Governor of the 
world it is to the good of the world that the validity 
of the law be demonstrated and upheld, so that Christ's 
suffering demonstrates theabhorrenceof God towards sin, 
exhibits the consequence of sin in a morally ordered 
world, and holds out the deterrent against future sins, 
so allowing God to withold punishment from the sinner 
himself without bringing about a breakdown in the moral 
fabric of His kingdom. Put more technically in the 
language of the Edwardian school of New England theology, 
Christ satisfies neither distributive justice which 
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refers to the punishment of crimes, nor commQtative 
jQstice which refers to the payment of debts, bQt 
rectoral jQstice which refers to the good of the universe 
(42). 
When the atonement is seen in this framework 
of civil law the resQlting model mQst be jQdged to be 
inadeqQate on a nQffiber of grounds. First, as H. BQshnell 
shows, the context provides no jQStification for seeing 
any relation between Christ's SQffering and the 
preservation of moral order (43). Since Christ's 
SQffering is neither a punishment for sin nor a result 
of sin there is no basis for seeing in it the abhorrence 
of God Qpon sin, and therefore there is no reason why 
it shoQld Qphold any moral order (44). Second, since 
the SQffering that Christ undergoes bears at best only 
an indirect relation to anything dQe to man or any 
condition experienced by man as a sinner, the basic 
insight offered by the interpretation is not that of an 
exchange which takes place between Christ and his people, 
but only an exchange of means of forgiveness (45). 
Third, whatever the assessment of this understanding, it 
must be noted that the term SQbstitQtion comes to 
feflect this new pattern of exchange, so that properly 
speaking Christ may not be described as man's sQbstitQte 
bQt only that his sufferings are SQbstitQted in the place 
of our punishment (46). 
A more complex sitQation is involved when the 
above pattern of thoQght is taken to complement or 
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correct other judicial understandings of the atonement 
(47). Here it may be argued that Christ bears the 
consequences of sin, and that his punishment is substit-
uted for our punishment, not because of any retributive 
principle in God, but because in so doing the validity 
of the law is upheld along with the moral order of the 
world, so that God may withold punishment from the 
sinner without compromising His righteousness (48). 
There is a sense in which this pattern of thought is 
more adequate to interpret the work of Christ, in that 
God is no longer regarded as being bound to a particular 
form of retributive justice, and therefore that Christ's 
death may be seen in terms other than those that are 
strictly penal, without there being lost the insight 
that sin and judgement are inextricably interwoven. 
However, two points of possible confusion should be 
noted. 
First, because this pattern of thought does not 
need to assert the penal character of Christ's death, 
it may use the less clearly defined language of Christ 
bearing 'the consequences of our sins', primarily in 
the sense of 'dying our death'. While this may remove 
the offensiveness of some penal language, it also 
~ blu~ts the basic issue of the significance of this 
'death' or of 'these consequences'. Simply by replacing 
the concept of punishment with these less clearly 
defined penalties it is not clear that the argument 
has been substantially altered but only that it has been 
less clearly stated. The only circumstance which does 
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change the argwment is when the consequences of sin 
that Christ suffers are related less to the direct 
judgement of God and more to a natural process which is 
only indirectly due to God. Thus, it is possible to see 
in Christ's death God's confirmation of the reality of 
sin, without it being explicitly stated that God 
punishes or inflicts anything on Christ (49). 
Second, even in this latter case the link 
between Christ's suffering or death and our sin remains 
ambiguous and problematic. Some framework is still 
necessary in which it may be asserted that it is the 
consequences of our sins that Christ suffers, or that it 
is our death which he dies, or else the pattern of 
thought reverts to that outlined above as construed 
solely in terms of civil law together with its critical 
problems. It seems to be the case that in order to 
make sense of the terms 'consequences of our sins' or 
'our death' tacit appeal has to be made to those patterns 
of thought which are embodied in criminal law and which 
have already been criticised. The virtue of this 
pattern of thought, despite these confusions, is that it 
can be more clearly seen as an interpretative model which 
articulates the exchange between Christ and his people 
while minimising those features of the model that arise 
from a strictly retributive view of punishment. 
c) The Use of Substitutionary Terminology in 
the Context of Pecuniary Law 
In the context of the model that describes the 
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satisfaction of God through the payment of a debt on 
the analogy of pecuniary or commutative law, the term 
substitution can be seen to be less problematic, in that 
there is no difficulty in conceiving of one being able 
to discharge the deQts of another. So long as the 
character of this debt is not construed in penal terms 
there seems to be no inherent objection to a substituted 
payment by another which satisfies the creditor. 
However, the problem at once arises as to the adequacy 
of the analogy of sin as a debt and consequently as to 
the adequacy of this model for the atonement. It is 
not the case that the concept of a debt precludes a 
moral and serious understanding of sin, for there is 
nothing strange in referring to a debt of service, a 
debt of honour, a debt of love or a debt of obedience. 
In all such cases sin is given the fullest seriousness 
for this debt is before God to whom is due absolute 
service, honour, love and obedience. The analogy of 
debt can make quite clear the structure of sin as the 
non-fulfilment of the highest personal responsibilities 
before God (50). 
The question that comes to the fore when sin 
is construed as debt in this way is whether the analogy 
of the vicarious payment of this debt can still be 
conceived. Is it possible to use the language of debt 
after the analogy of financial transactions when the 
content of the debt has been expressed in such personal, 
moral and individual terms, which transcends pecuniary 
analogies? In other words the model of a pecuniary 
debt warrants the use of the concept of substitution, 
since there are no longer moral or legal problems 
inherent in such a vicarious payment, but as soon as 
the language of 'debt' is filled out and personalised 
in the sort of context that can relate it to the 
seriousness of sin the model, as a substitutionary 
model becomes susceptible to all the moral and legal 
objections previously encountered. The strength of the 
pecuniary model is that the fundamental reality of the 
exchange in which Christ fulfils the debt which is owed 
to God in our place is capable of clear articulation, 
since Christ pays our debt in obedience, love, service 
and honour. By means of an analogy of a vicarious act 
that is instantly intelligible, the character of 
Christ's vicarious act is at once articulated and 
illuminated despite the fact that a literal application 
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of the payment of this debt is not instantly in~elligible. 
This is in contrast to a penal exchange, where the 
vicarious aspect is not intelligible even in analogy 
since there are no general circumstances in which the 
innocent suffers justly for the guilty. The analogy of 
a debt carries with it potential misunderstandings, as 
does any model, but at its heart it illuminates and 
expresses the exchange that takes place between Christ 
and his people. 
It is significant that, although the term 
substitution has been used until now to describe this 
vicarious payment of debts, the analogy on which it 
rests allows for a recognition of the relation between 
this debt and the consequent response of mankind. 
Although Christ pays our debt and therefore man is 
free of his debt before God, the term representation 
may be employed at this point to express the insight 
that there is a continuing debt before God which man 
must pay and into which he is drawn by virtue of the 
character of Christ's work. 
4. The Moral Relevance of the Terms Substitution 
and Representation 
In this section the claim is critically 
investigated that patterns of substitution are 
essentially morally irrelevant while patterns of 
representation embody or generate moral value. The 
controlling presupposition for such claims is that the 
concept of atonement refers not solely or primarily to 
the satisfaction of sin before God but partiallS or 
wholly to the moral growth of the individual or 
community so that sin is overcome in reality and 
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reconciliation is thereby effected between man and God. 
The use of the term substitution is held to denote or 
imply an exclusive work before God, removing from the 
sphere of atonement the moral state and growth of the 
individual which thus renders the act of atonement 
itself morally irrelevant. As shall be seen, the term 
representation may be emplpyed to answer or avoid this 
charge of exclusiveness so that the atonement itself 
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can be seen to have moral content and relevance. 
The claim that the concept of atonement 
itself must consist of a reconciliation between God 
and man which is based on man's actual moral condition 
and God's moral nature is put succinctly by Rashdall: 
For those who believe in a righteous God, God 
must be supposed to act in a way which the moral 
consciousness approves. If a man has actually 
returned to the right moral state - for this 
is what repentance means - a righteous God 
must forgive the past, must judge him according 
to what he is, and not accordin~ to anything 
he was and has ceased to be (51). 
It would not seem possible that the term substitution 
could continue to function in this new context of 
thought on the atonement, but the following quotation 
from Bushnell provides an instructive example of how 
theological vocabulary is thought to be capable of 
new meaning: 
Christ, in what is called His vicarious 
sacrifice, simply engages, at the expense of 
great suffering and even of death itself, to 
bring us out of our sins themselves and so 
out of their penalties: being Himself· 
profoundly identified with us in our fallen 
state, and burdened in feeling with our evils 
(52) . . •. this vicarious sacrifice only does 
and suffers, and comes into substistution for, 
just what any and all love will, according 
to its degree (53). 
Although it is understandable that Bus~~ell should 
want to retain traditional vocabulary it is not clear 
how the term substitution can express the identification 
of Christ with humanity (54). 
However, Bushnell picks up a theme, common in 
this context of the moral relevance of atonement, in 
which Christ is said to 'bring us out of our sins', 
that is, to be not simply an example to be followed, 
but a power of life which enables and informs our 
response. In this pattern of thought the term 
substitution may still have a limited role, in that 
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it may indicate the uniqueness, difference or pre-
eminence of Christ's life over the secondary and 
derivative response of our moral growth. In a similar 
sense Christ may be seen as the sponsor or guarantor 
of our new life, who not only initiates it, but also 
completely realises it, so that even the goal of 
moral growth is determined by his accomplishment (55). 
In these contexts, in a limited sense, Christ may be 
described as our substitute in that his is our sole 
power and end, and his substitutionary role which sets 
him apart from mankind may be contrasted with a 
representative role in which he and mankind are brought 
together in a close relation (56). 
However, because the focus of this pattern 
of thought is upon an imitation or participation in 
Christ's work by man which gives that work atoning 
value, it is more common that the term representation 
be introduced in place of the term substitution. 
Christ is one who represents before God a human nature 
in its moral stature and fullness which is p~asing 
to God, an offering which man may claim as that of 
his representative, thus putting himself within that 
sphere of moral intent which Christ inspires and 
completes (57). Or again, Christ in his holiness and 
perfect moral nature represents mankind in the sense 
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that he creates by his power that pattern of a new 
humanity which is to be realised by individQals and the 
cornmQUity which follow him (58). 
Two points mQst be considered in the light of 
this discQssion. First, any distinction to be drawn 
between those views of atonement which are said to be 
morally relevant and those which, by virtQe of Christ's 
SQbstitQtionary work, are not, mQst be stated with 
precision if it is to be of any valQe, becaQSe the 
majority of those QSing the term SQbstitQtion woQld 
wish to see the moral relevance of Christ's work in 
terms of a response which is SQbseqQent to, and 
dependent Qpon, Christ's own work (59). Similarly, 
those who QSe the term representation in this context 
do not normally wish to deny the primacy and necessity 
of Christ's work which sets OQr own response in 
motion (60). In other words, the QSQal context for the 
QSe of the terms sQbstitQtion and representation is 
formed by the common groQUd of Christ's atoning work 
initiating, empowering, and in some sense inclQding 
the response of others (61). The QSe of the term 
sQbstitQtion does not necessarily denote the moral 
irrelevance of Christ's work, bQt focQsses and 
concentrates on the primacy of this work, to SQCh an 
extent that this is regarded as constitQting atonement, 
while man's response, althoQgh significant, is secondary 
and dependent. EqQally, the QSe of the term repres-
entation does not necessarily relativise Christ's work, 
bQt focQsses attention instead on the fact that withoQt 
the response or the creation of the new humanity, 
Christ's work cannot be considered to be atoning. 
There is a distinction, but it can be drawn only in 
terms of a difference of perspective, emphasis, or 
degree (62). The term substitution highlights one 
aspect of Christ's work, laying stress on its bearing 
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on God; the term representation highlights the bearing 
of that same atoning work on man, but in any description 
of the atonement both aspects would be present. 
Second, this point can be brought out clearly 
by noting that those patterns of thought which focus 
on the moral relevance of Christ's work still presuppose 
some framework in which the language of forgiveness, 
repentance, moral worth, and adequacy still have 
meaning. Moral evil or lack of holiness are said to 
be 'judged' by God; repentance is said to be a 
'condition' for God's forgiveness; the term 'forgiveness' 
itself is meaningless apart from some framework in 
which condemnation is presupposed or judged to be 
appropriate. In other words, to whatever degree 
atonement is expressed in terms of its bearing on man, 
its presuppositions, explicit or implicit, will contain 
some frame of reference which is directed towards God. 
It is particularly the case that when the term rep-
resentation is used in this context it cannot be 
assumed to solve or remove problems of construing 
the atonement in its bearing on God; rather, it is more 
often the case that this aspect is presupposed but 
never clearly articulated or interpreted. 
5. Substitution, the Atonement, and the Trinity 
There will, almost by necessity, be some 
reflection and articulation of trinitarian insights 
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to the doctrine of the atonement, as has been 
demonstrated by the concept of the infinite merit of 
Anselm's God-man, or the infinite dignity of Christ 
which gives infinite value to the suffering of the 
God-man, or even the concept of the perfect holiness 
and offering of Christ (63). In all such examples 
christological or trinitarian insigh~s are an integral 
part of reflection on the atonement and constitute a 
part of the basic 'data' which demands evaluation and 
consideration (64). However, there is a more explicit 
use of trinitarian insights when it is claimed that 
substitutionary models, particularly those which 
involve suffering or punishment, are given greater 
coherence and intelligibility by the assertion that in 
this act God receives on Himself His own punishment 
and judgement (65). Thus, such a trinitarian model 
may counter the accusation that it is unjust for the 
innocent to be punished or judged in place of the 
guilty by arguing that there is no injustice if the 
punisher himself assumes the place of punishment (66). 
However, the use of trinitarian insights in 
this context, rather than rendering the concept of 
substitution more intelligible, in fact translate the 
problems that have been encountered in the use of such 
judicial language into the concept of God. It leads 
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to the concept of an opposition within God, between His 
justice and mercy, or between His wrath and love. 
Side by side in the Godhead, there dwell the 
impulse to punish and the desire to pardon; 
but the desire to pardon is realised, in act, 
by carrying out the impulse to punish; not 
indeed upon the person of the criminal, but 
upon that of his substitute. And the subst-
itute is the punisher himself .... The divine 
compassion itself bears the infliction of the 
Divine indignation, in the place of the 
transgressor (67). 
Such language is, indeed, only making explicit the 
logical conclusion of penal substitutionary thought, 
but in making it explicit and using it as an explanation 
of the rationale of substitution, the character of the 
exchange thereby articulated is transformed (68). An 
act that was perceived to focus on the relation between 
man and God, and on the condition of man before God, 
now becomes an act within God, with Christ's humanity 
instrumental and passive, having no significance for 
our humanity. The general New Testament insight of the 
exchange that takes place between Christ and hi~ people 
before God has become so narrowly focussed in penal 
terms that it has become a transaction between God and 
God, virtually independent of the human story which 
formed its origin and impulse (69). 
An alternative may be posited, that God 
substitutes Himself in the place of man, not to 
receive upon Himself His punishment, but to 'absorb' 
the sin and disease of man, and to take upon Himself 
man's alienation (70). G. Berkouwer comments: 
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... the theopaschite tendency in the new doctrine 
of reconciliation, the new doctrine of 
'substitution', is a human attempt to present 
the trinitarian background of the incarnation 
in a logical synthesis. But in so doing it 
oversteps the limits of speculation, because 
the new doctrine is not concerned with the 
mercy, the concern, the initiative of God, of 
which the Confessions of the Church are full, 
but it speaks of God abandoning Himself, of 
God's taking upon Himself the misery and sin of 
the world, so that it brings in a separate 
concept, namely, the suffering of God, although 
it immediately adds: 'in Christ' ( 71) . 
Thus, it cannot be said that the concept of substitution, 
particularly concepts of penal substitution, become 
more intelligible or more coherent when viewed from this 
perspective of God substituting Himself, punishing 
Himself in place of the guilty. Further, when the term 
substitution is employed in this context, it is often 
held to express the sense of God's identification with 
the human situation or plight - a sense of the term 
that must be rejected for the same reasons as it has 
already been rejected in the context of Christ's 
identification with man. 
Summary and Conclusions 
From the critical analysis of the term 
substitution, and in a limited sense, the term repres-
entation, the following summary is offered together with 
some concluding remarks. The attempt has been made to 
characterise and describe the scriptural material that 
is held to warrant or generate substitutionary language 
and 'theories' of the atonement. From this material 
there emerged a basic pattern of reversal and exchange 
134 
which was rooted in the story of Jesus and his relation 
to God, but which could articulate in varying forms 
the salvific reality of Christian experience. This 
pattern of exchange could then constitute a source 
against which various substitutionary models could be 
checked in order to determine the sense in which they 
were interpretative of Christ's salvific work. In 
order to treat the actual patterns of substitution 
and representation as they refer to the work of Christ 
in their full complexity, four areas of their use were 
examined critically, areas which themselves arose from 
the material' of Chapters II and III. From this critical 
discussion the following points have emerged. 
First, where Chapter II described the variety 
of the uses of the term substitution, which indicated 
that the term functioned as an interpretative tool, the 
present discussion has demonstrated that substitutionary 
terminology is misunderstood if it is regarded as having 
explanatory power or significance in Christian doctrines 
of the atonement. In section 2) of this chapter it was 
demonstrated that substitutionary 'theories' which 
claimed explanatory power were always dependent upon 
and subordinate to the mysterious and inexplicable 
grace of God which wills and brings about salvation. 
The various expressions of penal substitution, which 
are most commonly held to embody a rational explanation 
of Christ's work, were shown to develop and change as 
their failure to explain became apparant, or as the 
explanation offered conflicted with other Christian 
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insights. Ultimately, it was argued, the categories of 
law, whether criminal, civil or private, could provide 
contextual frameworks within which interpretations 
of the New Testament insight of an exchange can be 
offered, but these models are misconstrued and they 
mislead if they are taken to explain 'how' the work of 
Christ saves. 
Second, two particular patterns of substit-
utionary thought were judged to be inappropriate to 
describe the atonement. On the one hand, the exclusive 
use of the concept of civil law failed both to 
substantiate the use of the term substitution since 
the pattern of exchange articulated did not refer to an 
exchange of Christ with man, and it failed to provide 
a coherent framework in which Christ's work could be 
expressed and interpreted. On the other hand, the use 
of the term substitution to express a pattern of 
identification, whether that be the identification of 
Christ or God with man, was found to be misleading and 
unjustified. 
Third, in considering the broad range of penal 
patterns of substitution, this dicussion points to the 
conclusion that, with certain qualifications, penal 
language can provide a contextual framework within 
which the work of Christ may be expressed and within 
which the concept of substitution articulates and 
interprets the pattern of exchange between Christ and 
his people that was discerned in scripture. Qualif-
ications are, however, necessary and can be summarised 
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Qllder four headings: a) the penal framework is only 
acceptable if it is construed as an interpretative 
model, and it becomes QllSuitable for Christian atonement 
theology if it assumes the role of an explanatory 
system; b) the penal framework is only acceptable if 
it is construed as one among a number of interpretative 
models, all of which articulate some dimension of the 
work of Christ, and it becomes unsuitable if it assumes 
the role of a control mechanism, subordinating the 
diverse models of scripture to its single insight; 
c) although penal language may constitute the framework 
for an interpretative model, it should be recognised 
that the judicial categories of the New Testament do 
not demand, or are not necessarily best interpreted by, 
such a framework; the New Testament itself does not 
give prominence to penal terms, and such an-inter-
pretation of the judicial and cultic language is in 
danger of directing attention away from the Ne~ Testament; 
d) the various models of penal substitution must be 
assessed not only by their ability to interpret a 
pattern of exchange that articulates an experience of 
salvation but also by their ability to cohere with 
other patterns of Christian thought. An interpretative 
model must be evaluated not simply by its success in 
interpreting one dimension of Christian thought, but by 
its ability to illuminate a wider pattern of thought, 
and it is on this account that models of penal 
substitution are found to be least adequate. Only 
narrow and restricted understandings of God, sin and 
justice are admitted by these models, and the work of 
Christ is seen narrowly in terms of His death, 
excluding salvific significance to his ministry, life 
and resurrection. If penal frameworks are still to 
have a place in atonement theology, the models which 
they espouse must be more modest and limited in their 
range and significance. 
Fourth, those patterns of substitution which 
were formulated within a non-penal framework were 
shown to contribute significantly to an understanding 
of atonement, since they better preserved their 
interpretative character, they raised fewer problems 
with regard to the central conviction of the 
vicariousness of Christ's work, and they proved better 
able to accommodate and open up other insights into 
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the significance of Christ's work and its relation to 
man. Although problems clearly arise in relation to 
these models they must none the less be recognised as 
contributing significantly to any future discussion of 
the use of substitutionary or representative terminology 
in the doctrine of the atonement. 
Finally, with regard to the relation of the 
terms substitution and representation, on the evidence 
of this discussion both terms were found to have a part 
to play. In relation to an interpretation of the work 
of Christ the use of the term representation was not 
held to solve the difficulties that arose as a result 
of judicial or penal frameworks, but in non-penal 
contexts it could aid interpreting the sense in which 
Christ's work is appropriated and is relevant to man's 
moral condition. A more complete evaluation of the 
two terms must, however, wait until their role in 
expressing the relation between Christ and his people 
or mankind has been examined. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE USE OF THE TERMS SUBSTITUTION AND REPRESENTATION 
TO DESCRIBE THE RELATION BETWEEN CHRIST AND HUMANITY 
Introduction 
The second central issue that serves to 
determine the range of meanings of the terms 
substitution and representation is that of the relation 
of Christ to humanity, or the relation of Christ to 
a certain section of humanity. As in the previous 
chapter we will be concerned first of all to describe 
the biblical motifs that generate this discussion, 
and then we will assess the various models specifically 
related to the terms substitution and representation 
that have been employed to interpret and order this 
biblical material. 
1. The Bearing of Biblical Material on the Use of 
the Terms Substitution and Representation to 
Describe the Relation Between Christ and Humanity 
We begin by describing briefly four biblical 
themes that indicate and express some relation between 
Christ and other people. 
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a) The New Testament language of f.v IC•«rT~ since 
this subject has been exhaustively treated by a number 
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of writers (1), it will be sufficient simply to indicate 
the subject matter under examination by listing the 
nine headings under which E. Best groups all of the 
New Testament texts. l) The form A is in Christ; 
2) the form A does or is something to B in Christ; 
3) the form A does something in the Lord; 4) the form 
A is X in the Lord, where X denotes some quality; 
5) the form God does something to us in Christ; 
6) the form 'the gift of God that is in Christ • Jesus; 
7) the form A, B, C, are one in Christ; 8) passages 
of cosmic significance; 9) natural forms that are not 
distinctive (2). 
The variety of uses and contexts in which 
this phrase occurs weighs against any simple meaning 
or definition being given. As has been noted the 
phrase can frequently mean no more than our word 
'Christian' (3). Or, it may be argued, the phrase is 
simply an expressive use of an instrumental me~ning 
so that the &v lies close to the meaning of dL~ (4). 
In this instrumental sense the phrase may denote the 
sphere of reference of salvation, being accomplished 
by (in) Christ and not by (in) me: ' ... the term sums 
up what has come about for believers through Christ 
and constitutes salvation' (5). If it is denied that 
this phrase carries any more than this instrumental 
sense then its meaning may be taken to be !the new 
basic and all-comprehending reality', the reality of 
the Body of Christ, the Church (6). In Bornkamm's 
words:· 
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QQite often it only expresses rneM~ership of 
the chQrch. ObvioQsly, no profoQDd theological, 
let alone 'mystic', rneanin~ should be wrested 
from such turns of phrase (7). 
However, following Deissrnann's monograph on 
the subject many writers believe the preposition 
to express a spatial dimension so that the believer is 
regarded as being physically in Christ (8). This may 
be conceived of as a participation in the 'ethereal 
substance', the 'sphere of vitalism', of the exalted 
pneQffiatic Christ. Or, following A. Schweitzer, the 
phrase w ,X~""T~ may be taken to refer to the sharing 
in a quasi-physical sense, or the grafting into, the 
corporeity of Christ (9). This refers to the mode of 
being of Christ appropriate to the conditions of the 
Messianic Kingdom which again results in the preposition 
being given local force to indicate a sphere in which 
the elect live (10). 
, 
Thea Preiss contends that this 
concept of Christ as an ethereal substance must be 
rejected, for Paul's idea of new life is no diifuse 
mysticism but flows from justification and remission 
of sins and is expressed in 'the most common and secular 
business terms' (11). Thus R. P. Martin concludes 
that being in Christ 'is a cipher for a network of 
relationships both divine and human ... that stern from 
Paul's orientation as a justified sinner and a redeemed 
man' (12). This relational interpretation is further 
strengthened when it is noted that the phrase 
appears in those very passages where judicial language 
is employed (Rom 3:24, 8:1, 2 Cor 5:21). 
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Clearly, there is no discernable consensus of 
opinion as to the meaning of the phrase ~"' Xe_\ITT~) 
although several main alternatives have become apparent. 
The phrase may be taken to denote a spatial reference, 
pointing to a physical relation constituted by an act 
of inclusion or incorporation; the phrase may be taken 
in an instrumental sense, expressing a concentrated 
interest on the particular agency of Christ; the phrase 
may be taken to express a network of relationships 
within both the unity of the Church and between Christ 
and the Christian as an expression of the reconciling 
activity of Christ; the phrase may be taken to express 
the ultimate grounding of all reality as all things are 
created and consummated in Christ. However, the valuable 
term 'interchange', coined by M. Hooker, expresses 
clearly the main thrust of this language in its bearing 
on soteriology (13). The term points not only to the 
reversal and transforming reality of Christ's salvific 
work, to the change involved, but also to the concent-
ration on the person of Christ and on the immediacy of 
the involvement in relation and participation on the 
part of the believer. 
b) The second biblical theme, that is closely 
) y ,.. . 
related to the language of ev r(•rr•~ , 1s the description 
of the Church, or the community of believers, as the 
Body of Christ (14). Commentators are divided as to 
whether this description is a result and extension of 
the language of being Ev ;<e1 err~ , or whether the 
description of Christ's Body is primary and generates 
the description of being in Christ (15). Whatever 
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the precise relation, the description of the Church as 
the Body of Christ bears on the relation between Christ 
and believers in two different ways, depending on the 
perspective adopted. 
First, the description of the Church as the 
Body of Christ can emphasise and explicate the nature 
of the relation between Christ and believer, or between 
Christ and the Church, as that which exists between a 
head and a body (16). Basic to this view are such 
passages as Col 1:18 - 'He is the Head of the Body, 
the Church; he is the beginning, the first-born from 
the dead, that in everything he might be preeminent' 
- and Eph 1:22-23 - 'God has put all things under his 
feet and has made him the head over all things for the 
Church, which is his body, the fulness of him who fills 
all in all'. As KUng comments, 'the concept of the 
head always carries overtones of the ruler' and it is 
this sense of Christ standing over and against the 
members of his body that is to the fore (17). 
Second, the description of the Church as the 
Body of Christ can serve to characterise the union 
between believers, so that the 'one body' c.onsti tutes 
the continuing corporeal reality of Christ on earth (18). 
By being members of this one body it is emphasised that 
failure to maintain unity in belief and practise is 
tantamount to separation from and a denial of Christ. 
Since the believers in their life together make up the 
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Body of Christ, the life of this body must be congruous 
with the paradigmatic life of Christ, which means that 
this many-membered body can be identified to an extent 
with Christ as the form of his continuing corporeal 
presence in the world. Thus, the context of this 
description of the Church as the Body of Christ is found 
to be paraenetic or hortatory, as can be demonstrated 
by the principal texts of l Cor 12:12 ff and Rom 12:4 ff 
(19). While these two perspectives on the Church as 
the Body of Christ are not contradictory, they do 
develop distinctive insights from the description of 
the 'Body', which result in quite different models 
of the relation between Christ and believers. 
c) The third biblical theme, which deserves 
separate treatment despite its close relation with the 
theme of being in Christ, is found in the texts 
l Cor 15:21 ff and Rom 5:12 ff. In these pass~ges 
parallels are drawn and explored between Adam and Christ, 
in which it is argued certain similarities can be 
asserted as well as certain dissimilarities (20). 
That there is a parallel between the two figures is 
, "' ) A f' 
established by the complementary phrases fi:v ''f 11oo.iA' 
iv-f~ XPHrw, and through the designation ~v&t~-;ros to 
t '- L 
I ,.. 
describe both figures. The fact that the phrase e:v lw 
l 
Xet<rT~ can be directly preceded by a parallel d.l > 
~ 
~vSe~~o~ warns against taking the relation between 
man and Christ in any simple, local or inclusive sense. 
Equally Barrett's questions should be borne in mind in 
any consideration of these texts: 
In what sense is the whole race in Adam? Is 
it the same sense or some other that all men 
are in Christ? Are the 'all' who are in 
Christ the same as the 'all' who are in Adam? 
( 21). 
145 
That there is a contrast between Adam and Christ 
is expressed by a number of statements of opposite or 
contrasting ideas. Death is contrasted with resQrrection, 
disobedience with obedience, jQdgement with jQstification, 
and sin with grace. In addition, Christ's work is 
contrasted with that of Adam by its scope and range. 
This may be indicated by the repeated ~o~~~ f~~v, and 
by SQch terms as ElTt:(.'a-C"e:-uO'~V' , "1T~E=.,,h~t; f..j , and 
Finally the contrast is expressed 
between the 'spiritQal' or 'heavenly' character of 
Christ together with the consequences for those who 
are 'in him' and the 'physical' or 'earthly' character 
of Adam together with those conseqQences for men. 
Despite these contrasts, which mitigate against any 
simplY, parallelism between Adam and Christ, a basic 
pattern of interchange is once again being given 
expression. Whatever the precise force of the phrase 
l ,. )1,:~11 ~~ -.-rit is clear that it is the condition of man as 
characterised by his sin, the solidarity of all men in 
sin and in its conseqQences of death that is being 
considered. EqQally, whatever the precise force of 
the phrase ~ Tc:; "-,err~ a contrast is being drawn which L- {~ ... 
both defines the qQality of the change between the old 
and the new, and the person 'in whom' this change has 
been wroQght, and the interrelation between the old and 
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the new. 
d) The fourth biblical theme that bears on the 
relation between Christ and the believer is to be found 
' ,... in the use of the phrase ~uv ~l~~ together with those 
/ 
verbs prefixed by crvv (22). Commentators have recognised 
) 
that due to the close relation between the phrases ev 
and ~v Je•~T~ the one must be interpreted 
in the light of the other, but it is not easy to see 
how these different descriptions are related to one 
another. The princip~e texts are to be found in 
Rom 6:4-11, Eph 2:5-6, Gal 2:20, 2 Tim 2:11-12, with 
additional references made almost in passing in Rom 8:17, 
Col 2:20 and 3:1. In every case the reference is to 
suffering, dying, rising, living or reigning with Christ, 
thus stamping such language with an unmistakable 
soteriological significance. 
However, it is again the case that any simple 
explanation or account of our presence with Christ is 
controverted by the variations as to the time of this 
participation (23). For example, in the texts where 
baptism is the specified context, Rom 6:4-11 describes 
the believer as having died with Christ, as being raised 
with him in the future and as being dead to sin in the 
present, whereas in Col 2:12-15 not only the death of 
the believer but also his resurrection is said to be 
in the past. A similar contrast is to be found between 
the texts of 2 Tim 2:11-12 and Eph 2:5-6, this time 
relating to the time of our exaltation. As with the 
r 
c) 
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phrase EV fe._l.:rT~ , so the description <Y<>J fetcrT~ focusses 
attention on the relation between Christ's salvific 
work and the participation of the believer in that 
work, but the New Testament leaves open the possibility 
of expressing this relation in terms not only of 
participation and interchange bQt also of imitation 
and duplication (24). 
The four biblical themes outlined above provide 
basic insights concerning the relation between Christ 
and others, a relation that could be expressed from 
the side of the believer by such terms as identification, 
incorporation, participation and imitation. As was 
indicated in the previous chapter, the presence of this 
language alongside the language of exchange (Rom 3:23, 
2 Cor 5:21, 2 Cor 8:9), acting possibly as a corrective 
of certain misinterpretations of this exchange, points 
to a model of 'interchange' (25). In this language 
of interchange, participation, and identification 
physical or spatial metaphors are employed which result 
in patterns of interpretation that are equally 'concrete'. 
ChapterUI demonstrated the patterns of thought and 
the interpretative models that can be employed in the 
context of the terms substitution and representation 
to express and interpret these metaphors - the concept 
of Man or Humanity, the concept of corporateness or 
solidarity, the concepts of centre, paradigm and 
consummator. In this chapter a critical examination will 
take place of such models, evaluating their ability to 
express coherently the biblical insights as to the 
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manner in which our destiny and existence is 'bound up' 
with that of Christ. As in the previous chapter, where 
both the terms substitution and representation were 
considered in the context of the work of Christ, so 
too in the context of the relation between Christ and 
his people both terms will be considered. Although in 
this instance the term representation has been found 
to play the larger part, the contribution of the term 
substitution to express the relation between Christ and 
others, particularly in the phrase 'inclusive 
substitution', must be considered and assessed. As in 
the previous chapter the method employed will be to 
test both the coherence of the model in its relation 
to other Christian insights and the ability of the 
model to express and interpret the biblical themes 
outlined above. 
2. The Theological Context in Which Christ's 
Relation to Others is Defined 
As was shown in the description and discussion 
of the term substitution, it is a common belief that 
if the external and remote patterns of thought that 
are associated with the term could be lessened, 
emphasising instead the immediacy and internality of 
Christ's work, then the concept of atonement should 
become more coherent and intelligible. R. Dale expresses 
this conviction in the following way: 
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... no clear and articulate conception of that 
relation of Christ to mankind which renders it 
possible for him to sustain a representative 
character, appears to have rooted itself in 
the popular theology, or in the moral and 
spiritual life of Christendom .... The general 
and growing dissatisfaction with the theory of 
expiation has probably arisen partly from this 
cause, and it will be impossible for that 
theory to retain its place in the theological 
thought of the church, unless it can be shown 
that the Death of Christ ... for the sins of 
men is the highest expression of an eternal 
relation between Christ and the human race, 
-a relation which ... has nothing in it to 
offend the higher reason or to provoke 
antagonism, and is capable of verification by 
the Christian consciousness (26). 
If it can be affirmed that the believer is 'in Christ', 
included in him, then it may be possible to argue that 
'in Christ' mankind receives its punishment for sin, 
or that 'in Christ' man dies and is resurrected to new 
life, or that 'in Christ' man lives a life of obedience 
and sacrifice pleasing to God. The various expressions 
of the relation of Christ to mankind are not tied to 
any particular model of the work of Christ; indeed, as 
Mozley comments in connection with 'the modern'notion 
of Christ as the Representative Man', the theory of the 
'inclusive humanity' of Christ 'is not self-sufficient: 
it needs to be helped out from other sources before 
we can say what it is that Christ, or mankind in Christ, 
does to make amends for sin' (27). 
However, if some inclusive relation is to be 
affirmed, then it is apparent that some conceptual 
framework must be employed in which this relation may 
be given expression. The first such model to be examined 
is that of Christ as the Universal Man, or more simply 
as The Man, which is then followed by an examination of 
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the models of Christ as the Corporate man, the models 
of solidarity, and the models of archetype and centre, 
in each case considering the model in specific relation 
to the terms substitution and representation as they 
are used in the context of Christian atonement theology. 
a) The Model of Christ the Universal Man 
The model of the Universal Manhood of Christ 
can be found expressed in the following way: Christ 
was a man - on that all will be agreed - but he is also 
more than a man; his manhood is God's manhood, he is 
the man, he is Man, he is the totality of all humanity, 
he is all men (28). In this sense, Christ is the one 
who includes in himself all other members of the human 
race. The argument for Christ's Universal humanity can 
be expressed more precisely in the following way: all 
individual men are human, belonging to the species 
'man', but only Christ can be described as humanity, 
as being in himself the reality that transcends and yet 
embraces all members of the species. His manhood, 
therefore, is generic, not simply one of a kind, not 
differentiated from others in the way that all 
individual members of a species are differentiated, but 
consummating, Universal and inclusive (29). As Man 
he stands in relation to men not by any external agency 
of deputation or delegation, but by the inclusive 
relation constituted by the fact that we are literally 
in him, so that what he does all men do, what happens 
to him happens in actual fact to all men. As K. Adam 
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has said: 
He is not merely a man, he is the Man; not one 
individQal member of mankind bQt the Head of 
Mankind, its new beginning, the first born 
among his brethren, the New Adam. JQst as the 
first Adam . . . was not a man like QS other 
men, bQt was the man, the God appointed 
representative-Gf the whole race who in 
himself contained germinally all possible men 
... so OQr Lord ... is the New Man ... whose 
life and fate are OQr life and fate also (30). 
A common form in which this argwment is to be foQnd is 
when a writer feels free to pass withoQt comment or 
explanation from the designation 'a man' to the general 
terms man, hwman natQre or hwmanity. This is esp-
ecially trQe in the case of the transition so often 
effected from 'a man' to 'Man' (31}. 
The tradition which lies behind the designation 
of Christ as the Universal man is extensive and varied. 
In the Patristic period there can be little doQbt that 
some SQCh concept provided the conceptQal framework 
for what is often called the physical theory of the 
atonement, and it may be claimed that it proviaed the 
impetQs for the development of christological langQage 
concerning Christ's natQre as trQe man. G. S. Hendry 
(" "' argQes that the term ofooocrtos when applied to 
Christ's manhood was intended to assert an ontological 
relation with the race of men so that 'jQst as it was 
trQe to say that "God was in Christ", so also there 
is a sense in which it coQld be said that "Man was in 
Christ"' (32). Hendry illQstrates this position not 
only from eastern writers SQCh as AthanasiQS and 
Gregory of Nyssa, bQt also from the western Hilary of 
Poitiers (33). As Hendry points oQt none of these 
writers feel the necessity of justifying this language 
of Universal manhood, nor do they seek to explain on 
what basis the language of ontological union is 
employed (34). It would seem that as G. Rupp says: 
... In the ecclesiastically normative 
formulation of Chalcedon ... the affirmation 
that Christ is consubstantial with men in 
his humanity assumes a Realist ontology only 
implicitly. But the conception of universal 
or generic human nature in any case functions 
more or less consciously as a cultural 
presupposition in the Patristic and early 
medieval period to facilitate comprehension 
of the connection between Christ's work and 
successive generations of believers (35). 
H. E. W. Turner recognises the part played 
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by Platonic philosophy in this 'cultural presupposition', 
especially in Gregory of Nyssa for whom the 'Platonic 
conceptions of Universals ... is basic to his theology' 
(36), but the following statement of John of Damascus 
exemplifies this Patristic presupposition. 
Essence (Ju~r~ ) is predicated of the indiv-
idual: therefore in each individual of the 
species the essence is perfect (or complete). 
Therefore nei~her do the individuals uiffer 
from one another in essence, but only in respect 
of the accidents which are their characteristlc 
properties. For they define the individual 
as 'essence together with accidents'. So that 
the individual has what is common together with 
that which individualises it, besides existing 
substantially in itself. But the essenee 
does not exist substantially in itself, but 
is only seen in the individuals. When, then, 
one of the individuals suffers, all the essence, 
in respect of which the individual has suffered, 
so far as it is capable of suffering, is said 
to have suffered in one of its individuals; 
without, however, its being necessary that 
all the individuals of the same species should 
suffer with the individual that actually 
suffers (37). 
In the medieval period it is generally 
recognised that the question as to the status of 
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Universals is 'one of the dominant intellectQal issQes', 
bQt the discQssion does not appear to have been related 
closely to soteriology (38). According to Ch DQqQoc 
Thomas AqQinas loses sight of the ontological root 
of the Universality of Christ, treating men as a mosaic 
of separate individQals connected only by their actions, 
\ A 
so that 'en dernien analyse, c'est done la grace 
/ 
sanctificante qQi est le principe immediat de 
IUniversalite de l'hQIDanit~ individQelle de J~sQs' (39). 
It is only in the 19th century that the 
concept of Christ as the Universal man again comes to 
the fore as a theological concept for soteriology (40). 
C. Hodge lists among german theologians the names of 
Nitsch, OlhaQsen and Ebrard; among British theologians 
the names of MaQrice and Morrell; and among American 
theologians the school of MercersbQrg following a 
professor HarbaQgh (41); In Chapter III a nQIDber of 
contemporary examples were given, bQt it should also 
be noted that in Chapter II reference was made to tre 
concept of inclQsive SQbstitQtion which may also be 
intended to express the conviction that an inclQsive 
relation exists between Christ and his people by virtQe 
of his Universal hQIDanity (42). 
However, as might be expected, the notion of 
Christ's Universal manhood has been heavily criticised 
by theologians, generally from the 'common sense' 
perspective that the term humanity is an abstract noun, 
as is the term Man, so to speak of JeSQS as Man or 
Humanity as the one who inclQdes all men is meaningless 
154 
or unintelligible (43). Thus, for example, C. Hodge 
complains that in addition to being merely speculative, 
ethically impossible, anthropocentric and materialist, 
the concept of the universal man is impossible since: 
There is no conceivable sense in which Christ 
had in Himself the whole of humanity, when 
millions of other men existed around him. 
This whole theory ... rests on an unintelligible, 
or meaningless proposition (44). 
Similarly Denney rejects 'the fantastic abstraction 
of a racial act' (45), and V. F. Storr asks 'Do we 
mean that humanity has a life of its own apart from 
the individuals who compose it?' (46). He concludes 
that 'I find it very difficult to attach any meaning 
to the phrase "Christ was inclusive man" which makes it 
possible for me to think of the death on the Cross as 
an act in which all humanity shared' (47). 
H. E. W. Turner, commenting on the au~~? of 
Athanasius asks: 
Is this humanity a single humanity or humanity 
as such? If the former, how can the a~sumption 
by the A~~os of a particular humanity avail 
for the sins of humanity as a whole? If the 
latter, can any convincing significance be 
attached to a humanity which lacks part-
icularity? We are here confronted with the 
dilemma which was to embarrass the Greek 
tradition of Christology for centuries, and 
which perhaps has not been successfully overcome 
even yet ( 48) . 
On a more aggressive note Rashdall opposes the concept 
of Christ as Universal man on the grounds that it 
testifies to a false 'metaphysical theory', supposedly 
derived from Plato, but an 'insult' to him (49). The 
result of this 'bastard platonism' (50) is that Christ 
is regarded as a 'metaphysical entity which had somehow 
got incarnated in a human body' and which necessarily 
replaces the person of the Christ of history by an 
impersonal, unreal and metaphysical Christ (51). 
These comments are specifically addressed to Moberly, 
but more generally he comments that 'a Universal 
cannot be a particular member of the class indicated 
by the class-name' (52). M. Wiles, commenting on the 
Patristic understanding of a Universal human nature, 
recognises that such a concept is understandable and 
intelligible within the context of platonic thought 
forms, but that although: 
there is something in common between all men, 
which we are indicating by our use of the 
words 'human nature' ... I doubt if many 
people today can really visualise or express 
that which is common to mankind as a whole as 
strongly as our principle seems to require 
if it is to retain its verisimilitude (53). 
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It may help in an assessment of the language of 
Christ as the Universal, inclusive and representative 
man, to outline the different ways in which it is 
possible to use the language of universals, and thereby 
to reach some understanding of the theological use 
appropriate to this language (54). First, a universal 
may be spoken of in the sense of a reality which has 
logical and ontological priority over the particulars 
which participate in and derive their characteristics 
from the universal. In this sense the Universal man 
is conceived as a reality standing over and before all 
individual men, who only are men in that they 
participate in the universal. In the incarnation 
Christ may be thought to have been united to this 
universal, or he may be thought of as the universal 
which has been given specific form (55). 
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Second, a universal may be taken as the common 
specific form which can be apprehended in a group of 
objects which enables both their common classification 
and the recognjtion of their individual status. In 
this sense universals cannot be said to exist in the 
same sense that individuals exist, for the individual 
is unique and cannot be common to many whereas the 
universal is that which is common to many and therefore 
cannot be. However, in this view, the universal can 
act as a subject, since something can meaningfully be 
said of it, and it can be predicated of an object. In 
this sense, to speak of a Universal man is not meaning-
less, but it would not be possible to speak of him in 
the same sense of which the individual is spoken (56). 
Third, a universal may be construed as a 
necessary accompaniment to the perception·of reality, 
functioning in the mind as a regulative concept which 
enables the observer to perceive and recognise reality. 
The universal is the presupposition or the product of 
the ability to classify and recognise community amongst 
complex and diverse forms. The universal is therefore 
an epistomological category that allows for the recog-
nition of the individual and the class or species to 
which he belongs. The Universal man is thus a logical 
and epistomological construct which corresponds to the 
observer's experience of the complex reality of indiv-
idual humans (57). 
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From this outline of the different ways in 
which the language of universals may be used it follows 
that the use of such language by a theologian does not 
necessarily commit him to a particular metaphysic. 
Rather, it is the case that the theologian uses the 
language of universals in order to express the New 
Testament insight that individual human destiny is 
'bound up with' the person of Christ, that his life is 
decisive for the life of all men, and that his relation 
with God is constitutive of our relation. In other 
words, the language of universals is an immediate 
expression and consequence of the conviction of the 
universality of Christ. Indeed, a careful study of 
Patristic writers who draw heavily on such language 
points to this conclusion, in that distinctions are 
carefully drawn so as to subordinate the metaphysical 
context implied in the language of universals to the 
tensions and claims of Christian faith (58). Thus, 
the language of universals can be a powerful model for 
interpreting Christian insights, where the ambiguity 
and diversity ill this language, which results from the 
different metaphysics in which it is formulated, is not 
the immediate concern of the theologian. As a model 
its coherence is founded not upon a particular 
metaphysic, but upon the significance of Christ, of 
whom it is said that he is 'before' all men in such a 
way that all other men are wholly dependent upon him; 
that he is the 'summation' of all men in such a way 
that our common human nature is seen to receive its 
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full expression and destiny; that he is a paradigmatic 
form of humanity in such a way that individuals may 
define their actions and experience in the light and on 
the basis of his. 
When a theologian moves from the language of 
'man' to that of 'Man', or from a human nature to 
Humanity, he is drawing upon a model which has its roots 
deep in the structure of human perception, thought and 
language and which functions to express and interpret 
the universal significance of Christ. 
However, there are occasions where this 
language would appear to be misconstrued and misused, 
where the charges of 'bastard Platonism', 'outmoded 
realism', have more force. For example, what is the 
significance and status of the language that as Jesus 
is Man, Universal Man, all men are thereby punished 
in his punishment, or all men die in his death and are 
raised in his resurrection? On the understanding 
given above, such language would be construed as 
expressing the significance of Christ's work, its uni-
versality, in the sense that if punishment is seen to 
be a legitimate understanding of that work then salvation 
is apprehended as liberation from punishment, and that 
liberation is effected through a universal range and 
efficacy. Equally, Jesus as Man undergoing death and 
resurrection expresses the conviction that the history 
of this man is decisive and constitutive for the history 
of all men. However, this language often seems to be 
employed and understood not as an interpretation which 
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expresses Christ's universal significance, but as an 
explanation which justifies the belief that Christ's 
work is salvific for other men (59). The pattern of 
thought that, for example, finds Christ to be a 
substitute in the sense of bearing our punishment or 
death, and then seeks to apply that insight by appealing 
to the universal category 'Man', not only misconstrues 
such language, but also fails to recognise the origin 
and impulse of its use. The very fact that Christ is 
seen to bear our punishment or ~ death suggests that 
his universal significance is an implicit part of 
language about his salvific work, which may be expressed 
and interpreted by means of universal categories, but 
is not to be explained or justified by them. Such a 
view reverses the pattern and direction of Christian 
thought and experience and distorts the significance of 
the language of universals by failing to recognise their 
interpretative function as models. 
b) The Model of Christ as Corporate Man 
The second model that may be employed to 
substantiate the language of the inclusiveness of Christ 
draws specifically on the scriptural theme of the Body, 
and indeed, has been advanced as the Hebraic pattern 
of thought over and against the 'Greek' concept of the 
Universal man (60). As was noted in Chapter III this 
model can be employed to express both the consequences 
of Christ's saving work, that we are thereby incorporated 
into his Body, and to denote the presupposition for 
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that work, that in Christ, the corporate man, all men 
have already died (61). The oscillation between these 
two patterns of thought plays on the ambiguity of the 
phrase 'the Body of Christ' which can be taken to refer 
both to the physical constitution of the earthly Jesus 
and to the community of the church in its communion 
with the exalted Jesus (62). The concern of this 
section is to examine the models of Corporate Personality 
and the Body which substantiate this language of 
corporeity and incorporation. 
i) The concept of Corporate Personality was first 
advanced by H. W. Robinson (63) and it was r4pidly 
seized upon by many commentators as a means of rendering 
intelligible 'a much too crude mythology' (64). 
Robinson himself gave the term a restricted place, 
because, as shall be seen, the logic of his argument 
dictated that the notion of corporate personality could 
play no part in a contemporary understanding of the 
relation between Christ and mankind (65). However, 
because the term corporate personality has become such 
a familiar part of theological vocabulary, its origin 
as an anthropological construct to characterise patterns 
of 'primitive mentality' is often ignored. J. W. Rogerson 
has subjected the concept to an anthropological enquiry 
and argues that a distinction be made between 'corporate 
responsibility' which is a phenomenon of social groupings 
regarded without differentiation by law, and the 
psychological dimension that the term corporate 
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personality is meant to indicate, that is, the inability 
of the primitive consciousness to distinguish between 
the individual and the group in the way in which 
modern man does, and the corresponding notion that the 
individual personality was conceived as being capable 
of extension in society (66). 
Rogerson rightly argues that this latter 
dimension be rejected as an account of Hebrew thought 
and institutions (67). In proposing it Robinson was 
/ drawing on the anthropological theories of Levy-Bruhl, 
who argued that primitive mentalitie~ as opposed to 
civilized mentalities, thought and perceived within 
a network of alien concepts (68). Levy-Bruhl argued 
that such primitive mentalities thought in terms of 
'participatory representations', so that identifications 
between objects, persons and animals could readily be 
made (69). Robinson applies this theory to Hebrew 
thought and institutions, arguing that the ability of~ 
prophet to represent or 'be' God and the ability of the 
individual to be identified with his family or nation 
are not figures of speech or metaphors but literal 
statements of fact (70). The term corporate person-
ality was therefore supposed to be an explanation of 
patterns of Hebrew thought and behaviour that are now 
problematic and alien. 
Two comments must be made concerning the use 
of this anthropological theory. First, for a number of 
/ 
reasons Levy-Bruhl's theory of primitive mentalities 
and their manner of perceiving the world has been 
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largely rejected by anthropologists. Levy-Bruhl was 
possibly right to seek the resolution and meaning of 
certain patterns of thought and behaviour within the 
context of social structures, but he was wrong in his 
interpretation of those structures and in his view of 
primitive mentality (71). In particular the supposed 
identifications between individuals, animals and 
groups on closer inspection proves to be far more subtle 
and less problematic than might have been supposed (72). 
While corporate patterns of thought are certainly 
present in the Old Testament and while these patterns 
may be elucidated by an understanding of the social 
structure of corporate responsibility, Levy-Bruhl's 
theory of primitive mentality cannot be drawn upon by 
the theologian to substantiate the concept of corporate 
personality as a psychological or ontological description. 
. / Second, even lf Levy-Bruhl's theory were 
correct it would be impossible to apply the concept of 
corporate personality to the person of Christ as an 
explanation of his inclusive salvific work. Not only 
can there be no justification for applying a theory 
of primitive mentality to first century Jews and Greeks, 
but also its use as an explanatory or interpretative 
device for a contemporary 'civilized mentality' must 
also be illegitimate (73). The commentator cannot have 
/ it both ways: either Levy-Bruhl is correct, in which 
case the theory of corporate personality must be tied 
strictly to the primitive mentality of the early 
Hebrews and remain contradictory or 'pre-logical' to us; 
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or, Levy-BrQhl is incorrect in his description of 
primitive mentality, in which case there is no justif-
ication for a continued use of the concept of corporate 
personality as an explanation of that mentality (74). 
It appears to be the case that theologians employed the 
concept of corporate personality because it seems to 
explain how and why the New Testament saw Christ as a 
Universal figure to whom all are related so that they 
may be said to be really or potentially 'in him'. Not 
only, however, does the understanding of corporate 
personality rest on a spurious abstraction from Hebrew 
thought and is inapplicable to the New Testament, but 
also its continued use as an 'explanation' of the sig-
nificance of Christ reveals the misunderstanding to which 
language about the universality of Christ is prone (75). 
ii) The language of the 'Body' is more evidently 
a model which is expressive of relations rathe~ than an 
explanation or a constitutive reality, and is therefore 
less open to misconstruction than the model of corporate 
personality. None the less, caution must be exercised 
when considering the view, for example, of L. S. Thornton, 
where the relation to Christ expressed by the concept 
of 'the Body of Christ' (the Church) is referred also 
to the body of Christ (his physical constitution), 
particularly in his work on the cross (76). Rather, the 
model of incorporation, more clearly expresses the 
conviction of the universal significance of Christ, 
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interpretj_ng and illuminating the sphere of relation-
ships and responsibilities into which the Christian 
enters. The same may be said for the concept of 
'solidarity' as it expresses the inclusive significance 
of Christ in terms of the 'physical' model of union or 
conjunction. In both cases the commentator is doing 
little more than repeating scriptural analogies without 
making explicit the frameworks of thought on which 
such analogies are dependent. It is more likely that 
if appeal is made to the concept of the Body or to the 
notion of solidarity it will be undergirded by a 
recognition of a social awareness of community and 
interdependence and will be given expression in terms 
of patterns of social solidarity. 
iii) The presupposition for the model of social 
solidarity is that every person 'is involved in the 
society in which he lives by what he does and by his 
share in the deeds of others' (77). The structure of 
vocation, the division of labour, the common biological 
and psychological heritage all involve relationships 
of dependence so that not only do the actions of one 
affect the fate of others, but it may be said that all 
are involved in the actions of others (78). However, 
a distinction must be drawn to preserve the validity of 
the model of solidarity between the consequences of 
actions and the actions themselves. The patterns of 
dependence, and the social structures that order human 
existence, clearly result in a participation in the 
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consequences of the actions of others, but only by 
distorting the language of dependence can it be said 
that in the participation of these consequences there 
takes place a participation in the events themselves 
(79). 
Further, this distinction between consequences 
and actions, or between effects and causes, must be 
recognised when appeal is made to the model of social 
solidarity to establish the possibility and reality of 
a vicarious bearing of judgement, guilt, or punishment 
(80). The fact that another may be involved in the 
consequences of the sin of another does not establish 
that they are therefore involved in the sin itself. 
As H. Neie comments: 
Personal guilt and responsibility, in spite 
of all sharing with others who contributed to 
my failure through their sin of commission or 
omission, is not transferable. No one can 
vicariously bear my guilt even if he (she) 
bears the consequences of my failure (81). 
Thus, the language of social solidarity may ar~iculate 
the conviction of Christ's universal and decisive 
significance, and it may interpret this significance by 
means of patterns of dependence with which all are 
familiar, but when viewed more closely the model does 
not point to the New Testament insight that the believer 
is engaged with Christ himself, but rather indicates 
a relation between Christ and the believer which is 
expressed in terms of actions and their consequences. 
The intention of the model is to interpret the sense 
in which the believer is 'bound up' with Christ, but it 
succeeds only in establishing a relation of dependence, 
and thus it fails to interpret the pattern of inter-
change which the New Testament applies between Christ 
and his people. 
c) The Model of Christ as Archetype or Centre 
Attention must now be focussed on the use of 
the terms representation and inclusive substitution 
to describe the 'inclusive character' of Christ not in 
ontological terms but in terms of his quality as an 
archetype, prototype or centre - the 'typical' man 
who embodies, introduces and inspires a new humanity 
which hereafter looks to him both as its source and 
goal (82). In this pattern ci thought Christ'::= 
universality is interpreted and expressed not in terms 
of an ontological inclusion in his being or work, but 
in relational terms of dependence and invitation. 
In Chapter III it was shown that this relation could 
be referred either to particular qualities exhibited 
by Christ which are taken as determinative and 
normative for all other men#as for example his love, 
obedience etc; or to particular conditions of Christ's 
being which are taken as archetypal and constitutive 
for the being of other men (his God-manhood, the union 
of divine and human) (83). Whatever the quality or 
condition of Christ that is taken to be fundamental 
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and salvific, the relation that is posited with men 
follows a similar pattern: that which is evinced in 
Christ has universal significance as being determinative 
for men, to be realised and reflected in their 
individual existences, and as constitutive for all men 
initiating a new pattern of humanity, realising a 
destiny for mankind that is the first fruit of every 
individual's destiny. 
It would be possible only to see this pattern 
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of thought in terms of its philosophical or metaphysical 
origins and to charge it as being 'Hegelian' or 'Kantian', 
as the concept of Christ as Man could be labelled 
'Platonic', but such a criticism would miss what is 
significant in this contribution, in that once again 
a range of models are employed to interpret the 
universal significance of Christ (84). Two comments, 
however, should be noted. 
First, in this designation and description of 
Christ the term representation plays an important 
part, for it contains and evokes a double reference. 
On the one hand, to describe Christ as representative 
can point to Christ himself, in whatever quality or 
condition that is taken to be the embodiment of true 
humanity. On the other hand, to describe Christ as 
representative can point instead to his followers in 
the sense that what is seen in Christ is to be 
realised or reproduced in them. This double reference 
of the term representation allows a complex pattern 
of relation and association to be established that 
binds together the representative and those who are 
represented in networks of dependence which constantly 
evoke both the source and the goal of Christian 
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discipleship. 
Second, this use of the term representation 
can be seen to underlie and establish its interpretative 
role in the ontological contexts that have been 
examined. The term representation can evoke an 
inclusive relation which can be expressed in ontological 
terms precisely because the pattern of the relationship 
embraces both partners in a description of their 
associated roles. In this sense the use of the term 
representation in a political context is revealing, 
for the use of the term allows a transition to be made 
from the language of a functional relation which serves 
the end of the constituent to the language of the 
actual presence of the constituent 'in' the person of 
the representative. Such a transition is not invalid 
when the term representation is allowed to evoke this 
double reference of mutual interdependence and resp-
onsibility. It is only when this pattern of relation 
fails on one side that representation becomes mis-
representation and to speak of a 'real' presence becomes 
morally impossible. 
Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter attention has been focussed 
on the manner of the relation that exists between the 
believer and Christ, as this relation bears on the use 
of the terms representation and substitution. Four 
New Testament themes were examined which indicated a 
pattern of inter-relation, dependence and commQnity, 
a pattern that was seen to be well expressed by the 
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term 'interchange'. Three different sets of models which 
arose from the description of the terms in Chapters II 
and III, were then examined as they attempted to 
interpret and order this biblical material: the models 
of Christ as Man or Universal Man; the models of Christ 
as a corporate person, as a Body, and as existing 
within patterns of solidarity; the models of Christ 
as archetypal, typical or exemplary man. 
As in the previous chapter conclusions are 
offered on the basis of an assessment of the models in 
their ability to interpret and express the New Testament 
insights of the relation between Christ and men, and 
on the basis of the coherence of these models as they 
act as interpretative frameworks, particularly in their 
relation to the terms substitution and representation 
which can be used in these contexts. On these criteria 
two models were judged to be inadequate to aid inter-
pretation. First, the model of corporate personality, 
when used to express the inclusive relation between 
Christ and his people, was seen to be an artificial 
abstraction from the biblical material and from the 
point of view of its own coherence could not be used 
to interpret the significance of Christ. Second, the 
model of social solidarity, to which appeal is often 
made in the context both of the language of corporate 
personality and that of the Body, was seen to be 
inadequate as it could indicate only the relation of 
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dependence between the believer and Christ, but it 
could not interpret the immediacy of this relation or 
its interdependence as witnessed to by the New Testament. 
In the course of this chapter it has twice 
been noted that the phrase 'inclusive substitution' 
could be used to express the relation between Christ 
and his people. On the one hand it could express the 
ontological relation of inclusiveness, while on the other 
hand, it could be employed to express the universal 
significance and centrality of Christ. In both contexts 
the meaning and intelligibility of the phrase must be 
challenged. In the first place, referring to the 
inclusive significance of the work of Christ, the phrase 
is at best confusing and at worst contradictory. The 
term substitution, as was shown in Chapter IV, is 
closely allied to a pattern of exchange, a pattern that 
may be expressed and interpreted in varying conceptual 
frameworks, but one which demands the use of phrases 
such as 'in our place', and 'in our stead'. It is 
understandable that those who wish to use the term 
substitution should wish also to recognise the force 
of the New Testament description of being 'in Christ' 
or 'with Christ', but the mere addition of the term 
'inclusive' to the concept of substitution that is 
otherwise defined in terms of an exchange, or of an 
exclusive work means either that doubt is cast on the 
validity of the term substitution, or that its inclusive 
character is not really taken seriously, or that 
Christian atonement theology is faced with a fundamental 
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contradiction. It may be true to argue that the models 
of substitution and inclusiveness both have a part to 
play in illuminating and interpreting the Christian 
understanding of atonement, but to use a phrase like 
'inclusive substitution' demonstrates that the purpose 
and function of these models has not been grasped. 
In the second place, the use of the phrase 'inclusive 
substitution' in the context of describing Christ as the 
centre of humanity, or the one who has universal signif-
icance, is simply misleading. The term substitution 
in this context is used in a sense that bears little 
relation to the patterns of thought that are usually 
associated with the term, and the addition of the term 
'inclusive', while indicating the changed context of 
the substitutionary thought does not evoke or express 
this new context. Indeed it seems to be the case 
that traditional language is preserved for the sake of 
appearances, which, however, conceals a markedly 
different pattern of thought. 
The examination of the New Testament themes of 
the inclusive and universal significance of Christ 
indicated that this language is a significant part of 
the problematic that demands interpretation and 
expression as the meaning of the atoning work of Christ 
is explored. The subsequent Christological affirmations 
of Chalcedon and Nicea impressed this language with an 
ontological frame of reference which continues to exert 
a powerful influence ori soteriological thought. It is 
in this context that the language of Christ as Man or 
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Universal Man was recognised to express and articulate 
his universal significance, so that, despite the 
difficulties and problems encountered in these form-
ulations, the attempt is true to the fundamental insight 
that between Christ and his people there exists a 
relationship such that man can be said to be 'bound up' 
with Christ. It was recognised that although these 
models appeal to underlying linguistic and philosophical 
discussions as to the status of Universals, they are 
not themselves philosophical constructs that can be 
accepted or rejected on the grounds of their 'Platonism' 
or 'Nominalism'. Rather, an awareness of the philo-
sophical discussion and problems should serve to 
underline the appropriateness of the models as appealing 
to a fundamental character of human discourse and 
perception, and should also indicate the limits of the 
model, preventing it from becoming an explanation which 
is dependent upon a particular philosophical tradition 
or metaphysical view. Provided that the description 
of Christ as Man is seen to be interpretative of his 
universal significance, and does not become an explan-
ation of inclusive patterns of thought, the model has 
an important role in atonement theology. The reservation 
that must accompany it lies precisely in the fact that 
the model is so easily and frequently misconstrued to 
authorise certain explanatory patterns of thought. 
However, the final section of the chapter also 
demonstrated that the universality of Christ could be 
expressed and interpreted through the models of archetype 
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and centre. Despite the fact that these models make 
use of functional rather than ontological descriptions, 
the characteristics of interchange and inclusiveness 
are preserved. The relation between an image and its 
reflection, between an archetype and its copy, is 
complex and mutually defined, so that a pattern of 
interrelation and interdependence emerges which power-
fully interprets the New Testament themes of 'in Christ' 
and 'with Christ'. It seems inevitable that functional 
descriptions appear inferior to ontological descriptions 
of inclusiveness or relation, but in this context at 
least they are not to be despised as they articulate 
and interpret the extent to which the believer is 'bound 
up' with Christ. 
The part played by the term representation 
in this complex set of models must now be considered. 
First, the term representation is understood in three 
senses that are often described as wholly separate, 
but which in fact are seen to overlap to a considerable 
extent and to depend on the meanings of each other. 
It would be possible to define the term representation 
in the light of the models of section a) as referring 
to a person who literally includes others in himself, 
who is a representative of others because he is in some 
sense a supra-individual; to define the term in the 
light of the models of section b) as referring to a 
person whose individuality is extended to embrace others 
so that they may be said to be a part of their represent-
ative; to define the term in the light of the models of 
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section c) as referring to a person who initiates or 
typifies a quality or an action which is understood to 
be determinative and of central significance for others. 
However, to define the term representation 
in these three different ways would be to fail to 
recognise the complex, ambiguous and often undisclosed 
structure of representation that is always present. 
For these three expressions of the phenomenon of 
representation reflect the ambiguity that is always 
present in the term between 'counting as present' and 
'being present', between 'participation' and 'delegation', 
and between 'embodiment' and 'response'. When a literal 
inclusiveness is said to be denoted by the term 
representation it is clear that the language of 'being 
counted as present' is being 'stretched' by the insight 
that a representative is something that, or someone 
who, actually embodies or typifies those who are rep~ 
resented, so that it is often hard to distinguish 
between the language of Christ 'the representative of 
man' and Christ 'the representative man', although 
fundamentally different patterns of thought are being 
employed and evoked. Similarly, the language of Christ 
incorporating others so that they may be represented 
by him constantly oscillates between the individual and 
the supra-individual, between the earthly reality of 
Jesus and the spiritual constitution of the Church. 
The concept of representation used to describe this 
relation between Christ and man constantly reflects and 
embodies these different insights, so that the structure 
of representation is never simple but always involves 
an appeal to a complex set of representative 
relationships. 
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Second, the complex set of associations attached 
to the term representation is further enlarged by 
considering the patterns of representation that were 
discussed in Chapters III and IV, as the term was 
taken to refer to the work of Christ. As was shown, 
these patterns of representation describe and define 
the work of Christ in terms of the manner in which it 
becomes our work, in terms of our dependence upon it, 
and in terms of our continuing dependence upon it, as 
through Christ we are brought into the presence of God. 
ClP.arly this use of the term representation to express 
the work of Christ is not independent of its use to 
express the relation between Christ and man, for it 
draws upon common themes and ideas, but it refers these 
insights to a different context and so further enhances 
the term representation in its ability to evoke and 
express the conceptual matter of the Christian faith 
in its complexity. In this context the association of 
the term representation with the term 'interchange' is 
attractive, in that not only does it allow for 
development and expression of the inter-relationship 
that is understood to be a part of the New Testament 
witness to the salvific reality of Christ, but also it 
allows for the development and expression of the reality 
of the reversal or change that is involved in and occurs 
as a result of this saving work. 
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Thus, it may be concluded that the term 
representation expresses by means of various contextual 
frameworks the New Testament insight that believers 
are 'bound up' with Christ in a pattern of relationships 
that expresses and evokes structures of dependence and 
responsibility, participation and imitation, presence 
and absence. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUBSTITUTION AND REPRESENTATION IN THE WORK OF 
D. SOLLE 
Introduction 
Having completed our examination of the terms 
substitution and representation as they have been 
found to occur in the formulation of doctrines of the 
atonement, and having discussed and criticised their 
range of meanings together with the models that are 
held to be appropriate to articulate those meanings, 
the task remains to examine in greater depth the work 
of one theologian who has given specific attention to 
the terms and their use. The theologian in question 
is D. Salle, and the work in which she deals with 
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these issues is entitled 'Christ the Representative' (1). 
As has been stated in the introduction to this study 
the examination of Selle's work that is found in this 
chapter stands parenthetically to the main body of the 
thesis, contributing towards an understanding of the 
terms substitution and representation and acting as 
a test case and a reference point to check on the 
analysis of the terms that has so far been offered. 
The reasons for Salles work occupying this place will 
become clearer throughout the course of this chapter, 
but briefly stated S5lle writes from a vantage point 
and with intentions that are Qllique to this enquiry 
and which render any discussion of her contribution 
highly problematic. In particular two features of her 
work must be singled out to illustrate the eccentricity 
of her approach. 
First, the controlling presupposition of 
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Salle's examination, and the framework in which she 
elucidates the meaning of substitution and representation 
is that theology, as a 'reflective description of certain 
experiences' (2), can only be conceived within a post-
theistic experience of the world (3). Theological 
reflection must now be determined by 'the new experience 
of God which characterises our contemporary situation, 
the experience of the individual who finds himself 
insecure and alone in a completely changed world and 
society' (4). Salle employs the familiar phrase 'the 
death of God' to give 'theological expression to these 
changed psychosocial conditions' (5). The character-
istics of these changed conditions will be considered 
in more precise detail shortly, particularly in their 
bearing on the formulation of Christology and Soteriology, 
but for the moment it must simply be recognised that for 
Salle 'atheism is merely a different mode of speech 
from theism' (6). 
Second, this post-theistic context of 'theology' 
means that Salle's formulation of the concept of 
representation is integrally boQlld up with her intention 
to express anthropologically what was formerly expressed 
theologically (7). In other words the term representation 
embraces a complex set of fQnctions, all of which are 
interrelated in Solle's intentions, which are difficult 
to disentangle from one another, and whose precise 
force and manner of interrelation is difficult to 
perceive. One function of the term representation is 
to express the character of Christ's representation of 
men before God, but because Salle has already argued 
that the structure of representation itself is the key 
to the quest for human identity, the phrase 'before 
God' adds nothing new to the term representation (8). 
Thus, it is the function of the term representation 
to translate theological language into anthropological 
language, and the pattern of representation disclosed 
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must be seen to be integrally bound up with that intention. 
In a similar fashion Salle also employs the term to 
express Christ's representation of God to man, and 
again the structure of representation becomes the means 
by which this theological language can be given_ 
anthropological content. In this case (as is perhaps 
also the case with Christ's representation of man before 
God) the issue is further complicated by the fact that 
theological language is not wholly expressed by anth-
ropological language since God is said still to have 
a future, although what this future is remains ambiguous. 
Thus, because of the distinctive theological 
context in which Solle wishes to examine the meaning 
of the terms substitution and representation, and 
because of the variety of functions given to the latter 
term, a separate examination has been regarded as 
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appropriate to grasp the complexity of Salle's 
investigation and to relate her discussion to the main 
body of this study. 
The intention of the chapter is as follows. 
First, the phenomenon of representation and its relation 
to the question of identity as conceived by Salle will 
be described and discussed. Second, the specific 
characteristics that Salle uses to describe Christ's 
work of representation will be examined. Third, 
Salle's understanding and criticism of the term 
substitution will be considered. Finally, some 
assessment will be made of Salle's use and understanding 
of the terms, together with an assessment of the 
contribution of her work in the light of the analysis 
of the terms that ha.s already been offered in this 
study. 
1. The Phenomenon of Representation as 
Conceived by D. Salle 
Part One of 'Christ the Representative' is 
sub-titled 'A Provisional Interpretation', whose 
specific task is to 'describe the phenome~on of 
representation, and to illustrate its structures from 
a sociological and anthropological standpoint' (9). 
This description is necessary since the concept of 
representation 'can only be used to describe the work 
of Jesus if it is firmly rooted in human relationships 
in society - in other words, only if it matches a 
universal phenomenon in our world as well' (10). 
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However it is necessary to recognise and clarify the 
two controlling presuppositions of the enquiry which 
are mentioned in a preliminary fashion in an intro-
ductory chapter to the book. 
The first presupposition is constituted by the 
question 'how can one achieve personal identity?' (11). 
The search for the 'Kingdom of identity' (12), the 
longing of man for identity, is regarded as 'axiomatic' 
(13) and in need of no further demonstration. 
Whether there ever have been or ever will be 
human lives not engaged in this search for 
personal identity cannot be demonstrated 
empirically or historically. Nor does this 
lessen the gravity of the question for 
ourselves ( 14). 
No further discussion is offered at this point by Solle 
to clarify what is meant by personal identity, nor 
to substantiate the claim that the search for identity 
constitutes the 'unconditional' (15) for contemporary 
man, but the reasons for the crisis of identity become 
\ appar~nt when Salle's second controlling presupposition 
is considered. 
This presupposition refers to the circumstances 
and conditions under which man's longing for identity 
takes place, the historical condition experienced as 
'the death of God' and embodied in a post-theistic 
culture and pattern of thought (16). For Salle the 
phrase 'the death of God' describes an experience which 
the terms theism and atheism both alike fail to 
recognise, for this is a 'new experience of God' (17), 
the historical condition of 'the absolute'. (18), 'the 
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experience of the individual who finds himself insecure 
and alone in a completely changed world and society' 
(19). The point is not whether God exists, and those 
who claim either that he does exist or that he does not 
are both alike in their naivity and in their 'undist-
urbed ideological confidence' (20) which fails to 
grasp the nettle of our time, which is that the 
experience of God is that of fthe absence of God' (21). 
Our condition is one of constant uncertainty which 
cannot be ignored but which makes it impossible for us 
either to answer or to forget the questions of meaning 
and purpose which confront us (22). 
It is under these new conditions that the 
longing for identity takes on its particular features, 
for in man's search for identity is discovered a concern 
for the absolute - in other words, a concern that 
corresponds in anthropological terms to the theological 
language of God. 
For what does it mean to assert that God is 
dead if, and so long as, there is still 
something which concerns us unconditionally? 
Is not atheism merely a different mode of 
speech from theism? Does not everything depend 
on anthropology, that is to say on the problem 
of the irreplaceable man who is seeking 
personal identity and can never be freed from 
this search? (23) 
Thus, Selle makes the connection that will be of crucial 
significance for her understanding and use of the term 
representation: for if the question of identity expresses 
the same concern as the question of God, and if identity 
is seen to be gained by the phenomenon that Solle 
terms representation, then it may be argued that the 
structure of representation itself will be the 
appropriate anthropological language to express the 
theistic language of a previous age. In this way the 
term representation acquires its pivotal function as 
a concept that interprets theological reality and at 
the same time translates this reality into a form 
suitable for a post-theistic understanding. 
Thus, the two presuppositions of the search 
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for personal identity and of the contemporary experience 
of the death of God form the context for the discussion 
which Salle pursues in the next six chapters with 
regard to the phenomenon of representation as a universal 
phenomenon rooted in social relationships. 
Solle begins that discussion with a 'linguistic 
enquiry' (24), in which she attempts to disentangle 
the confusion between substitution and representation 
to which 'current linguistic usage has become 
insensitive' (25). Salle sees four criteria or 
characteristics which determine the phenomenon of 
representation: it is a temporary expedient; it is 
limited in its scope to specific areas; it is conditional 
on the approval of the one represented; it is incomplete 
so that the representative only plays a role and thus 
safeguards the memory of the one represented (26). 
Substitution, on the other hand, is characterised by 
Salle as permanent rather than temporary; total in its 
scope rather than limited; unconditional rather than 
conditional; complete and final, so that the one who 
is represented is replaced, forgotten and treated 
impersonally as a thing (27). Thus, for S~lle, the 
blurring of the distinction between substitution and 
representation is a reflection of a depersonalised 
world where people can be treated as things, where 
'substitution is a final exchange of dead impersonal 
or depersonalised being, whereas representation is 
the provisional intervention of persons on behalf of 
persons' ( 28) . 
It is difficult to know the precise purpose 
of this 'linguistic enquiry' in the context of the work 
as a whole, for, standing as it does at the beginning 
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of the work it is clearly intended to ground the terms 
substitution and representation in common discourse so 
that any similar patterns disclosed in the unfamiliar 
discourse of the search for identity or in the technical 
language of Christology might be appropriately named 
and recognised. However, the definitions or portrayals 
of the terms are stated dogmatically with little 
illustration or explanation and while they reflect, 
at least in part, some of the meanings which are 
associated with the terms, a more thorough 'enquiry' 
would have revealed alternative uses and contexts 
which 'colour' the terms somewhat differently. 
If these alternatives had been noted and discussed it 
would not have been so easy for Salle to identify 
each of the terms with a particular theological or 
anthropological stance, nor would it have been possible 
to draw the contrast between them in quite so explicit 
a way. For example, in considering the use of the 
term representation Salle fails to make any mention of 
the political dimension of the term, which forms its 
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most common context and is one which embodies ambiguities 
and subtleties that are central to the phenomenon of 
representation as it is commonly perceived. Equally, 
in connection with the term substitution, Salle rightly 
identifies the characteristic of exchange, but quite 
arbitrarily decides that exchange and replacement always 
treat one as a dead or as an impersonal thing. It is 
true only in the pattern of an exchange which is 
constituted by a simple either/or, as in the case of 
a substitute for a football team, where the substitute 
is a replacement to the detriment or disadvantage of the 
one who is replaced. In a more complex pattern of 
exchange it is possible to express the situation where 
an exchange may displace someone from one position to 
enable him to take up a place which is of greater 
advantage to him. By focussing on the pattern_of 
exchange that involves only the notion of either being 
'in' or being 'written off' Salle fails to realise 
that this concept of substitution does not exhaust the 
possibilities open to the term. Whether or not it is 
possible to construct an understanding of Christ's work 
which involves this more complex pattern of exchange is 
irrelevant here; what is at issue is whether Salle's 
account of the use of the terms can be called an 
'enquiry', or whether the meaning of the terms has not 
already been fixed upon as a result of her particular 
interpretation of the significance of Christ's work (29). 
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However, whatever the limitations of the 
linguistic enquiry, the main substance of the examination 
of the phenomenon of representation follows in Chapters 
2-6, and it is this material that must now be considered. 
In these chapters Solle explores the different ways in 
which personal identity has been sought, preserved 
and threatened in Western culture, tracing the process 
that has given rise to the present challenge to identity, 
and suggesting some of the criteria that are necessary 
if personal identity is to be gained. 
In the Western medieval culture identity was 
assured because the theistic framework of belief allowed 
for the conviction that the individual was known to 
God, that his soul (identity) was safe in heaven, what-
ever the circumstances of his earthly life; in fact, 
despite the 'role' that he was called on to play in 
his mortal life. The irreplaceability of the individual 
is guaranteed because identity (the real self) is safe 
in heaven with God (30). However, with the breakdown 
of this theistic confidence the 'role' performed on 
earth becomes increasingly the only reality and this, 
far from securing identity, only serves to highlight the 
way in which the individual is not significant, since 
in his role he is always replaceable and can be treated 
as an 'it' (31). Selle sees in German Idealism, notably 
in Hegel, a conspicuous protest against this process: 
a protest which affirms the irreplaceability of the 
individual not only because of his differentiation from 
God, which is expressed in his relationship with God 
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and in God's 'interest' in him, but also because of his 
differentiation from society which he achieves through 
his work and which must be overcome to 'make himself 
what he is' (32). After Hegel, S~lle believes, these 
two aspects fell apart, and identity is conceived either 
in terms of the 'infinite value of the soul' (Harnack) 
(33) or in the heroic achievement of the exceptional 
individual (34). In the modern world, despite our 
conviction that man is irreplaceable, the reality is 
that most people are seen, and see themselves, as cogs 
in a machine, valued not for who they are but only for 
the particular function demanded of them (35). Identity 
is not possible, either because one simply accepts 
replaceability or because to attempt to make ourselves 
irreplaceable is to attempt the impossible (36). 
What hope then is there for identity? Salle 
answers that I become 'irreplaceable only for those 
who love me' (37), that is those who do not write me 
off when I fail but give me more time. It is those who 
love me (who expect more from me than what I appear 
to be at present) and those who hope in me (who allow 
me more time to fulfill my potential) who hold my place 
open for me, intervening on my behalf, not to replace 
me, but to enable me to reach that place for myself. 
But this is what Selle has outlined in her linguistic 
enquiry as 'representation', and so it becomes true to 
say that it is as I experience representation that I 
gain my identity or that identity becomes a possibility 
(38). Representation takes seriously the irreplaceability 
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of man in that it is temporary, limited, conditional 
and incomplete, but i~ also recognises that the 
individual cannot always stand heroically on his own 
but needs that sort of assistance which gives him time, 
holds his place open, waiting for him until he is once 
again capable and present. Thus, representation 
recognises that man is dependent upon others, but it 
also allows for identity to emerge because the dependence 
expressed by the representation is of the kind that 
establishes and safeguards the irreplaceability of the 
individual. 
If the person is no longer regarded as 
irreplaceable, representation becomes unnec-
essary, substitution will do. Only the 
irreplaceable man, who cannot abandon the 
search for personal identity, wants to be 
represented; but for him it is essential. He 
depends upon representation because he exists 
in time (39). 
Thus, the phenomenon of representation is characterised 
by temporality and personality which are also the 
conditions undqrwhich identity is said to be capable 
of realisation. 
2. The Structure of Christ's Representation 
The provisional enquiry carried out by Salle 
in Part I of her work described the two criteria of 
temporality and personality which together were said 
to ensure a pattern of representation rather than 
substitution, and therefore to be the conditions under 
which identity may be realised. In Part II of the work 
Salle reviews a number of different attempts to express 
the significance of Christ's work, using the two 
criteria as a test of their adequacy and concluding 
that these two conditions were: 
... too easily lost sight of, with the result 
that personality was depersonalised. The 
irreplaceable individual became a mere pawn 
in God's chess game, and temporality (the 
basis of the hope of the represented) was 
ignored in the interests of a supra-temporal 
and timeless salvation mechanism, which lost 
none of its patent artificiality by being 
labelled 'salvation history' (40). 
The material found in Part II will be of indirect 
interest only so far as it assists in showing more 
clearly what Salle's own intentions and meanings are 
as she engages in the constructive work of Part III. 
In this third section of the work Salle is 
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concerned to determine the relation between the structure 
of representation as an anthropological reality and 
the significance of Christ's person and work. As a 
preliminary statement Salle claims that: 
... from now on representation is not just 
a postulate of the reason, nor an everyday 
occurrence, but the really decisive event of 
all human history. Anthropology and 
christology are related as question and 
answer. In Tillich's terminology, they exist 
in correlation. To ask about the structures 
of living representation is necessarily to 
ask about Christ (41). 
In order to substantiate this claim and to elucidate 
the meaning of Christ's representation, Selle selects 
three 'basic principles' which 'seem relevant' -
identification, dependence and provisionality - to be 
examined to see 'what light they throw on christology', 
and to assist in interpreting more precisely the 
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representation which was provisionally defined as 
personal and temporal (42). Because Christ's represent-
ation is not only the representation of man before God, 
but also the representation of God before man, the order 
of Salle's own exposition will be followed here, 
considering first the bearing of these three principles 
on the representation of Christ before God. 
a) Christ - the Representative of Man before God 
Christ's representation of man before God is 
first of all provisional, not in the sense that a 
'precursor of someone greater' is provisional, but as 
an 'ultimate and final provisionality' (43). Salle 
sees Christian anti-semitism as a direct consequence 
of failing to recognise this provisionality, for 
the final Christ is a 'totalitarian' Christ (44), and 
those 'who have the final Christ need no future' (45), 
for the present and the past become decisive. The 
final Christ can only mean the crowding out of those 
'underdogs' and 'also rans' (46) who need a future, 
but if 'the still invisible kingdom of God remains open 
as something still future rather than as something 
which already exists and has to be defended by all 
available means [then] there cannot possibly be any 
ground for the brash and confident Messianism which 
makes pogroms and courts of inquisition possible' (47). 
It is only in the provisional Christ that 'the kingdom 
of God is at the same time present and still not 
present' (48). It is only in 'the pure and limited 
representation of the One who is now already where 
we have not yet arrived and who waits for us as the 
forerunner' (49) that there is given a future, and it 
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is only when the Church recognises this that Christians, 
too, can remain open to the future God and can take 
responsibility for the world as its spokesman and 
champion (50). 
Christ's representation of man before God is 
not only as forerunner, it is also as one who 'identifies 
with those who follow after, those who remain behind, 
those who no longer move forward' (51). This 
identification can no longer be conceived after the 
pattern of a 'mythical exchange' (52) of personality, 
no matter how we may long for such an identification: 
rather, identification is to be conceived after the 
pattern of a teacher, one who gives himself to his 
pupils, holding open the place for them which in their 
ignorance cannot yet be attained, but graduallY, effacing 
himself and making himself superfluous as the pupil 
grows to maturity (53). Christ is the teacher whose 
interest in us secures us time. But he is not the 
'"eternal" teacher whose work is never done' (54), he 
desires rather that 'we should graduate from his school 
to his Kingdom' (55), calling us to freedom and 
responsibility. 
With the identification of the teacher and 
the pupil Solle believes she has found a means of 
tackling the problem of punishment, for modern educational 
theory stresses that 'punishment is only meaningful if 
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the person who inflicts it himself SQffers Qllder the 
pQDishment he sets' (56). The representative act of 
the teacher in identifying with the pQpil in pQDishment 
'abolishes the difference between the agent and the 
acted Qpon' (57), so that as pQDishment is seen 'as 
the restoration of a broken personal relationship' (58) 
there is no longer room for 'those strange theological 
controversies aboQt law or grace, God's jQstice or 
Christ's mercy, which land QS in an artificial yet 
irredQcible tension' (59). Rather, 'representing QS 
provisionally, Christ pQDishes QS in SQCh a way that 
he SQffers himself' (60). What is this pQDishment? 
In a post-metaphysical world the only possible view of 
pQDishment is 'the complex of social relationships' 
(61) which OQr actions shape and which operates on QS 
in a 'deadly cycle' (62). When Christ identifies with 
QS it is with those who are the agonts of their own 
pQDishment. 
Christ makes the prison warders aware of the 
prison in which they themselves live, and he 
does so by showing that he himself is its 
prisoner .... Because Christ identifies 
himself with us in teaching and in punishing, 
he enables us to accept ourselves as guilty 
but also to be at peace (63). 
In Christ's representation of man before God 
he makes himself dependent on us, suffering for us by 
suffering because of us. 'Representation can only be 
thoQght of as a conditional and not as an automatically 
effective event' (64) so that in his representation 
Christ puts himself at risk. When representation 
involves identification, the representative cannot 
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refuse to be involved or wish to withdraw; rather, 
'the forerunner is shown up in all his provisionality 
when no one follows him' (65). The resurrection is 
not a reversal of this dependence, a final victory which 
makes the cross a transitional stage. The resurrection 
is 'simply an anticipatory sign of hope' (66), for 
otherwise the future would be assured, there would be 
nothing new to expect, 'simply the unfolding of the 
pre-determined' (67). The resurrection does not 
'abrogate this law of the world - the law that love 
itself is destroyed, when it identifies itself with 
those who are destroying themselves' (68), rather, 
'in the symbol of the resurrection, this shadow of the 
cross so imprinted itself in reality, that it can never 
again be forgotten as the key concept for the objective 
onlooker and as the possibility of life for those who 
accept this identification of another with themselves' 
(69). 
Christ's representation of man, therefore, is 
marked by provisionality, identification, and dependence. 
Salle now claims that to add the phrase 'before God' 
is rhetorical if these basic characteriestics have 
been understood correctly. 
All the anthropological characteristics we 
have described - that man needs a forerunner 
if he is to gain an extension of time; that 
man acquires identity through the identif-
ication of another; that when he acts repres-
entatively he makes himself dependent and 
suffers, because he puts himself at risk, 
all these statements speak of God, and do so 
in fact in the only possible theological sense 
by speaking of what God does in us (70). 
,. 
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God has made himself 'implicit in our history' (71), 
so the only way to speak of God is to speak of man; 
the only way to be or to act for God is to be in 'radical 
existence for others' (72). Thus, when representation 
takes place there also God is present and is spoken 
of, but the vocable God adds nothing new to what has 
been said. This language of representation is language 
about 'God' for it is unconditional, absolute language, 
and in a post-thei5tic age corresponds to what was 
previously said and experienced as a direct and 'in 
that sense religious relation to God' (73). 
b) 
Christ is provisional- if we add 'to God' 
we emphasise the provisionality but say nothing 
new. 
Christ makes himself dependent on us - if we 
say 'dependent on God', this simply means that 
Christ is radically surrendered to men. 
Christ identifies himself with us - if we add 
'before God' it amounts to the same thing, 
for whenever this identification takes place, 
God is there (74). 
Christ -God's Representative Among Men 
Salle argues that the representation of God 
by Christ has been ignored by dogmatics because in a 
theistic age the concept of a God who acts can be 'more 
or less taken for granted' (75). In a post-theistic 
age, where this sort of religious immediacy is no 
longer possible, and where any 'metaphysical "positing" 
of God [is] to remain a prisoner within the private 
sphere of individual religious aptitudes and experiences' 
(76), the 'truth that Christ represents the absent God 
first takes on its full significance' (77). For there 
are two options open: either 'we can assume that God's 
absence means he is dead, and so seek or create a 
substitute for him' (78), a function which modern 
technological society attempts; or, 'we can regard his 
absence as a possible mode of his being-for-us' (79). 
In this case 'man depends on their being someone to 
represent the irreplaceable God' (80). Thus, Christ 
provisionally holds the place of the absent God open, 
his representative activity is to hold together the 
two experiences of 'the death of God and of faith in 
Christ's resurrection' (81), and to mediate them into 
a new unity- 'a theology after the death of God' (82). 
Christ is not God's replacement, but his forerunner, 
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and that means that whenever anyone engages in the task 
of representation, whenever 'a man acts or suffers in 
God's stead' (83), there Christ's cause is served and 
God is represented. This is the form, the 'cipher 
"Christ"' (84) in which: 
Jesus continues alive to the end of the world 
- as the consciousness of those who represent 
God and claim him for each other. Where this 
representative claim on God is made, the 
implicit Christ is present. For it is not 
only Christ who represents God in the world. 
Christ's friends and brothers also represent 
God by allowing God - and this means necessarily 
those as well who need him- time (85). 
In representing God Christ identifies with him 
so that God is now identified with Christ. 
The God whom men believed in, and for centuries 
worshipped as the God who sits on his heavenly 
throne, comes to be regarded instead ... from 
the time of the man Jesus of Nazareth, as a 
disinherited and homeless being whom one might 
any day meet at any street corner (86). 
In identifying with God, Christ played God's role and 
in the process 'God has changed' (87). 
In Christ God himself left the immediacy of 
heaven ... v-rent out from himself into unrec-
ognisability .... The very God of power was 
played under conditions of helplessness, .. . 
homelessness, in the far country. Christ .. . 
claimed God for this new mode of existence -
powerless, homeless, in alienation (88). 
Christ's representation is now 'the only possible 
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experience of God' (89), and what is real for Christ is 
also real for his followers: 'we, too, can now play 
God for one another' (90). 
In representing God, 'Christ put himself in 
the place of God' (91), and yet he also made himself 
dependent upon God, acting in the name of God, putting 
himself 'unreservedly into the hands of the God who 
can accept or reject him' (92). So, too, whenever we 
do 'the same as Christ did, namely lay claim to God for 
each other, we too make ourselves dependent on God, by 
putting our existence at risk' (93). Put in non-theistic 
terms this means that if we cease clinging to our longing 
for happiness and pursue the 'way of love' (94) then in 
the pain and the renunciation of dependence in rep-
resentation identity is discovered. As we identify with 
Christ and so participate in suffering as the repres-
entatives of God we wait for God's identity, a person-
alised world, the Kingdom of God. 
God wills to be represented. He has made 
himself representable. He has made himself 
conditional, provisional. He has become 
dependent; he has mediated himself into the 
world. He became man (95). 
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Thus, Christ's representation of God before 
man, no less than his representation of man before God, 
is characterised by provisionality, identification, 
and dependence. Because such characteristics constitute 
the conditions under which identity appears the language 
of representation functions to provide a 'theology 
after the death of God' which answers the longing for 
identity and which safeguards the future of God. 
Before continuing with an assessment of this structure 
of Christ's representation, a brief examination of 
Selle's understanding of the concept of substitution is 
necessary. 
3. The Use and Meaning of Substitution 
As has already been mentioned Salle discovers 
in her linguistic enquiry that substitution is marked 
by the characteristics of permanance, totality, and 
completeness; features that are appropriate to a 
depersonalised or an impersonal world where identity 
is impossible because people are treated as replaceable 
things. In religious terms Solle sees this substitution 
most clearly in a magical view of the world, found 
even in the Old Testament, when dealing with ideas 
like the scapegoat. 
The important thing is not who removes the 
sin. What matters is that it disappears from 
the human sphe~e (96). 
The agent which removes the sin may be a goat or a 
stick or stone. Modern technology bears a remarkable 
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resemblance to this magical world view, for technology 
assumes universal interchangeability, although the 
basis in magic is a lack of recognition of the distinction 
between things and persons, whereas in technology the 
basis is in the exchangeability of methods of production. 
Magical representation (sic), a natural growth 
on the soil of a pre-personal era, approximates 
to the technological substitution of post-
personal thought (97). 
According to Salle the New Testament liberates 
the concept of substitution from any magical view of 
its efficacy by using a range of metaphors to elucidate 
the significance of Christ's work ~rr~t ryfwv (98). This 
was achieved by relating substitution to historicity, 
universalisation, voluntariness, and suffering. These 
features are said to remove Christ's substitution from 
a magical sphere and therefore to express the sense of 
personal representation, but succeeding interpretations 
are seen by Salle to lack the 'personalist' (99) 
dimension and so to tend towards substitution.·. Anselm 
is seen as an example of this tendency, for despite a 
'personalist view of sin' (100), the notion of a 
satisfaction offered to God by Christ 'creates salvation 
independently of those he represents' (101) so that it 
lacks that provisional and dependent quality. 
However, the strongest criticism is reserved 
for Barth's 'objectivist interpretation' (102) which 
fails to indicate 'any distinction between substitution 
and representation' (103). Barth, according to Salle, 
'turns Christ into a replacement' (104) so that the 
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relationship between Christ and those who are represented 
'is not conceived in personal terms' (105). This is 
because Christ's work is seen by Barth to be complete, 
which implies 'the complete incapacitation of man' 
(106), and because it is seen to be independent of any 
relation between the representative and those represented, 
so that the representative becomes a substitute and a 
replacement acting irrespective of the wishes of those 
who are supposed to be represented. Salle locates the 
basic reasons for this depersonalising interpretation 
of Barth's to lie in his failure to recognise the 
perspective of time and constantly speaking instead 
of man's place - a feature more appropriate to things 
(107). 
If substitutionary ideas remain dominant in 
Christian theology, that is, if exclusivist christologies 
and soteriologies persist as the proper formulation of 
Christian belief, Salle believes that the contribution 
made by theology to the loss of identity will be 
continued so that the possibility of the establishment 
of the 'Kingdom of identity' becomes remote. Salle 
is thus committed to eradicating any patterns of thought 
that display the characteristics of permanence, totality 
unconditionality, and completeness - in other words, 
any of the hallmarks she identifies as belonging to the 
concept of substitution. 
4. An Assessment of the Use by Salle of the Terms 
Substitution and Representation 
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Salle has attempted to give the 'unfamiliar and 
almost unintelligible' (108) term representation a 
new content, removing it from its traditional place in 
dogmatics under the heading of the Priestly work of 
Christ and giving it a central role for christology 
and indeed for theology. The commitment to the term 
representation has already been noted as a consequence 
of its function as a correlative term to express in 
anthropological terms what was formerly said in 
theological terms, and the difficulty that this causes 
in attempting to uncover the precise thrust of Salle's 
argument, particularly in relation to her understanding 
of the representative work of Christ before God. While 
it is not the concern here to enter into a detailed 
comment on S~lle's convictions that the experience of 
the death of God is formative for our age, and--that 
any religious or metaphysical 'positing' of God is 
simply naive or irrelevant, it must never the less be 
recognised that it is on the basis of this assumption 
that Salle is able to make the link between the 
anthropological structure of representation, the longing 
for identity, and the significance of Christ as the 
representative of man and God. What the present 
assessment must consider is the contribution that Salle 
makes towards an understanding of the terms substitution 
and representation, the manner in which she employs them, 
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the points of contact between this use and those uses 
already outlined in the course of this enquiry, together 
with the points of originality and divergence, and 
the problems involved in S~lle's use of the terms. The 
three characteristics shall therefore be considered 
that Salle believes are appropriate to distinguish 
representation from substitution - provisionality, 
dependence and identification - and then some reflection 
will be offered on some more general issues her study 
raises, particularly in the light of our own analysis 
of the terms and their uses. 
a) The Provisionality of Christ's Representation 
With regard to the provisionality of Christ, 
Salle highlights a dimension of the term representation 
which has been noted in other contexts, namely the 
reference of the term to the responsibility of those 
represented to reflect and continue the action~ of the 
representative. As was noted in Chapter V such an 
obligation could be interpreted and expressed in a 
number of different ways, but it was seen to be a 
persistent and central feature of the term. However, 
it should be noted that Salle radicalises this aspect 
of representation by her insistence on the necessity 
that the representative becomes superfluous, vanishing 
totally in favour of those represented, thus disallowing, 
in contrast to many who would wish to use this feature 
of the term, the possibility of some exclusive or 
unique element of Christ's work which always renders 
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his work of representation significant and primary, 
so that any subsequent repetition or imitation remains 
secondary and derivative. While it was recognised 
in Chapter V that there was considerable difficulty 
in recognising on the part of some writers precisely 
what element of Christ's work remained exclusive, and 
what the basis was for that exclusivity, Salle's own 
position of pressing for the superfluity of the 
representative, and thus, in principle at least, the 
denial of any unique status to Christ's work, is no 
less problematic. 
The dilemma can be expressed in the following 
way (109): if the task of the representative is to 
make himself superfluous, to hold the place open of 
someone who is temporarily incapacitated, then it must 
be the case that the sought for identity is a recovery 
of a lost identity, a restoration of an identity that 
was once possessed but for some reason now awaits 
discovery. The superfluity of the representative 
carries as its correlate a concept of identity that 
is 'objectively there', an identity that is 'there' 
but is waiting for its recovery (110). 
Certainly there are times when Solle speaks 
of identity in these terms, and in fact at one point 
seems to indicate that our future identity made possible 
by Christ's work of representation is constituted as 
the identity of a direct relation to God, in other 
words by a ~eturn to a former identity (111). However, 
Solle also speaks in another sense, where the identity 
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awaited is not something to be regained, bQt is some-
thing genQinely new, made possible by the particQlar 
character of Christ's representation, and therefore 
depending Qpon that work for its actQalisation. In 
this second sense of identity a different concept of 
representation is involved, for it is not possible to 
speak of the SQperflQity of the representative when 
the act of representation has been creative rather 
than restorative. As Moltmann pQts it: 
A representative can only make himself SQper-
flQOQS when the place is objectively there and 
cannot be occQpied for a while by the real 
occQpant for reasons of SQbjective weakness 
and incapacity. BQt if the place is not there 
or is not yet there ih its fQll and free form, 
but first must be made ready, the the repres-
entative does not make himself superfluous 
like an employment agency, but so to speak 
founds a new firm. In that case he has an 
effect not only on the subjective incapacity 
of the occupant of the place, but also on the 
making of the place. He not only represents 
but creates .... In that case his represent-
ation is not jQst mediation for a while but 
also the basis for the new being and the new 
identity which goes beyond the self-identity 
that men always desire ( 112). --
Thus, Salle's work is not free from an 
ambiguity in the concept of representation, which is 
reflected in the correlative concept of identity, so 
that the actual content of Christ's representative 
work remains in doubt. It is significant that precisely 
the same problems are encountered when considering the 
other aspect of Christ's provisional work of represent-
' 
ation - his representation of God before man. R. Jensen 
I 
puts it this way: 
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Jesus' representation of God must be non-
identity with God, so as to leave an open 
future, something to expect more than what is 
- for this is the very point of our quest for 
identity. God's identity in our history still 
remains future, and the very function of his 
representative is to hold this future open 
for him. 
But here Solle stops. She does not take us 
further on this promising path. We wait for 
her to give content to this talk of God's 
future, to tell us what to 'expect'. But 
this she refuses to~ Instead she bends 
everything back on itself, by identifying 
Christ's waiting for God to take over with 
his waiting for us to respond to his represent-
ation. There is-a sense in which this too is 
right. But it does not suffice to give content 
to the promise made by Christ's provisionality. 
Indeed, the only future beyond Christ's 
representation which Salle ever mentions is the 
return of immediate religious certainty (113). 
The characteristic of provisionality can certainly 
function to clarify the concept of representation and 
to express the conviction that the representative 
initiates and inspires a work which is to be continued 
or realised by those who are represented, but the radical 
content given to the notion of provisionality expressed 
in Salle's understanding of the eventual superfluity 
of the representative conceals a fundamental problem 
in the concept of identity employed and the work of 
representation that is said to make such identity 
possible. 
b) The Dependence of Christ's Representation 
The second characteristic that Solle uses to 
characterise Christ's representative work is that of 
his dependence on us and on God, a dependence which 
involves his putting himself at risk, depending on the 
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assent of another for the success of his work. In this 
respect Salle is surely correct to emphasisethis 
dependence as a basic characteristic of representation, 
and further, to regard suffering as the indispensable 
correlate of dependence. It is the fact that Christ 
suffers because of man that he is seen to be 'radically 
surrendered' (114) to man. As was noted in Chapters 
II and IV one of the dangers confronting a substitution-
ary view of Christ's work was that while suffering could 
be elevated to a central place in understanding the 
significance of Christ's death, paradoxically that 
suffering could come to be treated more and more 
artificially and abstractly so that an essential 
component of suffering - self giving - would appear to 
have been forgotten. By emphasising the characteristic 
of Christ's dependence on man and on God so that he 
has 'nothing of himself to fall back on' (115), not 
even 'God behind him' (116) as a guarantee of _success, 
Solle can give a distinctive recognition to the place 
of suffering within the representative work of Christ. 
However, it is disappointing that Salle does 
not give more attention to the sense in which Christ 
is dependent on God, instead of again simply turning 
everything in on itself and seeing Christ's dependence 
only in terms of his dependence on us, and therefore 
of God's dependence on us. 
[Christ] depends upon God by depending on us 
and living by our decisions. But that is to 
say that God depends on us, that he is at risk 
because he has linked his destiny with ours 
( 117). 
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If Christ's dependence upon God turns out to mean 
chiefly God making himself dependent (118), then it is 
a pity that Salle's understanding of Christ's dependence 
on us does not have a similar implication of our 
dependence upon Christ. In fact, for all S~lle's talk 
of a dialectic of dependence and responsibility, it is 
difficult to substantiate the claim that we remain 
dependent in any sense upon Christ, or that Christ 
remains dependent on God. The dialectic is all but 
swallowed up so that S~lle can mediate the two elements 
into the new sythesis of a 'theology after the death 
of God', and it only reappears in an attenuated form 
to give some justification for the continuing use of 
christological or theological language. 
c) The Identification of Christ's Representation 
The third characteristic that Salle selects 
as appropriate to the term representation is again one 
that is familiar from the description of the uses of 
the terms in previous chapters, the concept of 
identification. Salle rejects as 'mythical' (119) 
any patterns of exchange such as a transfer of qualities 
or deserts, but closely associates the language of 
identification with that of acceptance. 
Identification is the readiness to accept 
without limit, without conditions. It means 
acceptance as a matter of course (120). 
Fu.rthermore, Salle argu.es, it is only as we know 
ou.rselves to be accepted by another that we can learn 
to accept ou.rselves and hence to attain our identity. 
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Solle believes that, rightly handled, the 'pattern of 
the teacher' (121) can illuminate this identification 
in acceptance and can therefore give content to the 
concept of representation. A teacher is not one 'who 
conveys certain intellectQal goods' (122), nor one who 
simply imparts knowledge, for 'a teacher who does not 
also give himself - in, with, and QDder the facts which 
he conveys- is not a gen~ine teacher' (123). ThQs, 
a trQe teacher holds the pQpil's place open, effacing 
himself as the pQpil comes to occQpy that position of 
matQrity which the teacher has made possible and which 
he has safegQarded. 
Two initial comments mQst be made concerning 
this pattern of identification. First, the rejection 
of 'mythical' patterns of identification and exchange 
is based on the total rejection of any 'metaphysical' 
view of reality for contemporary western man. The 
QDiversality of this experience has already been 
qQestioned, bQt it remains pertinent to ask whether or 
not Christian theology shoQld remain a reflection of 
contemporary thoQght, or whether it shoQld be creative 
of alternative patterns of thoQght, especially since 
Salle realises that there is a possible 'experience' 
of SQCh 'mythical exchanges' (124). Since Salle 
believes that the Christian faith has something 
important to say aboQt the reality of representation 
as 'a decisive event of all hurnan history' (125), 
theology is clearly seen as a discipline which attempts 
to shape thinking and acting. Despite this, S~lle 
limits the scope of such creative activity by deciding 
that in particular areas of thought theological 
thought must operate within the parameters set by the 
contemporary consciousness of self. Whether this is 
an adequate foundation for the rejection of any 
Christian metaphysical language must be disputed. 
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Second, the purpose of Christ's identification 
with us, illustrated by the teacher/pupil relationship, 
remains unclear. The teacher encourages the pupil to 
take responsibility for himself and for his world, i£. 
to become adult, and this is apparently the purpose of 
Christ's identification with us. The representative 
must become superfluous, and cannot remain the eternal 
teacher and yet this surely dissolves the dialectic 
S5lle is anxious to establish between identity and 
non-identity, dependence and responsibility. When 
the pupil reaches maturity, when he reaches the place 
that has been held open by the teacher, he becomes 
independent. He did depend on the teacher to reach 
this position, but does so no longer. Solle, of 
course, would wish to argue that the position of 
maturity is precisely the point at which we accept 
our dependence on others and our responsibility for 
them, and in this sense the dialectic is continued, 
but the dialectic of Christ's representation has 
vanished into our representation as he makes himself 
superfluous, like the true teacher, and even in Solle's 
terms that must be ground for questioning the 
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representative character of his work. 
The real test for this pattern of identification 
occurs when S~lle uses it as a 'cleansing and clarifying 
... touchstone' (126), for the concept of punishment. 
Punishment, Solle believes, can be regarded as expiatory 
or rehabilitative, and she holds that both views are 
'relevant for theology' (127). Both, however, must 
be viewed from the perspective of Christ as teacher, 
rather than simply as judge, for 'according to 
Maharenko, the infliction of punishment is only mean-
ingful if the person who inflicts it himself suffers 
under the punishment he sets' (128). Thus, 'representing 
us provisionally, Christ punishes us in such a way that 
he suffers himself' (129). Punishment cannot then be 
regarded as an 'educative device which God needed in 
order to assert himself' (130), for that would be a 
'metaphysical error' (131); rather, Salle believes 
that punishment, and the agent of punishment, 'the 
punishing God, is nothing other than the whole complex 
of social relationships' (132). 
In this concrete worldly form, punishment is 
seen in the fact that those who destroy hope 
live themselves in an atmosphere of hopeless-
ness. What they imagined they were inflicting 
on others they were really inflicting on 
the~sslves, and it marks them out. The curse 
of the evil deed is that it recoils upon the 
world and the 'I' inexorably. The liar 
deceives himself, the man liho treats other 
men as prisoners is himself imprisoned. The 
loveless are bored; and there is no need for 
any vrorse form of punishn1ent, perhaps in some 
post-mortal hell, than this abandonment to a 
world thus produced and determined (133 ). 
Christ, in his role as true teacher, 'suffers everything 
which results from the destruction of hope' (134). 
Christ's entire life is determined by this 
unending identification with those who are 
the agents of their own punishment. Christ 
makes the prison warders aware of the prison 
in which they themselves live, and he does 
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so by showing that he himself is its prisoner . 
... Christ belongs to both parties at the 
same time; he punishes and is punished. He 
thereby excludes any idea of punishment as 
a predetermined fate. It ceases to take by 
surprise those on whom it falls, as if it 
were something meaningless, for the judge 
identifies himself with the condemned, the 
teacher shares the punishment alongside the 
pupil ( 135) . 
Because Christ shares the punishment through his 
identification with the 'botched cause' (136) of another 
the pupil can learn 'to identify himself with his own 
cause' (137). 
What are we to make of this view of punishment 
and of Christ's role in it? Two questions would seem 
to challenge S3lle's view that the pattern of ident-
ification of the teacher gives the only theological 
content to the notion of punishment. First, h?w in 
Salle's view does Christ himself impose punishment 
on us? Since punishment is the complex of social 
relationships it does not seem possible to speak 
meaningfully of Christ punishing us. If S~lle means 
that Christ is somehow the creator of the pattern of 
social relationships in which 'the evil deed recoils 
upon the world and the 'I' inexorably', then she is 
guilty of a 'metaphysical' judgement on the significance 
of Christ's person. If, on the other hand, we are 
meant to take seriously the statements that it is our-
selves who are the agents of our own punishment, and 
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that the agent of pQnishment 'is nothing other than 
the whole complex of social relationships', then to 
state that this is Christ pQllishing QS is simply an 
arbitrary application of the cipher 'Christ' and one 
that woQld seem to be intended to persQade the reader 
that the SQbject Qllder discQssion relates to punishment. 
For to remove the personal and relational elements 
from the soQrce of this complex of social relationships 
is to cease to be able to see them as punishments and 
to see them instead solely as a part of a causal nexus. 
Second, how does Christ, in Salle's terms, 
make the prison warders aware of the prison in which 
they themselves live? Salle's answer is that 'he does 
so by showing that he himself is its prisoner', bQt how 
is that so, and how does that disclosQre reveal the 
prison of the warders? Salle seems to be clinging to 
some notion of the unjQst or undeserved SQffering of 
Christ, but on what basis does she postQlate this? 
Her only contribution is to state that 'as teacher -
or precursor- Christ has reached a different stage' 
(138), but that surely is a piece of vagQe rhetoric 
which cannot bear the weight of argument that is put on 
it to declare Christ's 'separateness' (139) from us 
in order that he may acknowledge and impose punishment. 
FQrthermore, the connection between Christ's acknowledge-
ment of punishment and the revelation that the prison 
warders are themselves prisoners remains unclear and 
Qllexplained. Salle may have dispensed with mythical 
patterns of exchange and identification, but she has 
raised in their place a pattern of identification 
which fails to answer the central problem of how such 
identification may be salvific. 
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Thus, we have now considered in greater detail 
the three characteristics that Salle believes distinguish 
the concept of representation from that of substitution 
- provisonality, dependence and identification. In 
each case it has been found that such characteristics 
clarify and refine motifs that have been seen 
previously in the study, and that such characteristics 
are not inappropriate to the concept of representation. 
However, it has also been noted that fundamental 
problems are caused by Salle's desire to refer the 
language of representation to the possibility of a post-
theistic theology and to give it a non-metaphysical 
content. While the characteristics she identifies 
correspond to a significant degree to patterns of 
representation that have been previously discussed 
(thus confirming the adequacy and accuracy of the 
analysis offered there), the specific content given to 
them proves to be unsatisfactory and susceptible to a 
similar range of problems that have already been 
encountered in the use of the term representation. 
In conclusion, the value and scope of Salle's 
work must be questioned in the light of our own 
description and anlysis of the terms substitution and 
representation, for it would appear that her under-
standing of the terms, while embodying many of the 
elements of previous discussions, despite their 
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presentation in a novel context, lacks an awareness 
of the breadth of meaning of the terms so that her 
analysis remains insensitive to other possibilities 
inherent in them. It was earlier noted that the political 
dimension of the term representation was scarcely touched 
upon by S~lle and yet she can hardly fail to be aware 
of the possibilities and ambiguities inherent in such 
a frame of reference. Again, to dismiss the complex 
treatment of the term representation as denoting 'a 
making present', together with the wide range of models 
used to articulate this conviction, as 'mythical' is 
to dismiss without comment some of the most significant 
and complex uses of the term. 
In a similar fashion, Salle rejects with a 
minimal amount of argument the term substitution as 
being always depersonalising, and yet the history of 
the discussion of the concept has been well aware of 
this criticism and has sought in a number of ways to 
remove or at least alleviate the force of such objections. 
To fail to note either the intentions of such attempts, 
or to fail to consider their results is to ignore the 
complexity of the concept of substitution. 
This lack of sensitivity to patterns of 
substitution and representation that differ from her 
own is demonstrated most signally in Salle's discussion 
of Barth's understanding of Stellvertr@tung. The 
failure to note the persistent and sophisticated debate 
in which Barth engages as he expresses both the 
exclusiveness and yet the total inclusiveness of Christ's 
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work, its character as a once for all event within 
God and yet its determinative character as a foundation 
for the new life of man, its character as destruction 
and yet not as punishment, its links with the already 
complex and subtle understanding of election, is an 
indication of the inadequacy not only of Salle's 
treatment of Barth but more importantly of her own 
analysis which fails to come to terms with the full 
complexity and scope of the terms substitution and 
representation. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUBSTITUTION AND REPRESENTATION: 
THEIR MEANING AND USE IN ATONEMENT THEOLOGY 
To conclude this study of the terms 
substitution and representation it is necessary to 
draw together the conclusions and observations of the 
former chapters. From this material some general 
points will be made regarding the terms as they have 
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been found to function in atonement theology, followed 
by some specific comments relevant to each term, which 
will be followed in turn by some comments on the 
relation between the terms. Finally, the implications 
of this study for 'a doctrine of the atonement' will 
be considered. 
l. General Observations on the Terms 
Substitution and Representation 
First, and most obviously, both the terms 
have been shown to be highly complex theological 
words, expressing a range and variety of meanings. 
The term substitution was shown to denote a range of 
ideas that far exceeded the limits normally imposed 
by the phrase 'penal substitution'; and even within 
the general parameters set by the latter description 
there was found to be not simply differences of 
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emphasis but fundamental differences of meaning which 
radically shaped both the concept of substitution employed 
and the general interpretation that has been offered 
of the significance of the work of Christ. Further, 
in contrast to the common assumption that the framework 
of penal substitutuion formed the only valid context 
for the use of the term, it was argued that certain 
non-penal formulations of the concept were of decisive 
importance for the meaning of substitution and for its 
continued use as a theological term. Thus, with regard 
to the concept of substitution, there can be no doubt 
that a complex term of theological vocabulary is being 
considered, and to ignore or minimise this complexity 
is either to engage in shadow boxing, or to shelter 
behind w1explored and undisclosed ambiguities. 
In a similar sense the term representation 
was also shown to be capable of expressing a wide range 
of meanings. Because this term has not been subject 
to the same intensity of theological scrutiny as 
substitution, and because it is less closely allied 
to particular theological schools or traditions, it 
was shown that the task of discrimination between these 
different meanings was correspondingly difficult and that 
the transition from one set of ideas to another could 
be accomplished with relative ease. This fluidity of 
meaning in the term representation was seen, in part, 
to account for its popularity as an alternative to the 
term substitution, particularly because it was claimed 
to be able to function both in the context of an 
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interpretation of Christ's work and also in the context 
of the application and relation of this work to others. 
Without at present commenting on this claim the term 
representation has been clearly shown to be a complex 
theological term that expresses a range of insights 
concerning the work of Christ and the relation of that 
work to others. 
Second, the above conclusion has important 
implications for the method of using the terms 
substitution and representation in the course of a 
theological enquiry. If their complexity is recognised, 
then it is simply not possible to approach a particular 
text or a particular theme with the question 'are 
substitutionary ideas present here or representative 
ones?' Such a question reveals that the enquiry is 
still being conducted as though the meaning of the terms 
could be assumed or could be taken as self-evident. 
Their meaning clearly cannot be assumed to be self-
evident and therefore some careful delineation must take 
place prior to such a question being asked so that the 
reader is clearly informed as to what the distinction 
is in any particular instance. In a similar vein, 
the sort of study made by L. Morris must be judged to 
be seriously flawed by the fact that Biblical concepts 
like propitiation, sacrifice, redemption, and ransom 
are seen to witness to substitution or to embody 
substitutionary ideas, and yet it is clear that the 
term 'substitution' is being used so indiscriminately 
that any such observations are virtually meaningless 
(1). A critical reading of Morris' work suggests that 
the term substitution is used as a theological port-
manteau which blurrs the distinctions between the 
different contexts under discussion and creates the 
illusion that substitution is a 'key word' necessary 
for a correct understanding of the different Biblical 
language related to God's salvific activity. 
Third, the study has demonstrated that the 
terms are 'contextualised': they only receive meaning 
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in particular contexts, and that variations in meaning 
and distinctions between meanings depend on the contexts 
in which they operate (2). Thus, it can be seen that 
the sort of distinction offered between substitution 
and representation such that the former means 'in our 
stead' and the latter 'in our behalf' is wholly 
inadequate. These two phrases can only assist in 
differentiating between the terms if the cont~xtual 
frameworks which support such a distinction are made 
explicit. As long as these frameworks remain unstated, 
little or no content is given to the terms and no 
clarification if offered as to their meaning. The 
distinction between substitution as an exclusive work 
and representation as inclusive has more substance, 
but only because it appropriately describes a particular 
set of meanings of both terms. However, to raise this 
as a general criterion for determining the use or 
rejection of either term not only fails to recognise 
that other meanings are possible, but also fails to 
recognise that both terms may express exclusivity and 
inclusivity in particular contexts. 
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Fourth, foll0wing from the demonstrable 
complexity of the terms, and their inherently contextual 
nature, it has been shown that it is not possible to 
engage in a criticism of the terms themselves as though 
they expressed self-evident theological realities, nor 
is it possible to consider the range of meanings of the 
terms as equally vulnerable to a particular critical 
point. Rather, by letting the terms speak for them-
selves, advertising the contextual frameworks in which 
they were found to acquire distinctive meaning and 
content, it has been shown that the terms must be 
critically engaged within their context, and the 
recognition must be allowed that different contexts 
are not equally vulnerable to the same criticisms. 
Fifth, the recognition of the contextual 
nature of both terms promotes a sens±tivity to the change 
and development that takes place within the meanings 
of the terms and between the terms themselves. For 
example, having identified a particular pattern of 
penal substitution, the recognition of a change in the 
meaning of penalty enables and facilitates the 
recognition o~ a different pattern of substitution; 
and where a different use of the term substitution is 
observed a means is provided to detect the changes in 
the contextual framework that surrounds the term. 
Thus, not only does a study of the terms substitution 
and representation provide a sensitive means to detect 
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changes in patterns of thought, but the process of 
development within those patterns of thought comes to 
be more readily perceived as ideas are tested and 
weighed in relation to the varying contexts and options 
that are available. 
2. The Meaning and Use of the Term Substitution 
Taking first the use of the term substitution 
as it was understood within the general description 
of the heading 'penal substitution', three distinctive 
patterns of thought were identified. First, the use 
of the term substitution which operated within the 
context of a framework of criminal law to articulate 
the conviction that in his death Christ suffered or 
bore an identical punishment that would have fallen on 
guilty man had that exchange not taken place. Second, 
the use of the term substitution which contin~ed to 
operate within the general field of criminal law, but 
which was modified by the statement that Christ did 
not suffer an identical punishment, but an equivalent 
punishment which was accepted by God as satisfying 
his justice. Third, the use of the term substitution 
in a context that is distanced from the framework of 
criminal law, modifying still further the sense in which 
it may be said that Christ bore our punishment, and 
expressing the conviction that not punishment, but 
legal desert, is the guiding concept, so that it may 
be said that Christ died our death, substituted for us 
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to give expression to God's law and satisfying the 
demands for a just and moral universe in which God may 
still remit punishment. 
These three views are, and can be, all described 
under the general heading of penal substitution, and 
yet it is clear that the differences between them are 
highly significant. Three comments will suffice to 
summarise the conclusions reached in Chapters II and IV. 
i) The change that comes about in the description 
and function of the concept of criminal law testifies 
to the fact that the term 'penalty' is not a 'given' 
in the data for a doctrine of atonement, but is rather 
a construct built out of more general perceptions reg-
arding the relation of God to man. Even when the 
bald statement 'God must punish' is given as a self-
evident theological truth, the question is by no means 
settled as to what that punishment means, for the 
concept of penalty is dependent upon particular frame-
works, although the same words are used. Furthermore, 
the concept of substitution owes in part its resilience 
to the fact that this framework of law may subtly change, 
allowing the theologian to move across a spectrum of 
thought to counter different objections and propositions. 
He may do this under the auspices of the general terms 
penalty and justice, thus seeming to establish firmly 
this framework as the necessary context for an under-
standing of substitution, when in reality he is employing 
several different frameworks which are not easily 
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reconcilable. The apparent QDiformity of the concept 
of penal substitution is an illusion, and a dangerous 
one because it encourages the belief tbat any other 
view surrenders the justice or holiness of God. In 
reality, the QDderstanding of the justice of God within 
the description of penal substitution has already 
QDdergone significant change and variation, a fact 
which tells against any claim to be a necessary or self-
evident pattern of substitution. 
ii) This variation within the concepts of penalty 
and law, which is most clearly seen in the debate 
surroQDding the identity, equivalence or appropriateness 
of Christ's pQDishment also demonstrates quite clearly 
that the concept of penal substitution cannot be raised 
as the only theory which rationally and logically 
'explains' the atonement. Whether or not this was its 
original intention is hard to tell, but on no account 
was it found to be capable of realising the claim that 
a rational and consistent explanation was provided. 
The assertion of an identical punishment could only 
be an assertion which is incapable of demonstration 
or rationalisation; the more sophisticated concept of 
an equivalent punishment which might be held to supply 
a rational basis for an explanation of how the atonement 
worked was shown to depend on an appeal to an act of 
God's grace which accepted that there was an equivalence; 
the corresponding notion of appropriateness confirms 
the suspicion that the framework of criminal law is in 
abeyance, and some other basis for seeing Christ's 
death as penal is being asserted. No single pattern 
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of penal substitution proved to be capable of bearing 
the explanatory role of why and how Christ's punishment 
secures the salvation of man, contrary to much popular 
expectation, indeed the extraordinary thing is that 
it might have been thought to do so. What is not 
surprising is that such patterns of thought should be 
thought to be fitting, and it is in the consequent 
interplay between what is regarded as fitting for 
God's justice, for man's redemption, for God's love, 
and for man's moral convictions that the various 
patterns of penal substitution are built up and are 
adapted. 
iii) Partly on the grounds of this internal 
variation in the concepts of penalty and law, and 
partly on the grounds of the Biblical testimony to the 
relation between punishment and atonement, it was 
argued that the relation between forgiveness and penalty 
was not direct or necessary, but rather indirect, so 
that vicarious punishment in whatever sense of the 
term might be able to articulate a perception of 
forgiveness, but it did not of itself constitute the 
basis of atonement, its rationale, or its only expression. 
These three comments all refer to the various 
patterns of penal substitution that were disclosed in 
the course of the investigation into the uses of the 
term substitution. However, into this already confused 
and confusing mix of ideas must be put four more 
ingredients. 
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First, while it was noted that some expressions 
of 'penal' substitution employed a concept of penalty 
that was progressively distanced from the context of 
criminal law and from concepts of retributive justice, 
there are also expressions still employing the term 
substitution that continue this process to the point 
where not only is the designation 'penal' misleading 
but the concept of substitution itself is transformed. 
Thus, the use of substitution in the framework of law 
that is interpreted in civil terms, a use which 
explicitly rejects the notion that Christ was punished 
by God, favouring instead the formulation that Christ's 
sufferings are an appropriate substitution for our 
punishment, was seen to remove the term substitution 
both from the context of penalty and indeed from those 
patterns of exchange which it was formerly intended 
to express. Neither the use of the term substitution 
in this context nor the framework of civil law was 
difficult to refute; what was more problematic was the 
way in which this range of ideas was mixed, often almost 
indistinguishably, with other more recognisable patterns 
of 'penal' substitution to provide support and an 
additional framework to give intelligibility to the term 
substitution. Although the different contexts afforded 
by 'penal' and 'civil' law appear to complement each 
other in many examples cited, it was argued that the 
manifestly different frameworks, presuppositions and 
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intentions rendered such mixing of ideas misleading 
and invalid. In these instances no genuine inter-
pretation is offered, rather several interpretations, 
united by common terms although used in different ways, 
between which the theologian oscillates fitfully 
according to the question he is answering or the 
objection he is meeting. The synthesis presented is 
an illusion, although one that is difficult to expose 
because of the flexibility and ambiguity of the concepts 
in question. 
Second, leaving penal context behind, an 
investigation into the possibility of the use of the 
term substitution with the concept of satisfaction 
demonstrated that a coherent and intelligible pattern 
of ideas could result. In fact, it was argued, that 
when pecuniary analogies were used the substitutionary 
bearing of the argument became more intelligible and 
proved an effective method of expressing and interpret-
ing the significance of Christ's work. Its drawback 
was found in the fact that as due seriousness was 
given to the personal dimension of the debt to be paid 
so the possibility of this debt being paid by another 
recedes. However, this investigation exposes the 
underlying ambiguity of many uses of the term substit-
ution in that different analogical relations are employed 
at different points to demonstrate the reality of 
substitution, failing to note that these different 
relations cannot be unified but must remain in oppos-
ition or in contrast to each other. This is true of 
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the varying patterns of law that are employed in the 
internal dialogue within the concept of penal 
substitution, but it is also true of the dialogue 
between penal and non-penal formulations of substitution. 
It is frequently the case that pecuniary analogies 
will be advanced in order to validate the concept of 
substitution, and penal analogies in order to express 
the judgement due to sin, and then for both to be 
'combined' to explain or interpret the significance 
of the death of Christ. Again, an oscillation between 
conflicting contextual frameworks is concealed by the 
availability of common terms and the ambiguity of the 
language employed. The very language of 'paying the 
penalty' demonstrates just how deeply rooted is the 
conviction that pecuniary and penal language are 
mutually interpretative, and yet closer examination 
reveals clearly the error in this judgement. 
Third, partly in order to demonstrate the 
versatility of the term substitution and partly to 
disclose the sense that is often taken to be funda-
mental to its meaning, the use of the term was examined 
in the context not of any kind of 'passion', but in 
an active sense where Christ is said to defeat the 
powers of evil in place of man. While this is not a 
common context for the use of the term, the sense given 
of 'doing what man could not do' is common. In fact, 
as the 'passive' dimension of the term comes under 
increasing attack, particularly as the penal framework 
of the term is abandoned as it becomes increasingly 
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hard to speak of Christ suffering in place of man, so 
it becomes increasingly attractive to refer substitution 
to Christ's act as waged in man's place, and therefore 
of benefit to him. Thus, the concept of substitution 
may be commended on the grounds that it speaks of 
performing an act which someone else cannot do - an 
acceptable sense of the term - but not if the act in 
question is the suffering of a penalty or a judgement. 
Fourth, the final pattern of thought that the 
term substitution sought to express and evoke concerned 
the relation between Christ and man rather than the 
content of Christ's work. Most explicit of these uses 
was the concept of 'inclusive substitution', a concept 
that seemed designed to repudiate the charge of 
externality, exclusiveness or moral indifference, but 
which failed to commend itself since it lacked the 
conceptual frameworks to elucidate or interpret such 
inclusivity, and it merely seemed to assert a new 
sense of substitution in flat contradiction to patterns 
of thought that were still being retained and utilised. 
It could not be accepted that merely by adding the word 
inclusive to the term substitution was anything 
substantial being said, unless the concept of subst-
itution were recognised to be shaped and altered by 
this new context. Since no such recognition was 
apparent it might be concluded that the concept of 
inclusive substitution is merely an apologetic device 
used to deflect criticism of a particular concept, 
suggesting another more congenial pattern of thought 
and claiming the benefits of both patterns of thought 
despite their essential contradictory nature. 
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Thus, with these four broad patterns of thought 
engendered by the term substitution the picture has 
emerged of a term that stands in relation to a cluster 
of divergent and varied theological concepts. Since 
these theological concepts are themselves variations 
which stern from reflection on unresolved or ambiguous 
theological themes - law (whether expressed in criminal, 
civil or private terms), bondage (whether expressed 
in penal, demonic or moral terms) - there is no simple 
recourse to 'scripture' to prove or disprove a 
particular cluster selection, nor to establish defin-
itively the 'correct' framework or set of criteria to 
guide such a selection. All that can be done, and that 
has been effected here, is to test the appropriateness 
of any particular selection of concepts, to test the 
resulting patterns of thought against one another in 
order to discern the fundamental reality that they 
are attempting to interpret, and to test the part 
played by the term substitution in these different 
frameworks for its coherence and its ability to direct 
the enquirer to the heart of the matter. 
3. The Meaning and Use of the Term Representation 
In the presentation of the concept of 
representation it was nmed that linguistic convention 
allows for three general areas of use of the word -
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delegation, presentation and typification. Similarly 
it was found that the theological use of the term 
included and built on these general patterns of thought 
so that a theological term was generated with a range 
of meanings that spanned a number of different contexts 
and issues, but which also related and unified them 
by virtue of their being expressed by a single term. 
This range of meanings was divided into three broad 
patterns of thought which can be briefly reviewed here 
together with the critical comments that were offered. 
First, representation carries with it the 
sense of an active work of Christ in contrast to the 
passive suffering that was taken to be characteristic 
of the term substitution. Thus, representation could 
interpret and express the obedience of Christ, his 
fulfilment of the Law, his offering of a holy and 
pure 'sacrifice', or simply the perfection of his own 
humanity to God. In each case, however loosely, it 
may be claimed that Christ accomplishes something, 
perhaps something of which man was incapable and yet 
which was necessary both for his own self-realisation 
and for the purposes of God. Thus, what might appear 
to be an exclusive work is revealed to be of immediate 
benefit to men in that what was formerly impossible 
is now a potential reality, what was only glimpsed is 
now realised perfectly. Thus, the content of the 
representative work of Christ is comprised of a pattern 
of offering, fulfilment and obedience in contrast to 
the substitutionary patterns of suffering, punishment and 
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judgement. Underlying this contrast is the perception 
that a vicarious action has a different moral status 
from a vicarious passion; and the term representation 
comes in part to express this conviction that atonement 
consists not of a vicarious suffering but an offering; 
not a death but the free gift of a life; not a judgement 
but a true holiness and obedience. 
However, this description of the content of 
the work of Christ is clearly shaped by the remaining 
two areas of meaning open to the term representation, 
in that the nature of the work is of the kind that is 
coherent with the concept of the 'making present' of 
man in Christ to God, and of the 'typification' of the 
destiny or ideal of each individual. Therefore, this 
first sense of representation cannot be viewed in 
isolation from these two other ranges of meaning, for 
it is constantly drawing on them and providing them 
with material in order to present a coherent and wide 
ranging interpretation of the significance of Christ's 
death. 
When the second sense of the term represent-
ation is considered, that of 'making present', this 
interaction with the range of meanings of the rep-
resentative work of Christ must be borne in mind, but 
so too must the possibility that this use of represent-
ation will be referred to quite different patterns of 
thought as to the content and nature of Christ's work. 
What emerged from the stQdy of this use of representation 
was a range of models that could be employed to 
articulate the manner in which such a 'making present' 
was to be conceived. The sense in which one could be 
said to be made present in another ranged from the 
conviction that all humanity was literally included 
in the one man Christ, to the conviction that one can 
be said to be present in another if, through imitation 
of actions, or participation in aims and objectives, 
a relation of sponsorship or discipleship is entered 
upon. Elucidating and substantiating this range of 
convictions is a set of models which can be reviewed 
under three headings. 
First, the model which makes use of the 
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language of universals, whether explicitly or implicitly, 
to express the conviction of the literal inclusiveness 
of the person of Christ. While it was recognised that 
this model expresses a deeply rooted perception of the 
universal and archetypal quality of certain acts or 
experiences, it was also clear that such language could 
be easily misconstrued. For example, if it was argued 
that since Christ was universal Man, all humanity was 
punished by God in his punishment, and therefore 'I' 
have been punished by God. The language of universals 
may be misconstrued, and yet it was recognised to be 
a powerful articulation of the conviction of the 
universality of Christ's salvific work; of the conviction 
and interpretation of his universal significance, but 
such language cannot be considered to provide an 
explanation of how a particular theory of atonement 
can be said to work. 
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The second set of models relate representation 
and inclusiveness by means of physical or organic 
concepts: incorporation and all related 'Body' language, 
organism, and certain patterns of solidarity. Much of 
this language was used in direct appeal to the Biblical 
language of 'in Christ', 'with Christ', and 'the Body 
of Christ', with little further development or 
substantiation. However, the model of corporate 
personality proved popular in giving this language 
some additional foundation and to commend it to modern 
readers. It was argued that not only was the concept 
of corporate personality not clearly an adequate 
description of the Biblical patterns of thought, least 
of all of New Testament patterns of thought, but that 
the concept cannot be used to undergird and rationalise 
the act of the One on behalf of the many, or to explain 
how the many are present in the One. The concept of 
corporate personality does not justify or fund the 
concept of representation, but, like the physical or 
organic models of the relation of Christ to others it 
can function to articulate the conviction that mankind 
or believers are 'bound up' with the person and work 
of Christ. Once again, the use of such models and 
their association with the concept of representation 
is a powerful pointer to the universality of Christ's 
salvific work. 
The third set of models protrayed the relation 
of Christ to others by means of patterns of dependence 
and interaction that were basically causal in nature. 
The model of social solidarity was prominent in this 
respect, although it was noted that the model was 
often believed to be capable of portraying more than 
a pattern of cause and effect, dependence and resp-
onsibility, and to support the more 'physical' models 
of solidarity. 
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The examination of the range of models employed 
to express the relation of Christ to others demonstrated 
two things. First, the only way in which such language 
could be understood and assessed was in terms of its 
interpretative account of the universality of Christ. 
In order to articulate the fundamental soteriological 
significance of Christ's act as one for others it is 
necessary to give some account that communicates and 
expresses this Qlliversality. The models are not 
explanations of how this act can be said to be for 
others, but they are present to communicate and 
indicate the perception that this is the significance 
of the act. 
Second, the models and thE range of convictions 
concerning the universal significance of Christ's act 
were not only appropriately expressed by the term 
representation, but are endemic within the complexity 
and ambiguity of that term. Representation was shown 
to denote or invoke a complex and varied set of 
perceptions that allow for the articulation of fund-
amental insights concerning the. relations of one person 
to another, without necessarily making those perceptions 
conscious or explicit. Any use of the term representation 
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be it theological, political or constitutional, relies 
on these unspoken perceptions and constantly embodies 
the unresolved tensions that are involved. The 
questions: what is representation? how are the interests 
of one represented by another? how does one person 
stand for another? have no answer, only a variety of 
answers, none of which are wholly adequate, but all 
of which play a part in authorising and establishing 
the use of such language. 
The term representation is so far shown to 
consist of a fluid range of ideas revolving around the 
sense of 'making present', constantly shifting from 
one perspective to another, evoking and invoking a 
range of insights and models to attempt to articulate 
the manner of the relation that subsists between Christ 
and others. 
The third general area in which the term 
representation comes to have meaning and which reflected 
another aspect of its general linguistic use was found 
in the sense of typification or exemplification. 
When applied to the person of Christ, it was noted 
that such ideas were treated with suspicion and regarded 
as inferior to the supposedly 'ontological' christol-
ogical formulations. The foregoing analysis queried 
the strict ontological status of these formulations, 
showing them to be more complex and ambiguous; this 
latter use of representation cannot therefore be 
rejected or slighted for this reason. On the contrary, 
two points become evident. 
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First, the use of the language of archetype, 
prototype, ideal, and pioneer showed a depth and soph-
istication that removes it far from the level of 'mere 
example'. This language sets out to preserve fully 
the uniqua work of Christ in his initiation, demonstra-
tion and realisation of a destiny now capable of 
realisation, imitation and pursuit by mankind. There 
is both a creative act and a future consummation; 
there is still an unresolved tension between an 
'objective' work and the 'not yet' of man's only 
partially realised destiny. Whatever the shortcomings 
and idiosyncracies of particular expressions of these 
convictions, they are expressions of the same con-
victions that prompted the development of ontological 
patterns of thought. 
Second, this use of the term representation 
could not be dissociated from the former two general 
areas of use; rather, it became apparent that many of 
the senses of the term representation described by 
these ideas of typification and exemplification 
constituted the background and framework for those 
uses of the term that appeared to be more 'physical' 
or 'ontological'. Not only did it become clear in 
particular instances that the distinction between 
Christ as the representative man and Christ as the 
representative of man had almost disappeared, so that 
Christ was the representative of man because he was 
representative man, or that he was representative man 
because he was representative of man, but more 
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significantly this pattern of thought could be detected 
in almost any use of the term representation. Any 
talk of political representation will involve the 
same issues: whether a delegate represents a party, 
or is representative of his constituents; whether a 
delegate represents his constituents and how he can do 
so unless he is representative (typical) of their views. 
It is readily apparent that the theological use of 
the term representation involves and is confronted by 
the same set of issues. Thus, in addition to the 
range of models already described that elucidate Christ's 
representative relation to others stands this new set 
of ideas, not simply as an alternative mode of expression 
and interpretation, but as a pattern of thought that 
penetr~tes, shapes and even undergirds most other uses 
of the term. Far from being slighted, due recognition 
should be given to the part played by these ideas in 
any formulation of the concept of representat~on. 
4. The Relation of the Terms 
Substitution and Representation 
Some comments must now be addressed to the 
question of the relation between the terms substitution 
and representation although no clear cut or easy 
answers are possible. Such generalisations as 'the 
terms are complementary' or 'both terms are needed', 
while not untrue, are not particularly helpful. For 
if one of the conclusions of this study is that the 
meaning of each term is constantly shifting within 
(often loosely) given parameters then the qQestion of 
the relation of the terms, or of their complementary 
statQs, becomes virtQally impossible to answer with 
any precision. FQrther, if the terms are agreed to 
fQllction in the manner described, then their 'meaning' 
becomes mQch more elQsive, bQilt Qp from the patterns 
of thoQght and the variety of models which establish 
SQCh patterns. Therefore, neither is it possible, on 
the basis of this stQdy, simply to draw QP respective 
lists of meanings, the varioQs combinations of which 
can then be checked for their complementary qQality. 
What this stQdy has SQggested is that, as has 
often been recognised, bQt not always treated in an 
assessment of the terms, both SQbstitQtion and 
representation fQllction within two general contexts: 
to interpret the content of the work of Christ, and 
to interpret the manner of the relation of this work 
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to others. Clearly, between these two contexts there 
will always be some relation since this is inherent 
within the fQlldamental concerns of Christ's salvific 
work. To this extent, then, it is not SQrprising to 
see most of the staQllch proponents of the term 
SQbstitQtion QSing also the term representation withoQt 
explanation or apology in the coQrse of their work. 
Between these two general contexts there will be, and 
there needs to be, some complementary relation and QSe. 
However, it has become eqQally apparent from 
this stQdy that not every relation between the terms is 
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complementary, nor that every expression is appropriately 
complemented. Some expressions are mutually exclusive, 
and their use together is little more than a juggling 
with words, or the concealment of unexplained and 
unadvertised changes in meaning. Thus, it was noted, 
different uses of the term substitution which were 
not complementary could give the appearance of being 
complementary through being labelled 'substitution'; 
equally~ it was noted that part of the success of the 
term representation was due to its ability to bring 
new contexts into relation with one another, and yet 
it is also clear that there are uses of the term 
representation which are not self evidently complementary 
but which describe quite different perceptions as to 
the meaning and significance of Christ. Most obviously, 
it is not at all clear that certain meanings of 
substitution are complementary with certain meanings 
of representation, particularly if either term is used 
to give coherence or rational justification to the 
other. 
There are no simple solutions to the problem 
of the relation between the terms: all that can be 
said is that each detectable shade of meaning that is 
being suggested in relation to another be tested on 
its own merits and in its own setting to determine 
the appropriateness of such a combination of meanings. 
The purpose of this study has been to advertise and 
promote sensitivity to this range of meanings and to 
describe their content and purpose so that their presence 
and implications may be more reliably discerned in any 
particular setting. 
5. Theological Language and Doctrines of the 
Atonement 
Some final comments and observations must 
now be made concerning the significance of this study 
for the wider issues of the meaning and purpose of 
doctrines of the atonement. This is particularly so 
as both terms occupy prominent positions in such 
doctrines and are often treated as 'keywords' which 
express and evoke them. It is in this area that the 
first implication of the study is to be found, for it 
ought to be clear that it is highly misleading to 
suggest that there is such a thing as 'substitutionary 
doctrine' or a 'representative doctrine' of the 
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atonement. It is inevitable that theological shorthand 
will be developed, but the terms substitution and 
representation are themselves distorted, and their 
complexity overlooked, if they are taken to portray 
doctrinal stances in this fashion. Any label, of 
course, prohibits exploration and recognition of 
diversity and varllty, but in the case of the terms 
substitution and representation there is no justific-
ation for elevating them to 'keyword' status and positive 
harm is caused if they are. 
However, a more significant implication of the 
present study is to query not only the 'keyword' status 
of such terms as substitution and representation, but 
also the contribution they are supposed to make to a 
'doctrine' of the atonement. Throughout the study 
the distinction has been drawn between explanatory 
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and interpretative functions, although it has been 
recognised that the distinction cannot be drawn sharply, 
or that the two aspects are always divided. None the 
less, a common perception of the terms is that they 
do have an explanatory role that is designed to answer 
questions 'how' and 'why'. Furthermore, particularly 
with the term substitution, they are held in this 
explanatory role to render consistent and coherent 
diverse areas of Christian theology, creating a 
theological system that binds together a range of 
different theological insights. It is precisely this 
system-forming capability of the term substitution 
which makes it a keyword for its supporters, so that a 
challenge to the term necessarily is said to involve 
an attack on the entire theological framework. In 
the study, this explanatory function of the terms was 
consistently challenged and was shown to rest on a 
fundamental misapprehension of each term as it actually 
functioned 2ndas to what it was capable of realising. 
If, then, the terms are not explanatory but inter-
pretative within frameworks that seek to articulate 
and apprehend the character and significance of Christ's 
'story', then the 'doctrines' which they express and 
evoke are incorrectly seen as answering the questions 
'how' and 'why', but are themselves the attempt to 
apprehend within a particular conceptual form an 
appropriate expression of Christ's salvific work. 
A doctrine of the atonement, then, can be 
understood as an interpretative construct for viewing 
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and communicating the nature and significance of Christ 
in his relation to man and to God. A possible parallel 
to express this use of the term 'doctrine' is provided 
by the concept of ethics as a 'convention' which 
embodies and shapes moral decisions (3). An ethical 
proposition stems from a complex set of interactions 
between perceptions of the world, man and God, but is 
given a form that is conceptualised and institutionalised 
in order that the moral insight might be articulated 
and preserved. In the same way this study has shown 
how the terms substitution and representation both 
arise from basic perceptions as to the relations between 
God and man, perceptions that are themselves shaped 
and conditioned by the reading of Christ's st~ry, and 
it has shown how the terms seek to embody, express 
and interpret those insights in a clear conceptual 
framework. The resulting patterns of thought are 
ascribed doctrinal significance in order that Christ's 
story may be correctly perceived as having an ultimate 
significance, and that the content of this story might 
be related to our own needs, aspirations and destiny, 
thus securing for it soteriological significance. In 
the patterns of thought which make up such doctrines 
the terms substitution and representation are an 
important part of the process of conceptualising and 
institutionalising such relations, enabling the 
ordering, expression and interpretation of theological 
concepts such that they may help to embody and 
communicate the significance of Christ. As such they 
remain an integral part of the language of Christian 
atonement theology, in all their complexity and 
variety. 
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We mQst ask what is meant by the vicarioQsness 
of Christ's SQfferings. We mean that he 
SQffered instead of QS. When we call his 
SQfferings representative we mean that he 
SQffered on OQr behalf. The difference 
soQllds Qllimportant; bQt between the two 
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death (Davies, p. 80f.). However, Davies' 
arguments concerning Matt 17:27 are unconvincing, 
which together with Eph 5:31 and II Thess 2:10 
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Endnotes to Chapter IV 
1. This is not an attempt to describe a 'Biblical 
doctrine' of substitution or representation, but 
simply to identify and illustrate some themes 
that have been seen to shape understanding of 
the terms and which can be reckoned to function 
in a fundamental way to generate the distinctive 
patterns of thought that the terms are intended 
to express and clarify. 
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of God in the Teaching of Jesus (1963). 
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Son' pp. 80-83. 
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18. Ep. ad Diognetus ix: 
)\ "' ' , ., ,, "' Moberly translates u -ryt ~,..h,~~·Q..\ ~.rr~"'~~o?~, 
'0 the sweetness of the interchange' Atonement 
and Personality (1901), p. 330. More normally it 
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The Identity of Jesus Christ (1975), "the pattern 
of exchange" pp. 74-84; George S. Hendry, The 
Gospel of the Incarnation (1959), pp. 109-114; 
Ronald S. Wallace, The Atoning Death of Christ 
(1981), pp. 67-69, 78, and the following, p. 116: 
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current in the earliest days of the Church . 
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'Here in Christ', writes Heinrich Vogel, 'is 
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his blessed state. Just as he takes for his 
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guilt and death, so that all that is his, his 
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See also Gerrit C. Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace 
in the Theology of Karl Barth (1956), p. 106: 
"The content of Golgotha is therefore identical 
with the great exchange negotiated at Golgotha, as 
an exchange which cannot be undone through all 
eternity for it is God's eternal decision. Because 
of this exchange there is nothing to condemn any 
more in those who are in Christ." 
20. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics TV, 1, pp. 223-228, 
gives this theme classic expression. See the 
following comment on p. 226: 
There is in fact a complete reversal, an 
exchange of roles. The Judge allows 
Himself to be judged. 
For references to the 'exchange' with Barabbas 
see p. 226, 230. 
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"Interchange and Atonement" Bulletin of John 
Rylands Library 60 (1978), pp. 462-81; 
"Interchan~e and Suffering" in Suffering and 
Martyrdom (1981), edited by William Horbury and 
Brian McNeil pp. 70-83; "Interchan~e in Christ" 
Journal of Theological Studies 22 (1971), pp. 349-
361. For a fuller discussion of these themes 
see Chapter V, sections l and 2. 
22. See Hooker, "Interchange and Suffering" pp. 76-77, 
82-83. 
23. See James I. Packer, "What did the Cross Achieve? 
The Logic of Penal Substitution", The Tyndale 
Bulletin 25 (1974), pp. 3-45. 
24. Chapter II, section l. 
25. See for example John Owen, Of the Satisfaction of 
Christ p. 119, 122. 
26. However, it should be recognised that a certain 
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use of the phrase 'he bore our punishment', since 
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fashion to mean that he bore the punishment that 
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was due to us. 
27. See for example the quotation in John K. Mozley, 
The Doctrine of the Atonement (1915), p.210: 
If physical death be the penalty of sin, then 
Christ's death does not in fact save us from 
this penalty. But did Christ then suffer 
eternal death, commonly called damnation, in 
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not. So it is not clear, to say the least, 
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penalty due to mankind. 
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this process. 
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29. Again, there is no consistent use of the term 
equivalence. Its similarity to the term 'equality' 
approaches the meaning of 'identity' referred to 
above; on the other hand, it may be used more 
explicitly as a term of measurement where identity 
is excluded but 'appropriateness' maintained. In 
the context of criminal judicial procedure see 
the discussion on the term equivalence in Walter 
Moberly, The Ethics of Punishment (1968), pp. 194-
196. 
30. See the discussions of A. A. Hodge, C. Hodge and 
A. H. Strong as cited in Chapter II. 
31. A similar point is made in George Stevens, The 
Christian Doctrine of Salvation (1905), p. 161, 
where the concept of acceptilio is seen to be a 
necessary part of any formulation of penal 
substitution - the very point that the language 
of substitution was supposed to deny. 
32. Packer, op. cit., p. 31: 
The word penal is there, not to prompt 
theoretical puzzlement about the transfering 
of guilt, but to articulate the insight of 
believers who ... are constrained to say 
'Jesus was bearing the judgement I deserved 
(and deserve), the penalty for my sins, the 
punishment due to me' ... 
See also the comment of Paul Althaus "The Cross 
of Christ" in Mysterium Christi, edited by 
G. K. Bell and D. A. Deismann (1930), p. 204: 
The effect of the emphasis on equivalence has 
been to rationalise the mystery of forgiveness, 
which means that it does not sufficiently stress 
the incalculable wonder of forgiveness which 
simply faces us. Reconciliation and forgiveness 
belong together, but not equivalence 
and forgiveness. 
33. Stevens, op. cit., p. 160 gives the argument 
forcefully. 
34. Chapter II, sections l, 2 and 3. 
35. Although some of the language of penal substitution 
approaches such a position, it is more often 
portrayed in caricature by its opponents. 
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36. See Travis, op. cit.; Von Rad, op. cit., p. 264-272; 
H. H. Rowley, The Faith of Israel (1956), pp. 87-
98, and the following comment on p. 90: 
Nowhere is sin thought of as atoned for by 
punishment, so that by the mere fact of 
punishment fellowship is restored. 
37. For some of the complex moral, legal and 
philosophical problems surrounding the notion of 
retribution see The Coming Penal Crisis edited 
by Anthony E. Bottoms and Ronald H. Preston; 
H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 
(1968); Ernest W. Johnson, Suffering, Punishment 
and Atonement (1919); Elizabeth R. Moberly, 
Suffering, Innocent and Guilty (1978); Walter 
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"Punishment" Mind (1939), pp. 152-167; Paul 
Tillech, Love:-PQwer and Justice (1954); W. Lillie, 
"Towards a Biblical Doctrine of Punishment" 
Scottish Journal of Theology Vol 21 (1968), 
pp. 449-461. 
38. C. Hodge, op. cit., p. 531. 
39. Cf above section l(a) of this chapter and the lit-
erature cited. 
40. The futility of such generalisation from 
scriptural verses is seen when this reference is 
simply contrasted with Jer 31:30a: 
But each is to die for his own sin. 
41. See for example Smith, op. cit., pp. 51-52; 
Augustus H. Strong, Systematic Theologt (1886), 
pp. 416-419; Robert Hall, Works Vol I 1831), 
pp. 494-517; Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology 
(1958), p. 376 which summarizes such arguments 
as follows: 
(1) that the guilty party himself is not in 
a position to bear the penalty through to the 
end, so that a righteous relation results; 
(2) that the transfer does not encroach upon 
the rights and privileges of innocent third 
parties, nor cause them to suffer hardships 
and privations; (3) that the person enduring 
the penalty is not himself already indebted to 
justice, and does not owe all his services to 
the government; and (4) that the guilty party 
retains the consciousness of his guilt and of 
the fact that the substitute is suffering for 
him. In view of all this it will be 
understood that the transfer of penal debt 
is well-nigh, if not entirely, impossible 
among men. But in the case of Christ, which 
is altogether unique, because in it a 
situation obtained which has no parallel, all 
the conditions named were met. There was 
no injustice of any kind. 
42. Stevens, op. cit., p. 203. 
43. See Horace Bushnell, The Vicarious Sacrifice 
(1866), pp. 305-339. 
44. Bushnell, p. 309: 
If he is put in our place to suffer the 
penalty of our sins, then we can easily see 
abhorrence to our sins expressed in his 
suffering. But mere severities and pain laid 
upon him, even though God violated His own 
deep sympathies and loving approbations to do 
it, can only show the fact of something very 
abhorrent somewhere, and is much more likely 
to raise abhorrence in us, than to signify 
God's abhorrence to us. 
45. Horace Bushnell, Forgiveness and Law (1874), 
p. l45f: 
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The public justice is not made by Christ's 
endurance of any man's penalty, but is a public 
character of justice made up for God, by what 
expression of justice may be yielded in Christ's 
death, conceived to be equal to the expression 
of justice that would be afforded by all the 
penalties exacted of all the world. In this 
view Christ is the virtual substitute or 
compensation for all the pains of all 
transgression. Sometimes a different way of 
statement is adopted, to escape the obvious 
objection that, as Christ is supposed to suffer 
what is really nobody's penalty in particular, 
his suffering can not make any expression of 
God's justice at all; his death, therefore, it 
is said, expresses the abhorrence of God to sin, 
as the penalties exacted of all wrongdoers 
would, and so they make up the desired 
character of justice. 
46. For example, the comment of Strong, op. cit., 
p. 740 on the 'Grotian' view of atonement: 'Christ 
does not suffer the precise penalty of the law, 
but God graciously accepts his suffering as a 
substitute for the penalty'. 
47. See the examples quoted in Chapter II from 
Wardlaw, Macdonnal et al. 
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punishment, the sense in which punishment or 
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related in this fashion can be forcefully argued 
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perceptions and hidden presuppositions often 
introduce deterrence as a supposed justification 
for penal theory and practice. 
49. Clearly, there are certain attractions in this 
view, but it can be no more than an interim or 
diversionary argument, for the point at issue 
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is still the relation of God to this natural 
order. If there is said ~be no relation (an 
unlikely conception) then it is hard to see how 
such an instance of innocent suffering is atoning; 
if God is held to be responsible for the creation 
of this natural order then the question still 
arises as to the justice of God in accepting 
innocent suffering as atoning. 
50. See the discussion in John Mcintyre, Anselm and 
His Critics (1954). · 
51. Hastings Rashdall, The Idea of Atonement (1919), 
p. 49. 
52. Horace Bushnell, The Vicarious Sacrifice (1866), 
p. 7. 
53. Bushnell, p. 13. 
54. As Strong, op. cit., p. 735 comments on the 
'Bushnellian' or 'moral influence' patterns of 
atonement: 
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the atonement for its chief aim, and yet 
unfairly appropriates the name 'vicarious', 
which belongs only to the latt~r. Suffering 
with the sinner is by no means suffering in 
~stead. --
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If ... we wish to regard these two aspects 
of the High-priestly office of Christ in their 
indivisibility, ... then we may ... call 
Christ our satisfying representative: in the 
senses, first, that in virtue of his ideal 
dignity he so represents, in his redemptive 
activity, the perfecting of human nature, 
that in virtue of our having become one with 
him God sees and regards the totality of 
believers only in him; and second, that his 
sympathy with sin, which was strong enough to 
stimulate a redemptive activity sufficient 
for the assumption of all men into his vital 
fellowship, ... perpetually serves to make 
complete and perfect our imperfect consciousness 
of sin. 
56. See for example Wallace, op. cit., pp. 115-118; 
Mather, op. cit., p. 270; E. C. Essex, "The 
Atonement in Post-Reformation Writers" in The 
Atonement in History and in Life (1929), edited 
by L. W. Grensted p. 242. 
57. See for example the comment of Stevens, op. cit., 
p. 223: 
God forgives sin in advance upon receipt of 
a guarantee that sin will be put away. This 
guarantee is, as it were, furnished to God 
by mankind in the person of their represent-
ative, the second Adam. God may safely forgive 
the sins of the world in advance, since in 
Christ he has the assurance of the emancipation 
from sin of all who will enter into f~llowship 
with him. 
58. Schleiermacher, op. cit., p. 456, 46lf. 
59. See for example Dennty, op. cit., p. l97f, where 
Denn~t recognises that the term representation may 
be used to denote this response to Christ which 
claims him as moral exemplar. 
60. See for example the work of Vincent Taylor, where 
despite ambiguities in the presentation of 
precisely what is done in Christ's work there 
is no doubt that his representation is a creative 
work which is unique in that it initiates the 
response of men, but universal in that it 
consumates that response; Jesus and His Sacrifice 
(1955) p. 283, 306ff; The Atonement in New 
Testament Teaching (1940), p. l84f, l94ff; 
Forgiveness and Reconciliation (1941), p. 206. 
61. See the whole argument in G. B. Mather, "The 
Atonement: Representative or Substitutionary?" 
Canadian Journal of Theology 4 (1958), p. 266-
272. 
62. Mather, p. 270: 
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The two concepts representation and substitution, 
far from being exclusive, are in fact comple-
mentary; each presents a necessary aspect of the 
whole truth. The issue of representation and 
substitution hinges upon the problem: to what 
degree does the believer undergo the experience 
of Christ and reproduce this work? In so far 
as the experience and work of the believer are 
the same or similar, the sacrifice of Christ 
will be spoken of in terms of representation; in 
so far as they are different, it will be spoken 
of in terms of substitution. Representation 
emphasises similarity; substitution emphasises 
dissimilarity. 
While not wishing to limit the issue of repres-
entation and substitution to the single problem 
given above, in this context of the moral 
relevance of both terms Mather's conclusion is 
largely correct. 
63. Cf. Hugh R. Mackintosh, The Christian Experience 
of Forgiveness (1927), p. 208. 
64. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus, God and Man (1968), 
p. 279 is one of the few specifically to reject 
such a view. 
65. For example, Leon Morris, The Cross in the New 
Testament (1965), p. 410. 
66. For example Strong, op. cit., p. 752: 
This substitution is unknown to mere law, and 
above and beyond the powers of law .... the 
righteousness of law is maintained, in that the 
source of all law, the judge and punisher 
Himself voluntarily submits to bear the penalty 
and bears it in the human nature that has 
sinned. 
67. Quoted in Horace Bushnell, The Vicarious Sacrifice 
(1866), p. 316f, the author is not named but is 
probably W. G. T. Shedd. 
68. See the comments of Bushnell, p. 317f. 
69. Gerrit C. Berkouwer, The Work of Christ (1965), 
p. 267: 
The new doctrine places the wrath element at 
the top of the line which runs downward and 
thus the wrath conflict is projected into 
God himself, which he solves divinely by 
undergoing and overcoming the judgement and 
by surrendering himself in mercy. 
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See also the discussion in T. J. Crawford, The 
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